A staggering rise in Iranian food prices during Ramadan had already intensified concerns about access to adequate nutrition in the weeks before the war with the US and Israel began. According to estimates by the World Food Programme, “high food inflation in Iran had already reduced households’ capacity to absorb new shocks … rising fuel and transport costs and supply chain disruptions could increase the pressure further.”

Wars typically drive up energy and fertilizer costs, disrupt supply chains, reduce production and imports, and ultimately shrink people’s food baskets. During the 40 days of open conflict, prior to the tenuous ceasefire, experts identified three major pressures on Iranian households:

  • Shortages and rising prices of fertilizers, including urea
  • Scarcity and rising costs of animal feed
  • A sharp drop in purchasing power due to sudden unemployment and inflation

According to Samira, a marketing analyst living in eastern Tehran:

When the bombing began, the local supermarket’s delivery rider had nothing to deliver—but the shop itself was full of goods. If you stepped inside, there was no visible shortage of food. It was the prices that made it impossible to fill a basket. And all this while we didn’t even know if we’d receive a salary at the end of the month. Work was half-shut down, and there was no clear horizon for returning after the Nowruz holidays.

She continued:

With the outbreak of war and the complete shutdown of the internet, our company—entirely built around online operations—effectively stopped functioning. Our first concern was when we would return to work and whether salaries would go back to pre-war levels. Would we fall behind on rent and loan payments? Or even lose the ability to cover daily expenses?

A recent letter from Iran’s minister of agriculture to Qu Dongyu, director-general of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), warns that attacks on infrastructure could disrupt production, supply, and distribution networks that sustain not only Iran’s 90 million people but also parts of West Asia reliant on Iranian trade.

An Iran-based economic researcher, speaking anonymously, said:

My assessment is that Iran’s food security will likely worsen in the coming months—not necessarily as widespread famine, but as reduced access to sufficient and quality food. The short-term issue is less about absolute scarcity and more about rising prices, declining purchasing power, distribution disruptions, and higher costs for inputs and transportation.

Stockpiling, export bans prop up food supply in short term

Geopolitical shocks raise energy prices, transportation and insurance costs, and—through infrastructure damage—disrupt production and imports. During the 40-day conflict, all these risks materialized. The World Bank also reports that global urea prices rose by up to 46 percent, limiting farmers’ ability to use fertilizer efficiently and reducing agricultural output.

For several reasons, however, the direct impact of the war on food availability in Iran has so far been limited:

  • Maritime transport disruptions, including constraints in the Strait of Hormuz, have had only a limited effect on Iran, as the country’s merchant vessels continue to operate
  • About 85 percent of Iran’s food security relies on domestic production; only 15 percent depends on imports, mainly from Russia, Turkey, and the UAE
  • Iran appears to have stockpiled essential imports over the past six months

An analyst from Kpler told BBC Persian that, despite supply chain disruptions, Iran has sufficient reserves for several months, with shipments still arriving in the Persian Gulf.

Still, vulnerabilities remain. While Iran is relatively self-sufficient in basic calories, it depends heavily on imports for animal feed, oils, and key inputs. Any disruption there could expose structural weaknesses.

Government measures—such as banning exports of certain agricultural goods, supporting domestic production, and expediting customs clearance—may cushion the immediate impact. But the deeper threat lies elsewhere.

The primary threat to food security is not supply, but affordability. As Tehran’s Donya-ye Eqtesad newspaper notes, postwar inflationary pressures may well intensify with the surge in fertilizer and transport prices and the billions the state will need to expend on reconstruction. An economic analyst warns:

If the government cannot secure sanctions relief and increase foreign currency revenues, it will resort to printing money—fueling inflation, eroding purchasing power, and further endangering food security.

Reports indicate rising unemployment driven by wartime shutdowns and the internet blackout. If inflation is the engine of the crisis, unemployment is its accelerant.

“Hidden hunger” crisis looms

To mitigate the war’s impact, the government may expand subsidies and food voucher programs. But these measures are unlikely to outpace inflation.

The immediate danger is hidden hunger—malnutrition caused not by lack of calories, but by declining diet quality. Households cut back on protein, dairy, fruits, and dietary diversity, turning instead to cheaper calories like bread and potatoes.

This pattern is well documented in past economic shocks and typically affects:

  • Urban lower-income groups
  • Day laborers
  • Low-income retirees
  • Female-headed households
  • Children
  • Residents of peripheral areas

In the coming months, the real threat to Iran’s food security is not the availability of food, but the quality of diets eroded by inflation.

If the ceasefire holds, Iran may avoid widespread shortages. But declining purchasing power will still amplify the risks of hidden hunger.

If the war escalates, the situation could deteriorate further: budget deficits, unpaid salaries, and supply disruptions could push households into skipping meals, buying on credit, selling assets, and sharply reducing protein intake.

In both scenarios, the most pressing question is not whether there will be food in the market—but how many people will be able to afford it.

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