How propaganda, religious symbolism, and narrative revision are being used to legitimize Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession
The Iranian regime is manufacturing a Mojtaba Khamenei personality cult to reinforce his legitimacy as the Islamic Republic’s new supreme leader. First, by exaggerating Mojtaba’s past religious credentials, elevating him above the status of a mid-level cleric whose actual position in the Shi’a hierarchy is questionable. Second, by backtracking on past statements denouncing the concept of hereditary succession as counter-revolutionary. Third, by invoking the Shi’a myth of a “hidden Imam” to justify his unexplained absence.
1. Mojtaba, the hidden Imam
The first public message Mojtaba issued as Iran’s new leader March 12 did little to alleviate the public’s doubts of his actual existence. The statement was read by a news presenter, and lacked any video or audio footage of Mojtaba himself. Mojtaba’s absence from the public sphere since his anointment has led to a proliferation of speculation regarding his physical state. Many Iranians poked fun at the AI-generated imagery the regime has used to promote him, as well as his apparent lack of political experience. Images of regime dignitaries rallying around a cardboard cutout of Mojtaba have proliferated on social media channels, as has the nickname “mooshtaba,” or mouse family, a jab at Mojtaba and his late father’s disappearance from public view since Iran’s 12-Day War with Israel last year.
Regime prominents are attempting to counter these sentiments by portraying Mojtaba as a combatant martyr, or a hidden Imam whose concealment is necessary to advance the Shi’a fight against injustice.
“If Ali has been martyred, Mojtaba is in the battlefield,” Ali Reza Panahian, an influential cleric with beneficial ownership ties to prominent regime businesses and charities, posted on his X account March 11. “Our Ashura battle continues…!”
2. Mojtaba, the jurisprudent
Elevating Mojtaba to the post of supreme leader requires the regime to portray him as a qualified jurist, as defined by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s velayat-e faqih doctrine. This has led to the proliferation of biographical videos extolling his theological erudition, as well as a book allegedly authored by Mojtaba, titled “Estetaat” (ability, capability or power), that senior clerics lauded for its “scientific depth.”
Mojtaba’s actual achievements in Iran’s religious hierarchy are unclear. He only received the highest rank of ayatollah following his father’s Feb. 28 death, according to social media posts by establishment clerics. Recent pro-regime posts emphasize Mojtaba’s long tenure as a Qom seminary lecturer, where he purportedly taught Kharij-Figh, an advanced theological class, for 17 years.
Kharij-Fiqh is the highest level of education in Shi’a seminaries. Seminary students strive to attain the level of ijtihad, independent reasoning by an expert in Islamic law which means they no longer need to follow a source of emulation, which is also a requirement for the position of Iran’s supreme leader. Those who teach this course are “mojtahed,” meaning they have achieved ijtihad.
Since Mojtaba’s anointment, clerics have emphasized the popularity of Mojtaba’s class among high-ranking clerics. However, a hojjatoleslam, the title high-ranking clerics say he held prior to his promotion to ayatollah, Mojtaba would have been underqualified to teach the course. There is little open-source evidence of Mojtaba’s activities as a Hojjatoleslam, or the length of time he held this rank.
In this context, recent statements of regime officials like Abdolhossein Khosropanah, who heads the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, help fill the gap in Mojtaba’s public resume. In a March 10 Mehr News report, Khosropanah called Mojtaba Khamenei a “learned and distinguished figure who has fully completed his seminary studies and benefited from the instruction of many prominent scholars,” including the current head of Qom Seminary, Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani.
“He has also pursued studies in modern fields and is proficient in foreign languages,” Kosropanah continued. “When his qualifications were reviewed by the Assembly of Experts, no one expressed any doubt regarding his knowledge, jurisprudential authority, or ijtihad.”
3. Mojtaba, the rightful heir
The earliest mention of Mojtaba replacing his father as Iran’s supreme leader came during the run-up to the contentious 2009 presidential election. Politician Mehdi Karroubi, then a reformist candidate, questioned the hardliners on this topic, claiming that father-son succession was explicitly forbidden by the edicts of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which sought to distinguish the Khomeinists against the monarchy they overthrew.
Several regime prominents, including Head of the Assembly of Experts Seyyed Mohammad Mir Baqeri and Gholam Reza Soleimani, head of the Basij militia, have since issued contradicting statements regarding this narrative. In a March 10 post on X, Mir Baqeri stated the Assembly of Experts “found no document” indicating that Ali Khamenei “either recommended or opposed” Mojtaba’s leadership.
Older statements by regime officials appear to undercut this claim. In an older statement from Soleimani posted on X March 10, the Basij head gives an animated speech in a November 2024 news event that the Islamic revolution “put an end” to hereditary rule.
A final notable endorsement came from Mohsen Rezaei, who wields vast influence over the IRGC’s economic and security structure. In a March 10 report by Khabar Online, Rezaei reminisced on his long relationship with Mojtaba, claiming the “martyred” Ali Khamenei taught him his “governmental issues and twists,” including “cadre-building,” an issue to which he paid especially close attention.