From orchestrating terror plots to leveraging economic loopholes, Tehran’s reach in Germany underscores the growing complexity of countering the Iranian regime’s covert operations
Germany has long been a focal point of the Iranian regime’s covert operations. While the country offers a refuge for activists and journalists fleeing Iran’s oppressive tactics, it also serves as fertile ground for the regime’s economic enterprises—many of which are linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This troubling dichotomy highlights the reality that, as threats against critics of the regime escalate—including potential terrorist acts—Germany’s legal and economic landscape is still fertile ground for the Iranian regime’s illegal operations.
In the past year, Tehran Bureau collaborated with German media outlets to cover the activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) on German soil and the Berlin government’s shifting perspective on Iran:
- The article from ZDF titled “Wie Irans Revolutionswächter in Deutschland Terror planen” (“How Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Plan Terror in Germany”) discusses the involvement of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, specifically the Quds Force, in orchestrating attacks on Jewish institutions in Germany. It highlights the case of Ramin Yektaparast, a former leader of the Hells Angels in Mönchengladbach, who fled to Tehran after allegedly committing a murder in 2014. German security agencies believe that from Iran, Yektaparast coordinated a firebomb attack on the new synagogue in Bochum and a shooting at the rabbi’s house in Essen in November 2022, under the direction of the Quds Force. The article notes that Iran increasingly employs intermediaries from criminal milieus for such operations, posing new challenges for security authorities. These findings could potentially lead to the European Union designating the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization.
- The article titled “Ein Brandsatz zu viel” (“One Firebomb Too Many”) from taz discusses Germany’s evolving stance toward Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the potential designation of the group as a terrorist organization by the European Union. The catalyst for this shift was a failed arson attack on a synagogue in Bochum, Germany, on November 17, 2022. The suspect, identified as Babak J., was arrested shortly after the incident. Investigations revealed that he had connections to the IRGC, suggesting that the attack was orchestrated under their influence.
- This incident prompted German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock to advocate for the inclusion of the IRGC on the EU’s terrorist list. Such a move would require unanimous approval from all EU foreign ministers. While discussions are ongoing, there appears to be growing support for this designation within Brussels. If implemented, it would mark a significant shift in the EU’s policy toward Iran, signaling a firmer stance against the IRGC’s activities in Europe.
- The article “Revolutionary Guards: Why Iran’s Elite Force Should Be Considered a Terrorist Group” from Der Spiegel discusses the European Union’s consideration of designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. This move is in response to the IRGC’s alleged involvement in orchestrating attacks on European soil.
Iran’s repressive tactics over time
The foiled attack in Bochum was just one of many operations connected to Iran’s intelligence services in Germany. Silencing critics by any means necessary has been their constant objective since 1979.
The 1990s: Extrajudicial killings
One of the Islamic republic’s most notorious operations on German soil was the 1992 Mykonos restaurant assassinations, in which four Kurdish opposition leaders were shot and killed by operatives linked to Iranian intelligence. The ploy illuminated the scale of Iran’s extraterritorial operations against dissidents, including the singer and critic Fereydoun Farrokhzad, who was murdered in Bonn just one month prior to the Mykonos attack.
Following the Mykonos trial in 1997, which implicated senior Iranian officials, Tehran temporarily scaled back its European activities. This changed after the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War, as Iran escalated its regional influence and repression of critical voices. Iranian journalists and dissidents in Europe have since faced increasing threats and aggression.
2012-2016: The era of lobbyists
A renewed campaign of threats and harassment targeting critics abroad was initiated by the so-called reformist government of President Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s then-Foreign Minister. This escalated especially after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in 2015. As Iran sought to rehabilitate its international image and reintegrate into the global economy, it also sought to silence anyone jeopardizing these efforts. Dissident journalists living in exile, especially those critical of the regime’s domestic policies and foreign interventions, became prime targets. Tehran’s fear was that these critics could undermine the narrative it was presenting to the world, particularly regarding its nuclear program and regional ambitions.
To improve its public image and steer the negotiation of the nuclear deal (JCPOA) in its favor, the Islamic republic also employed a large group of well-placed experts to influence the opinions of policymakers and the public in key jurisdictions, such as Germany and the United States.
This trend did not go unnoticed by some German media outlets, who criticized their colleagues for their lack of scrutinous coverage of the political protests. A 2022 Ueber median article highlighted the role of lobbyists, specifically those who frequently appear in German media as Iran experts. It criticizes the lack of transparency about their affiliations, noting that their ties to the Iranian regime are often downplayed or ignored. This, the article argues, allows such figures to influence public discourse in Germany in ways that align with the regime’s interests, effectively serving as a form of propaganda under the guise of expertise.
The 2017 Protests: New types of intimidation
Since 2017, mass protests in Iran have marked a shift in the nature of dissent in the country, with demonstrators openly defying the government and the regime despite brutal crackdowns. Facing mounting domestic unrest and economic hardship, the Iranian regime once again ramped up its extraterritorial operations. Journalists, human rights activists, and dissidents living in Europe were viewed as a growing threat. Tehran’s intelligence services began using more sophisticated tactics and shifting their focus on journalists.
A Germany-based Iranian journalist who spoke to Tehran Bureau on condition of anonymity due to ongoing threats against his family in Iran said this shift was confirmed by one of his colleagues in Tehran with access to Iran’s intelligence services.
“He told me… there was a meeting with the intelligence service … and they wanted to be more active against Iranians, journalists, especially those working abroad,” the journalist explained.
Threats against journalists aren’t particularly new. “We always had emails, threats, and letters from the start,” the journalist said, adding that most of the threats were contained to harassment on online platforms. At that time, the threats felt generic, with vague messages like “We’ll show you,” aimed more at silencing than inflicting direct harm, he explained.
But the nature of these threats had changed significantly, the source said, shifting from threatening e-mails and online trolling to personal attacks.
“Around three years ago, things got much more direct,” he continued. There was a shift from indirect social media intimidation to more aggressive and coordinated attacks. On one occasion, the source’s Instagram account saw a sudden influx of 120 new followers within just a few hours, all with Iranian names. “We had over 120 new followers in three hours—all private accounts with no posts. It felt like a “signal,” he said.
Additionally, the regime intensified its pressure by interviewing those close friends of the journalist who traveled back and forth from Germany to Iran. These individuals, once trusted, were likely reporting back to Iranian authorities.“There are people I know who travel to Iran, and sadly, they can no longer be trusted,” he explained.
Iranian authorities operate a sophisticated surveillance system that extends well beyond their borders, effectively maintaining control over the diaspora. This system begins at points of entry, such as Imam Khomeini International Airport (IKIA) in Tehran, where individuals returning from abroad—particularly those tied to regime-critical circles—are flagged and subjected to intense investigation. According to Iranians who travel back and forth and the Swiss Refugee Aid (SFH) report, the regime employs spies, facial recognition technology and detailed social media monitoring to identify and track journalists, dissidents, and people connected directly or indirectly to dissidents.
The journalist shared how the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence service interrogated a female friend of his in Iran, asking her about her relationship with him. “They asked her what kind of relationship she had with me, and she responded, ‘He’s a good friend of mine, and we’ve known each other for years. I visit him from time to time.’ Then they asked, ‘Do you know what he does?’ to which she said, ‘Yes, he works as a journalist.”
This questioning raised concerns for the journalist. “At first I didn’t think much of it, but then I started receiving anonymous phone calls, where I was told that our “black portrayal” of Iran was only damaging the Iranian people and that if we didn’t stop, there would be consequences.”
The anonymous callers made sure to remind him that his work was being watched and that the stakes were high.
Other sources have recounted similar intimidation tactics used by the Iranian regime. Parastou (which translates to “swallow” in English) refers to women deployed by Iranian intelligence to seduce, manipulate, and gather information from opposition figures, especially those within the Iranian diaspora. These women, often posing as activists or supporters of opposition groups, are involved in espionage and psychological operations aimed at gaining the trust of their targets.
The tactic is akin to a classic “honey trap” in espionage, where seduction is used to either compromise the target or extract sensitive information.
Another source shared a personal encounter, recalling how a woman, posing as a left-wing activist, appeared at his and his wife’s doorstep. Though hosting activists had been common for him and his wife, they sensed something was wrong and turned her away. It wasn’t until months later that they learned she was indeed a Parastou, embedded in the regime’s vast espionage network.
More recently, Iranian dissidents in Germany have been subject to extreme acts of violence, including politically motivated crimes like the rape of an Iranian man in Iserlohn, allegedly by supporters of the Islamic Republic. This attack, described by authorities as a means to “humiliate” the dissident, highlights the brutal measures employed by regime loyalists to intimidate critics, even on German soil. Similarly, in 2023, an Iranian man in western Germany was arrested on suspicion of plotting a chemical terror attack using cyanide and ricin, further illustrating the dangerous reach of Tehran’s operatives.
Cases of online spying on against Iranian dissidents and organizations based in Germany are also increasing, recent findings suggest. Since 2022, the Iranian state-backed hacking group “Charming Kitten” has repeatedly targeted journalists, human rights activists, and lawyers critical of the Iranian regime, according to the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV).
Silencing journalists through legal intimidation
The Iranian regime’s intimidation tactics extend far beyond physical threats and digital harassment. They are complemented by sophisticated legal maneuvers aimed at silencing critical voices, especially when investigations delve into the regime’s financial and business activities in Europe. These legal attacks, often in the form of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), serve a dual purpose: to overwhelm journalists and small publications with expensive legal battles, and to shield powerful Iranian financial entities from scrutiny.
One such case involved a journalistic investigation into a large Iranian financial conglomerate that operates in multiple sectors like banking, insurance, and real estate. The bank operates in European financial markets, offering foreign exchange, credit scoring, and electronic payment services. Despite U.S. sanctions, it maintains operations in Frankfurt and Rome. The journalist recounted how his publication’s investigation into this conglomerate’s corrupt dealings, which involved billions of dollars, led to swift legal action. “They hired one of the most expensive media law firms in Germany to sue us for defamation,” he said. The legal battle became too costly for the small publication and forced them to retract critical information, including the names of key figures involved in the corruption. “We were forced to remove names not because we lacked evidence, but because we simply couldn’t afford to keep fighting.