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More than ever before, the management and nature of journalism in Iran is used as leverage for political gain. Not that this hasn’t long been the case. Iranian newspapers have traditionally been mouthpieces for political parties and organizations to disseminate their political views and spin.  

These political maneuverings existed even in the three short periods of relative freedom of speech and the press in Iran: the post–Constitutional Revolution period (1906–21); from Reza Shah’s exile in 1941 until the coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953; and in the brief euphoria after the 1979 Revolution.

But from August 1997, with the election of President Mohammad Khatami, certain politicians began to push their opposing agendas through various newspapers, giving an appearance of diversity in a number of news publications dubbed “independent.”

This group of newspapers that call themselves independent or “nongovernmental” in fact belong to a political tendency called “reformist.” These papers are not independent, and neither are they necessarily nongovernmental. Their autonomy is compromised not only by the government subsidies they receive, but also by their close ties to major regime institutions. 

For example, Mehdi Rahmanian, the managing director of Shargh newspaper, belongs to the reformist camp and served as city governor of Chabahar, in Sistan and Baluchestan province, during the Khatami period.

Elias Hazrati, the permit holder (grantee of the official license to publish) and managing director of Etemad, is a two-time reformist member of the Majles; he recently rose to the chairmanship of the Etemad Melli political party. 

The Sazandegi newspaper is an official organ of the Kargozaran party, whose leaders are all former members of the Rafsanjani government. The director of the newspaper, Mohammad Qouchani, is a Kargozaran party member, a media adviser to the government, and was recently appointed as secretary of the Center for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of Hassan Rouhani. 

The permit holders of lesser-known reformist newspapers such as Hamdeli and Arman Melli have similar backgrounds. The permit holder of Hamdeli, Valiollah Shojapourian, was a reformist MP, and Hossein Abdollahi, director of Arman Melli, was close to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and was his adviser at Islamic Azad University.

These newspapers closely represent official factions of the Islamic Republic and not varying or opposing points of view. 

Even though these newspapers cover important nonpolitical events like the passing of legendary maestro Mohammad-Reza Shajarian, regarded as a national treasure, they do so to appear as if they are reflecting the voice of the Iranian people. But the moment they sense the faintest opposition to the Islamic Republic, they either fail to cover those events that are close to the hearts and thoughts of the people, or they oppose them, as was the case with the mass demonstrations of December 2017 and November 2019. 

Politically motivated journalism

A few characteristics:

“Tribal” Journalism

The first and most important characteristic of this type of reporting is its factional nature, meaning it represents the interests and goals of a particular political party with devoted coverage of their speeches, spin, and analyses.

They hire staff more on the basis of loyalty than professional or related experience. 

For example, as the government changes hands from reformist to principlist (right-wing) and vice versa, the managers of Iran and Hamshahri newspapers change as well and groups of reformist or principlist journalists replace the old ones.

In 2017, when the reformists took control of Hamshahri, a reformist representative assumed the responsibility of reorganizing much of the masthead, and Javad Daliri, who had been editor-in-chief at Etemad, immediately took up the same position at Hamshahri. Mohammad Qouchani, the editor-in-chief of Sazandegi, has a regular team that manages and supports the magazine and newspaper groups under his charge.

This tribalism is also seen in the behavior of journalistic institutions such as the Association of Iranian Journalists (which is always controlled by reformists). In 2020, this institution delayed three months in showing any kind of reaction to the sexual harassment allegations raised by a number of women journalists, after which it announced the formation of a special committee to help those affected. But in practice, not only did they do nothing, but as a group of prominent independent journalists mentioned in a statement, they called the narrative of the affected women “immoral.” There are even reports that they reached out to the affected women in some cases in attempts to silence them so as to avoid any embarrassment for the press. By contrast, the truly independent journalists who work at these papers have no influence on the direction of the paper itself and remain sidelined.

The Lack of Training

Although the first generation of newspapers that were founded in 1991 (such as Hamshahri, Iran, and even Jame’h, one of the most professional postrevolutionary newspapers) didn’t treat the training of journalists as a matter of any importance, they employed trained and experienced journalists. Today’s generation of newspapers still places little to no value on education and training, meaning that not only do they suffer from technical problems in the writing and preparation of reports, but serious problems can be observed even in their Persian.

Government-Oriented Journalism

The third characteristic of this journalism, which is largely a corrupt result of the two characteristics discussed previously, is that a large share of all news items revolve around the speeches of various national personalities and officials, a tendency that has only intensified during the Rouhani presidency. Coverage of the remarks of officials is considered a news priority. For example, every word by the supreme leader and the president must feature on the front page. Some of these newspapers actually cover the remarks of the heads of other branches of government and ministers, whether they’re important or not. All of this has gone so far that the problems and demands of society are sometimes echoed by the same officials that are supposed to be responsible for answering them, making the whole issue of demanding accountability from government officials seem ridiculous.

These partisan and group affiliations and the looming threat of being shuttered heavily loom over the reporting of these so-called independent papers in a direction that, first, has importance for the reformists in the political arena, and second, supports the regime overall. For example, now that we are closing in on election season, the focus of the newspapers is on two issues: the elections and the JCPOA. Numerous editorials and reports are published daily on these two subjects. These two issues are covered in a way that represents the reformists’ official narrative and point of view and totally neglects the voice of the people. The elections are an important issue for the reformists, but not for a large portion of the population, which has lost hope in any change in the Islamic Republic’s behavior. In a poll by the Netherlands-based group GAMAAN, 76 percent of the respondents said they didn’t participate in elections. Even according to statistics from the Ministry of Interior, the turnout in the 2020 Majles elections was about 42 percent of eligible voters, and in Tehran the turnout was less than 25 percent. Some of the reasons for this abysmal level of participation are clear: the suppression of protests in 2017–18, the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, the rising cost of living, the lack of hope for any change, the Iranian government’s mismanagement of the pandemic, and its reluctance to buy vaccines. All of this has not only increased people’s reluctance to participate in elections, it has also amplified opposition to the Islamic Republic.

While some Iranians support the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency since that would entail further pressure on the Islamic Republic, they are never covered in the press. As a result, it is unknown why this group of people supports increased pressure on the Islamic Republic in spite of the economic strain resulting from the sanctions, since addressing this issue would raise fundamental issues and call into question a US-engagement policy that is the pride and joy of reformists in the electoral arena. Be it due to censorship or self-censorship motivated by the desire to support the government and reforms (for which the JCPOA is a bargaining chip to use against rival groups), ignoring the question of why a certain sector of the population no longer supports or cares about the JCPOA shows that one cannot understand the reality of what is happening in Iranian society today through the reformist-aligned media.

The daily coverage of these newspapers gives the impression that everyone in Iran is anticipating huge changes after the elections. From the last week of February through early March, “elections” were covered every day in either news reports or interviews. On February 20, 2021, Shargh dedicated its front page image to Seyyed Mohammad Beheshti, with a headline—”If You Don’t Run for the Majles, the Doors Will Be Closed”—that quotes someone identified only as “the daughter of Maryam Behrouzi” (a former Majles member). A few days previously, on the night of February 17, an earthquake occurred in Sisakht and Shargh was unable to run any news about it due to the offices being closed for the weekend. And when their first post-earthquake issue was released on February 20, they thought it was appropriate to report on an earthquake that destroyed 3,000 homes on page 9, rather than on the front page.

The left and right corners of that February 20 front page bear election-related quotes from Seyyed Hassan Khomeini and Mohammad-Reza Aref, with the speeches from which they are drawn presented as news stories. On February 21, the same day that the shooting of people carrying fuel across the border in Saravan took place and turned into a week-long crisis in Sistan and Baluchistan province, the front page photos were dedicated to Abbas Abdi, Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, and Ahmad Zeidabadi, all reformist figures. On February 22, the front page was decorated with photos of Gholamreza Zarifian, another reformist figure; on February 23, there was a photo of Alireza Alavi Tabbar; on February 24, there was a photo of pro-reformist novelist Mahmoud Dowlatabadi, who did an interview with the editor, and the top headline concerned disputes in the Majles. On each day from February 27 through March 2, the photos of reformist heavyweights Ali Motahari, Hossein Marashi, Mohsen Armin, and Mahmoud Sadeghi, respectively, all featured on the front page alongside quotes about the elections, and the newspaper’s main headlines were about disagreements between the presidency and the Majles. There was another important development during the latter part of February and early March: the IRGC killings of ten or more independent fuel carriers and subsequent protests in Saravan. But Shargh didn’t run even a single story about the events.

Etemad newspaper has more diverse coverage than Shargh and its headlines consist of more than just news and quotes from the reformist political arena. More often than Shargh, it features images of non-reformists or urban spaces on its front page. Etemad had front-page articles on the Sisakht earthquake and the Saravan protests, with the report on Sisakht coming from the field. The paper’s main focus, though, just like Shargh’s, is the favored issues of the reformists, which currently include the elections and the JCPOA. These two issues have been followed in articles, analyses, and editorials in successive issues of the paper and on pages 1, 2, and 3.

Sazandegi is even more transparent in showing its support for the current government than Etemad or Shargh. Apart from publishing quotes of members of the Executives of Construction party, it vigorously supports the Rouhani presidency. The news items appearing most prominently on its front page concern the elections and the Rouhani administration’s foreign policy. Sazandegi’s headlines smack of advertising and yellow journalism. For example, when the issue of human tests for the domestic Koviran vaccine was raised, Sazandegi covered it on December 30 with the extravagant headline “Beginning of the Downfall of Coronavirus.” Naturally, months after the tests concluded and the government had yet to announce a plan of universal vaccination, Sazandegi and the other reformist newspapers did no follow-up on the matter.

The photos on the front page of Sazandegi during the latter part of February and early March featured Kargozaran party members Hossein Marashi, Mohsen Hashemi, and Gholamhossein Karbaschi. From February 20 to February 28, the front-page photos featured: Joe Biden, Rafael Grossi, Ali Karimi, Ali Mottahari, Mohammed Bin Salman, Ali Karimi, an oil field, Donald Trump, Pope Francis, Ayatollah Sistani with the pope, and Ata’ollah Mohajerani. The top headlines were related to the photos, with some relating to the elections and others to government actions or interests in foreign policy, specifically the JCPOA negotiations. During these ten days, Sazandegi ran no report on the Sisakht earthquake or the events in Saravan. It appears that for the newspaper, these two events didn’t have the same value as Ata’ollah Mohajerani’s comments or Ali Karimi’s candidacy for president of the Football Federation. Featured items related to the Razzaq plan to issue licenses for limited fuel trade at the borders were almost literally old news—there was no new project to address the problem of fuel smuggling.

In each of the three aforementioned newspapers, the elections and the JCPOA are covered in the same way: election-related news about the rival faction and continuous, daily insider analysis. But in the case of events related to people’s daily lives, news coverage is often sporadic, without examination of the background or follow-up on any stories. The most important example of this is the coronavirus pandemic. For more than a year, COVID-19 has plagued Iran and the wider world, causing the deaths of over 75,000 Iranians to date. But it is only occasionally covered in Iran’s newspapers, with news about it often not appearing for an entire week or more. In addition, while prior to 2017 these newspapers frequently featured independent and academic analysis, in the past few years, the analysts featured in the newspapers have been limited to those who belong to their own inner circles.

Turning a Blind Eye

It is due not only to government censorship that the newspapers don’t cover popular protests, but also to the reformists’ interests as a group which require that such news not be covered. Ignoring the 2019 protests marked the beginning of serious public distrust of the reformist newspapers. The way the 2019 protests were covered can be considered a turning point in the history of Iranian journalism.

The 2019 protests started on November 15, after the announcement of the increase in gas prices. From that date, when internet service was cut in Iran—for five days in much of the country, for over a week in some of it—Etemad, Shargh, and Sazandegi did cover the protests, but how?

None of these newspapers produced any on-the-ground reporting on the protests. Sazandegi was satisfied with publishing the statements of officials and the analysis of political activists who shared their opinions on the roots of the protests. There was no reporting on the phenomenon unfolding on the streets, the number of people killed, or the cities where protests were taking place. Rather than cover such important events, on the second day of the protests, Sazandegi ran a cover story with a photo of Ayatollah Taleqani and the headline “40 Years After the Father”–his death. The paper’s top story reported heavy snowfall in Tehran, and only under that headline were protests in several cities mentioned. During a week of protests, Sazandegi published articles supporting the government’s decision to increase gas prices. The paper’s top headline on November 20 was “The Margins versus the Center,” a metaphor for “villages and smaller cities,” on the one hand, versus “Tehran and other major cities” on the other, signaling the paper’s dismissive stance toward the protests. A week later, Sazandegi adopted a clearer stance against the protests. On November 26 through 28, the paper ran the headline “Interior Minister’s Narrative of the Crisis,” reported on the “Demonstration Against Destruction” (a reference to the usual pro-government demonstrations following popular protests), and covered “Burned Banks” rather than killed protesters. The flattering headline “Decree of Consolation,” decorated with a large photo of the president, who is supposed to bring justice, contradicted the coverage of these events. From the second day of the protests, Etemad made its stance against the protests clear. In a report called “Who Are the Ones Burning Down the City?,” the paper criticized protesters for burning banks, libraries, and ambulance stations. The report, which appears to be from the field but is in fact not, doesn’t mention any protesters who lost their lives apart from one person whose death was also reported by state news agencies. In its other reports, which focus mainly on the prepared statements of officials, Etemad wrote about the right to protest and the place of protest in expressing objections. In its November 26 edition, the top story covered the pro-government demonstrations, with the headline “Security for All.”

Shargh covered the protests with an air of calm. Its first report on the protests ran on November 17, which referred only to people gathering and causing traffic jams, neglecting to mention the repression of the protests. On other days and similar to the other papers, it examined the government’s policy of increasing gas prices. But on November 19, at the height of the protests, Shargh dedicated its cover photo to an image of Hassan Rouhani and current chief justice Ebrahim Raisi with the headline “Affirmation of the Protest, Condemnation of the Unrest”; the accompanying story affirmed the government’s position that the protesters were responsible for riots. In the days following, Shargh remained silent on the protests apart from one short column titled “Hear the Voice of the Protests.”

Both during and after the protests, a study of these newspapers yields no information on the protests, the number of those killed, the extent of the damage and how it was caused, or even the claim that the government demanded money from the relatives of those killed to reclaim the bodies of their loved ones. The newspapers condescendingly referred to the protesters as “marginals” who were attacking the “main body” of Iranian society, breaking laws, setting fire to banks and ambulances, and generally showing that they were unschooled in the proper “culture of protest.” It was only after the internet was opened back up that mobile phone videos were published to social media and public could at least partially ascertain the truth of what happened in those days. The videos even appear to show that the looting of the banks and smashing of car windows and some residences was the work of government agents themselves.

Shortly afterward, in an interview with the Tasnim news agency, Mohammad Qouchani, editor in chief of Sazandegi, and Abbas Abdi, a journalist and columnist at Etemad and Shargh, supported the government’s crackdown on protests. It is acceptable for journalists to exercise their right to their own opinions on transpiring events, but is it acceptable for a newspaper, as a channel of mass communication, to turn a blind eye to events that, according to some IRGC officials, affected 29 provinces and more than 100 cities and, according to an Amnesty International report, left at least 23 children dead? Is it acceptable for a newspaper’s field reporting to focus instead on traffic jams and feature an interview with a commuter who is stuck in traffic and can’t find a way out due to the cutting of the internet? Is it acceptable for journalists to sit in their offices in north Tehran, call protesters “an attack on the middle by the margins,” and suggest to them that they need to learn how to protest properly?

Appropriation and Theft of Symbols and Concepts

These papers either self-censor and turn a blind eye to events of societal importance, especially widespread discontent and protests, or cover them through the lens of official statements. They deliberately attempt to steal and appropriate the slogans that have been used to elaborate protestors’ demands at various points and try to reframe them as part of the regime’s narrative. One example is the well-known slogan “Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran,” which first appeared during protest marches on the annual Quds Day event in 2009 and was repeated in 2017, when even Ali Khamenei reacted to it. Sazandegi used the “I sacrifice my life for Iran” part of the slogan in a January 7, 2020, headline related to the funeral of Qasem Soleimani. In other words, the newspaper distorts a slogan in protest of the Islamic Republic’s regional, Shi’a-oriented policy and erases the first part of it to laud the very person who not only played a key role in carrying out those policies but in the words of former IRGC commander Aziz Ja’fari, played an active role in suppressing the student protests of the 1990s. It is said that Soleimani also used forces under his command, the Holy Shrine Defenders (as the IRGC forces in Syria are known), to suppress protests in 2019.

Another example of this appropriation can be found in the framing of reformist figures as protest symbols. In the 2021 edition of its annual Nowruz feature, Etemad published a headline and cover image featuring Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, and called him “a hopeful protester,” which provoked numerous reactions on social media. The large picture and headline shows how the reformists are interested in casting their own favored figures as representatives of the people and replacing the desperate protesters whose protest will be met with bullets, a long prison sentence, or even death in prison. Bear in mind that Seyyed Hassan Khomeini receives an annual budget from the government to run organizations such as the Institute for the Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works and the Mausoleum of Ruhollah Khomeini. He manages the Jamaran news website and maintains good relations with various elements of the regime. Can he really be a representative of the people and a narrator of the oppression currently being visited on them, solely because he was once disqualified from an Assembly of Experts election?

These “independent” Iranian newspapers are neither independent, nor do they take a balanced look at political and societal events. Censorship, self-censorship, and one-sided, biased pro-reformist views on the issues are more reflective of their group interests and concerns than a reflection of what is actually happening in Iran.

The post Deconstructing “Independent Media” in the Islamic Republic appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

Pressure on the media in Iran intensified shortly after the 1979 revolution, beginning with the shutdown of the “Ayandegan” newspaper, the seizure of major newspapers “Kayhan” and “Ettela’at”, and the persecution of numerous journalists through imprisonment and execution. In the aftermath of the revolution, Khomeini’s supporters targeted many independent magazines and newspaper establishments, leading to their closures. At the time, there was no legal basis for these press restrictions. However, the Islamic Republic later implemented laws to formalize censorship and restrict the issuance of licenses for independent media outlets.

The “Press Law” of the Islamic Republic, enacted in 1986, saw amendments in 1999 and 2017. These changes further tightened the media landscape, placing significant constraints on journalists.
In Iran, truly independent media outlets are virtually non-existent. The proprietors and senior editors of what are labeled as “independent media” often have affiliations with different factions of the Islamic Republic’s government and institutions. As a consequence, while some media entities might seem independent at first glance, they often toe specific political lines set by the regime. Journalists who overstep these boundaries risk severe repercussions, including imprisonment, torture, and, in extreme cases, execution.

The Iranian government’s vigilance also extends to social networks. Bodies such as the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, established in 2011, aim to inhibit both journalists and the broader public from using these platforms freely for expression. This restrictive approach to cyberspace underscores the government’s overarching objective to maintain a stranglehold on all forms of communicative information dissemination. Despite the formidable challenges and hurdles facing them, some Iranian journalists remain undeterred, bravely upholding their commitment to their profession.

The post Media in the Post-revolutionary Iran: A Timeline appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

Overview

Staffed by hard-line management whose members include execs from its big brother Fars News, the news agency Mashregh is a relatively new online media outlet controlled by the IRGC. As such, its content promotes Ali Khamenei’s ideology and the corps’ political agenda. 

Of the three people on its board of directors, one conspicuously lacks a public footprint (Afshar), another is on the coalition of Principlist parties who support President Ebrahim Raisi and install IRGC members into newsrooms (Davari) and the third, (Qobadi) has overseen at least two purges at Fars and IRNA news agencies. (The evidence suggests he is an IRGC intelligence officer.) 

Founding document

Registered as “Yavaran Khorshid Mashregh Cultural and Media Institute” on June 24, 2012, Mashregh is a news website closely affiliated with the IRGC. It heavily focuses on promoting concepts and slogans put forth by Iran’s leader Ali Khamenei, as our previous reporting has shown.

Mashregh’s articles of incorporation outline its objectives as “disseminating information and news, enlightening public opinion in line with the policies of the sacred Islamic Republic regime, news coverage of the three branches of government, “establishing communication with other independent media outlets, especially in the Muslim world,” and “paying serious attention to setting professional standards and observing professional and media ethics”, “cooperation, and collaboration with various [government] organizations to fulfill the mission of news delivery,” “obtaining loans from domestic and foreign banks and financial institutions, establishing branches domestically or internationally,” among other things. 

Pro-regime language

The “About Us” section of Mashregh’s website lacks concrete information about its activities and instead presents a lengthy essay that expresses hardline and pro-regime views. 

The website features sections including “Softwar“, a term coined by Khamenei), “Jihad and Resistance“, which contains propaganda about Quds Force operatives, their activities, and capabilities, as well as Hezbollah (Lebanon) and other anti-Israel allies of the Islamic Republic and spy captures, “Defense and Security”, which disseminates propaganda regarding the exaggerated accomplishments of the Islamic Republic’s armed forces, and Society, whose articles often contain harmful disinformation.  

The website also cherry-picks social media posts from Twitter, Telegram, and a government-sponsored messaging application called EITAA.

Mashregh’s Notable IRGC Board Members

Kamran Qobadi (Board Member)

Qobadi is one of the founding and current board members of Mashregh. Additionally, he has previously held the position of editor-in-chief at Mashregh. According to the news portal Zeitoons, Qobadi is reportedly a member of the IRGC intelligence apparatus.

Qobadi was an editor-in-chief at the IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency from 2015 to August 2017, according to public announcements made by the news agency.  

In March 2016 Qobadi allegedly assisted an IRGC member named HamidReza Tabatabaei, who was poised to become the CEO of the news agency, in purging 50 “undesirable individuals” from the media outlet, according to a number of news websites.

While Rooznameh Rasmi documents indicate that HamidReza Tabatabaei was an equity partner in Fars News Agency from December 2017 until May 2021, there is no record of him ever becoming CEO.  

By August 20, 2017, Qobadi had become the Director of News at Fars News Agency, according to various reports. However, no official announcements were made regarding his appointment to this position.

Qobadi was appointed as the Director of News for the official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) on November 24, 2021. 

During the inauguration ceremony, IRNA CEO Ali Naderi described Qobadi as an “experienced media” manager and “transformative figure” who has been “instrumental in bringing about innovative changes in many media outlets” and a “Hezbollahi”¹ individual “aligned with the path of the “martyrs and SL”

Qobadi, in turn, said that he had been stationed at IRNA for some time and had “conducted various investigations”, adding that he would begin a period of transformation at IRNA with the help of staff.

Unsurprisingly, by August 4, 2022, reports began to emerge on social media about layoffs at IRNA, with one Tweet revealing that reporters learned of their termination through a WhatsApp message. According to subsequent reports from IranWire and Melliun, 500 reporters were laid off from IRNA.

As an illustration of his Hezbollahi past, Qobadi was one of the signatories of a letter asking the notorious judge Mohammad Moghiseh to prosecute late president Hashemi Rafsanjani’s son Mehdi Hashemi in February 2015.  Qobadi was also a signatory of a 2014 petition by hardline and ultraconservative “media workers” demanding that they be sent to Gaza to cover what they described as “unprecedented atrocities committed in the Strip.” 

Qobadi was also on the board of  Mellat Construction Co, a Bank Mellat subsidiary, from March 2018 to April 2023. Bank Mellat is a state-owned banks sanctioned by the US Treasury. 

Reza Davari (CEO, Board Chairman )

Davari is one of the founding members of Mashregh and has been CEO and chairman of its board of directors since its inception. According to Zeitoons, Reza Davari is also an IRGC member who at one point appointed Reza Garmabdari editor-in-chief at Mashregh.

Garmabdari was formerly the head of the IRGC Political Studies Center and editor-in-chief of Sobh-e Sadeq, a weekly magazine published by the Political directorate of the IRGC.

On August 17, 2022, Davari became the secretary of the Coalition Council of Islamic Revolution Forces. This conservative coalition of parties was founded in 2019 and is led by Gholam Ali Hadad Adel, whose daughter Zahra is married to Mojtaba Khamenei.

Meysam Afshar  (Board Member)

Afshar is the third founding member of Mashregh. Aside from two RRK records pertaining to Mashregh, there are no other mentions of Afshar in public records. This in itself raises red flags. It suggests his name and personal information, the reporting of which is a standard requirement in such high-profile appointments, was intentionally omitted to protect his identity. 

The post The disappearing execs of Mashregh News appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

The IRGC-owned Atlas Media Group was founded following the 2009 Green Movement protests to counter “soft war” efforts. 

In October 2020, Ammariyon HQ, a unit believed to be associated with the IRGC cyber division, revealed in a Telegram post that the IDO had purchased Atlas for the publicized price of 20 billion Toman (about $20 million at the time). 

The Islamic Development Organization (IDO) is one of the several agencies controlled by Ali Khamenei, as Tehran Bureau has shown in previous reporting. Both Mehr News and Tehran Times are owned by the IDO.

Jabbari and the Atlas Media Group

In December 2020, state news outlets reported the death of Mohammad Saeed Jabbari, who had been the CEO of Nasim Online, managing editor of 90 Eqtesadi and CEO of Roshangari website, according to the reports. 

Mehr News Agency claimed he died of cardiac arrest, a common official cause of death during the COVID-19 pandemic in Iran, at the age of 33.  His memorial service was sponsored by IDO Arts Center and Safir Film, which was founded by Jabbari himself. 

Several news reports provided evidence of Jabbari’s links to Atlas:

-Jabbari’s obituary in Roshangari says Jabbari mentored Syrian youth in a “documentary filmmaking course held in Aleppo by Safir Film and Owj Arts and Media Organization (IRGC)” and that Jabbari had been managing “Atlas Media Center” since 2018. 

-In another report linking Jabbar to Atlas, Shabestan News Agency published the condolence letter of IRGC Commander Gholamreza Jalali who heads the National Passive Defense Organization (see below). The report also states that Jabbari had been the head of  “Atlas Media Center” since 2018 and includes a poster of Jabbari with a quote from Khamenei from his meeting with a  “group of Atlas Media Group employees.”
There is no information available about Atlas Media Group in public databases such as Rooznameh Rasmi, but an issue of the Atlas Media Group’s weekly magazine is available. The magazine dates back to September 2, 2012, and features articles from some of the group’s media outlets, including Nasim Online, ‌Borhan News Agency, and Eshraf News Agency.

-Borhan News Agency was launched in 2011, according to Fars News, but the website no longer exists, even in internet archives. 

-Eshraf News Agency is also defunct, but archived versions of its website are still available.

–Behdokht (better women), which is now defunct 

–Didarmedia (which has a one sentence About Us: “We give you news no other media has access to”) 

-Mowj Ghanoon (law wave), and Iran Hastei (nuclear Iran) are also reportedly part of the Atlas Media group, according to Melliun.org, but Tehran Bureau was unable to verify evidence of their existence  

—Afsaran Javan Jang Narm (young officers of soft war), which is linked to Atlas HOW, has a telegram channel. Afsaran’s website lists a series of supporters and colleagues which are all IRGC cyber army social media handles/ websites that push the guards’ agenda on various platforms including:  Enghelabi news , Radar Enghelab (insta, twitter, Aparat etc), Bisimchimedia (twitter, aparat etc ), Twitter Enghelabi  (telegram, aparat , etc), Andishkadeh Tabyin, Khiyaban Engelab (insta), Beheshte Shahr (insta), Arman TV (insta, apparat).

-Bisimchimedia, which recently made waves online with Twitter users calling on others to report Bisimchimedia accounts for being the first to post videos of forced confessions by Iranian women detained over their refusal to wear the veil.

Bisimchimedia’s media content is regularly used by Islamic Republic media outlets such as Hamshahri in their coverage of news about the arrest of social media users who defy the archaic and repressive hijab laws. 

Problematic content

-Atlas Media group was behind a cyber attack on Malia Obama, the daughter of the former U.S. president, according to Melliun News Agency.

Intentionally opaque ownership structure points to the IRGC

So who owns Nasim Online and 90 Eghtesadi? The lack of official business records and the sale to the IDO suggest that its beneficial owner is the IRGC. The corps is likely using resources from the IDO to disguise its control of the media organizations. To this end, the IRGC created Novin Rasaneh Sepehr Tasvir, the entity that holds the publishing rights to Nasim Online and 90 Eghtesadi.

The post The hidden powers of Atlas Media Group appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

Fars News Agency

Founded in 2003, Fars News Agency is the most established of the IRGC’s major media outlets. Hamidreza Moghaddamfar, an IRGC commander who also influenced the founding of Tasnim news agency and Javan newspaper, was on the board of Fars until April 2012, after which he transferred his shares in the agency to Seyyed Nezamoldin Mousavi and exited the organization, Rooznameh Rasmi documents show. 

The identity of the news organization’s founder helps explain the political leanings that motivated Fars’ disinformation drive against those who participated in the recent nationwide uprisings in Iran. One of Fars’ recent targets was Sarina Esmailzadeh, a 16-year-old girl was killed on September 23, 2022 in Karaj as a result of baton blows to the head from IR thugs, according to eyewitness accounts cited by Radiozamaneh, BBC Persian and Radio Farda.

On October 12, 2022 Fars News Agency alleged all these reports as fake, and that Esmailzadeh died as a result of jumping from a building. The news agency went on to cite a poll conducted by its research branch, which allegedly showed BBC Persian, Radio Farda, Iran International, VOA, and Manoto had published 17,312 fake news stories about the protests in Iran between September 14, 2022 and October 8, 2022.

In a separate instant on October 4, 2022, after 11-year-old Fatemeh Rezaei died in Qom under unusual circumstances, Fars conducted an interview with her father. He is quoted as saying she died from an infection and kidney problems, not poisoning. Currently, schoolgirls in various cities in Iran are said to have been poisoned by the authorities as revenge for participating in anti-hijab protests, according to various international news reports.

Last November, the Iranian hacktivist group “Black Reward”, which has targeted various Islamic Republic institutions and infrastructures, leaked an audio recording said to have been obtained from Fars News Agency’s internal servers. The recording was of a secret meeting between the Deputy Commander of the Basij, Qassem Qoreishi, and the managers of “aligned media” [meaning aligned with the regime] about the uprising in Iran and the regime’s plans to create a counternarrative. 

In the two-hour meeting which took place late in November 2022, several individuals gave reports about the protests. Qoreishi briefed them on how the regime wanted to counter and mitigate them. His suggestions included placing institutional pressure on female actresses and other celebrities who publicly removed their hijab in solidarity with the protests and using the FIFA World Cup in Qatar as an opportunity to reframe the protests as a public celebration. 

Qoreishi also mentioned a “fact-finding mission” to intimidate Molavi Abdolhamid, the prominent Sunni cleric and Friday Prayer leader in Zahedan, following the September massacre of protesters. Qoreishi also instructed state-run media to stop referring to “the protests” in their reporting, and instead use the terms “past riots,” “Mehr riots,” or “black sedition.”

A detailed look at the figures behind Fars News Agency

Seyyed Nezamoldin Mousavi 

While not an IRGC member, Mousavi is an influential presence in Iran’s conservative media scene. His previous roles as a spin doctor for various Supreme Leader-controlled “bonyads” and media regulators has contributed to his rise to political power. Now an MP for Tehran, Mousavi was a member of the board of directors of Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz, the organization that owns the daily newspaper Javan, from 2012 until 2017, according to Rooznameh Rasmi documents.

Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz is a Basij Cooperative Foundation, or Bonyad Taavon Basij (BTB) subsidiary, which in turn is controlled by the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, or Bonyad Taavon Sepah.

Hamidreza Moghaddamfar 

Moghaddamfar is an IRGC commander and the culture and media advisor to the IRGC commander-in-chief. He is also the deputy head of the office for the Preservation and Publication of the Supreme Leader’s works which is tasked with printing, promoting, and distributing Khamenei’s works. 

He has been on the board of Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz since 2012 and is also one of the founding and current board members of Tasnim News Agency. He was the CEO of Fars News Agency in 2012. He is also the secretary of the People’s Headquarters for Commemoration of Qassem Soleimani.

The third notable figure on Fars News Agency’s board of directors is Mohammad Mehdi Sayyari Zahan, who has been the board chairman of Fars since March 2008, according to Rooznameh Rasmi documents. Mehdi Sayyari is an IRGC Commander and the deputy commander of the IRGC Intelligence organization, according to the Afkar news portal. (In a Rooznameh Rasmi ad from March 2008, Sayyari Zahan’s father’s name is stated as Mohammad Ali and his place of birth is Qaenat in South Khorasan. When his father died, a host of IR officials sent Sayyari Zahan condolence messages in which they name his father as Haj Mohammad Ali Sayyari.)

Tasnim news agency

Tasnim News Agency is the largest IRGC-owned media outlet. Tasnim’s media license is held by Atisazan Farhangi Tasnim Institute.  Rooznameh Rasmi documents show that this news agency was founded on June 30, 2012 by IRGC commander Hamidreza Moghaddamfar (see above), Jafar Darouneh (board chairman) and Majid Qolizadeh Zahmatkesh (CEO). 

Jafar Darouneh, who was head of Tehran’s Department of Education in the Ahmadinejad administration, in addition to his position at Tasnim, is the secretary of a convention called “Tolou Haqiqat,” which aims to commemorate two letters that Khamenei wrote to western youth in 2015, preventing them from being forgotten. 

Majid Qolizadeh Zahmatkesh has remained the CEO of Tasnim since its establishment and has been chosen as a Qard al-Hasan ambassador by Mehr-e Iran Qard al-Hasan Bank, a sanctioned financial institution whose shareholders include the armed forces-owned Bank Sepah, as well as other bonyad-affiliated banks, as shown by this Rooznameh Rasmi document and reporting by Tehran Bureau.

Moghaddamfar, Darouneh and Qolizadeh Zahmatkesh are all on the board of the Imam Hasan Mojtaba Charity for Orphans and the Needy, according to Rooznameh Rasmi documents. 

Tasnim and the crackdowns

The identity of the Tasnim’s founder and shareholders helps explain the agency’s active role in the state-led disinformation campaign against protesters. 

On March 1, 2023, Radio Farda reported that security officers assaulted the mother of one of the students poisoned at the 13 Aban School in Tehran. On March 2, Tasnim published an exclusive report that quoted a police spokesperson saying an investigation concluded the woman had no children in 13 Aban School and had no familial connection to any of its pupils. He added that the individuals who assaulted the woman in the video have been identified and arrested. 

The news agency also ran a smear campaign against Esteghlal FC forward Mehdi Ghayedi, who refused to discuss his winning performance in a match on December 26, telling reporters that “Football is not what concerns people right now.” 

On January 1, 2023, Tasnim reported that a number of footballers, including some who lack “the motivation to compete or even talk about football”, were arrested at a party “in an abnormal state caused by the consumption of alcoholic beverages.” According to other news reports, Ghayedi was one of the detainees.

The post The IRGC’s Media Trifecta Part 1: The Case of Tasnim and Fars appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

The following report reviews the publicly available evidence of the IRGC’s ownership links to Nasim and 90 Eqtesadi, shedding light on the opaque business structure that disguises the corps’ control of these media outlets. In its previous reporting, Tehran Bureau detailed the media business activities of Atlas Media Group, the likely owner of the news portals Nasim Online and 90 Eqtesadi, among others.  

According to the IRGC’s Ammariyon HQ, Nasim Online and 90 Eqtesadi are both owned by Atlas Media Group. This information was included in an article detailing the sale of Atlas Media Group to the Islamic Media Organization (IDO, controlled by Ali Khamenei. At the time, the story was covered by a minor Iranian news agency called Ensaf News, which claimed that the deal enabled the head of the IDO, Mohammad Qomi, to expand his media influence due to his aspirations to run for president.

At first glance, the records suggest Nasim Online has always belonged to the IDO. It is registered at an address on Tehran’s Vali-e Asr Street (Tehran, Enghelab Street, between Abureihan and Palestine Streets, next to Bank Saderat, Saroosh Building, No. 2.), where a host of other IDO companies are officially based. 
Nasim’s website also lists a second address on Sanaei Street (Tehran, Karimkhan Zand Street, near Sanaei Street, No. 101), where a group of other IDO companies are also registered.

So who owns Nasim Online and 90 Eghtesadi? The lack of official business records and the sale to the IDO suggest that its beneficial owner is the IRGC. The corps is likely using resources from the IDO to disguise its control of the media organizations. To this end, the IRGC created Novin Rasaneh Sepehr Tasvir, the entity that holds the publishing rights to Nasim Online and 90 Eghtesadi. 

The umbrella company: Novin Rasaneh Sepehr Tasvir

This media company was established December 19, 2019, according to this Rooznameh Rasmi document. 

Novin Rasaneh Sepehr Tasvir currently holds the publishing rights to news websites such as  Nasim Online  (established in 2013), and 90 Eqtesadi (established in 2017). 

Its board members include:

Mohammad Shojaian Zanjani – Equity partner, CEO of founders board, vice chairman

Shojaian Zanjani is a long-time manager of various state-linked enterprises, and was formerly the director general of the Content Production and Distribution Division of the IRIB Cyberspace Directorate. He was the CEO of Mehr News Agency from September 2019 to  April 2023  and the managing editor of the English-language Tehran Times during the same period. 

Both Mehr and Tehran Times are owned by IDO. It should be noted that Fariduddin Haddad Adel, whose sister is married to SL’s son Mojtaba Khamenei, has served on the board of both Mehr and Tehran Times.

Shojaian  was also a founding member and equity partner in another company, Mowj Yek Atlas Emrouz,  which was founded on July 29, 2018 to provide computer services (hardware and software), and internet networks, informatics and domain hosting services, according to Rooznameh Rasmi.

Shojaian was also an equity partner and founding member of Payam Koutah Nasim, or Nasimonline (see below) in 2013, according to Rooznameh Rasmi. 

Yaser Jalali- Equity partner, chairman of founding board

According to state-linked sources, Yaser Jalali is the son-in-law of IRGC Commander Gholamreza Jalali, who heads the National Passive Defense Organization. 

Both Jalalis are staunch supporters of broader internet restrictions in the country. Yaser has openly advocated for the controversial Cyberspace service regulation system act known in Iran as “Sianat,” which gives control of internet exchange to the Armed forces.  

Yaser is the special assistant to the head of IDO, and sits on the board of dozens of IDO-owned companies such as Sepehr Fund (vice chairman), Bonyad Sepehr Tableegh Novin (CEO), Iran E Publications  (Board Chairman), Tebyan Nour Foundation (Vice Chairman), and Pardis Sharif Soroush (Board Chairman), to name a few. 

Notably, Khamenei’s nephew relative Komeil Khojasteh was the CEO of Tebyan Nour until April 2022.

Yaser Jalali was also a board member of IRIB subsidiaries Jam-e Jam Bartar Borna and Soroush Data . Jam-e Jam Bartar Borna (2019-2022) offered “management contract services and Soroush Data (2007) offers information technology services.

Jam-e Jam Bartar Borna holds the publishing rights to Vatan Emrouz Newspaper.

Fariduddin Haddad Adel, whose sister is married to SL’s son Mojtaba Khamenei, was also a board member and equity partner in Jam-e Jam Bartar Borna.

Jalali has also served on the boards of bonyad-owned media and Information technology companies such as  Fanava IDC (BTS), Raymon Media (EIKO) via  Iran Mobin Electronic Development Co.

Jalali has previously been featured on Ali Khamenei’s website, Leader.ir.

Like Shojaian, Jalali is also a founding member and equity partner in Mowj Yek Atlas Emrouz  (see above).

The cultural outlet: Nasim Online

Nasim Online was established on December 16, 2013  By Mohammad Shojaian Zanjani and Gholam Reza Nouri Hefzabad under the name Payam Koutah Nasim, according to Rooznameh Rasmi. 

Its articles of incorporation outlined its objectives as “designing databases and public and specialized libraries, as well as informational websites, providing services such as cataloging, indexing, and organizing artistic and cultural documents and records.” In July 2019, Nasim’s objectives were expanded to include “information dissemination in the fields of culture, art, Quranic sciences, and Islamic teachings.” 

The “About Us” section of its website states that Nasim “examines issues from the perspective of the “Islamic Revolution discourse,” and seeks to transform the “current conditions” into what they should be, which is reminiscent of Khamenei’s language about repression.

Board member and equity changes have not been properly recorded on Rooznameh Rasmi, which only lists two documents for the organization (see above). 

Nasim’s founding board members are: 

Mohammad Shojaian Zanjani

Payam Koutah Nasim (Nasimonline)-  Equity partner, founding board CEO

Shojaian was formerly the director general of the Content Production and Distribution Division of the IRIB Cyberspace Directorate. He was the CEO of Mehr News Agency from September 2019 to April 2023  and the managing editor of the English-language Tehran Times during the same period. 

Both Mehr and Tehran Times are owned by the Islamic Development Organization (IDO) which is one of the several agencies controlled by Ali Khamenei. Members of the ayatollah’s family have been board members in the tw over the years. 

Shojaian  was also a founding member of a company called Mowj Yek Atlas Emrouz in 2018,  which provides computer, informatics and domain hosting services, according to Rooznameh Rasmi.

He is also one of the founding members of Novin Rasaneh Sepehr Tasvir, which holds the publishing rights to Nasim Online, according to Rooznameh Rasmi.

Gholam Reza Nouri Hefzabad– Equity partner, chairman of founding board, board chairman. 

Nouri was appointed VP of cyberspace for IRIB on October 7, 2022.  In an interview with the Clean Cyberspace Association (FAMP) Nouri 

discussed his views on regulating the internet in Iran. He said he had “banned any reference to Instagram” and other international social media platforms in IRIB programming, adding that presenters are now only allowed to say “follow us on social media platforms.” 

The Clean Cyberspace Association (FAMP), an organization connected to the Khamenei family, is actively involved in efforts to push for more internet censorship in Iran.

Nouri has been an executive in various Supreme Leader-controlled media, including:

• Jam-e Jam Bartar Borna – Nouri was vice chairman of the founding board of this IRIB subsidiary, which was founded on June 25, 2019 and offered “management contract services for the implementation of institution projects.” Notably, Fariduddin Haddad Adel, whose sister is married to SL’s son Mojtaba Khamenei, was also a board member and equity partner in this company which was dissolved on January 17, 2022.

•  Jam-e Jam Institute – Nouri represented IRIB interests and chaired the board of directors of this institute from April 23, 2021 to March 27, 2022, when he was replaced by Fariduddin Haddad Adel.  Fariduddin has been a long-time board member of Jam-e Jam Institute. 

• Payam Novin Jam-e Jam Saba– Nouri was Chairman of the founding board of this company, which was founded on July 18, 2018, and represented the interests of Jam-e Jam Institute. This company which was established to offer “information technology services…[and] design, establish, and implement extensive communication and telecommunications computer networks…” was dissolved on July 6, 2021.

• Soroush Data – Nouri was Board Chairman of this company and represented the interests of the IRIB retirement fund. This company, which was founded on August 6, 2007, is a subsidiary of the IRIB-owned Soroush Institute and offers information technology services.

• Bonyad Sepehr Tableegh Novin– Nouri was Vice Chairman of this company, established on September 20, 2020 to “produce and disseminate written, computer, digital, audio, visual, and multimedia products, and [offer] other cultural services,” and “designing, establishing, and implementing cultural and communication centers, systems, and regimes…,” among other things. This bonyad is owned by the IDO, which is one of the several agencies controlled by Ali Khamenei.

The economic news outlet: 90 Eqtesadi 

There is no information available about 90 Eqtesadi on Rooznameh Rasmi. Its website still lists Mohammad Saeed Jabbari as its managing editor. 

As an outlet specializing in economic and business news, the stated intent of “90 Eqtesadi” is to address “the problems and demands of the people … by disregarding the conventions and common considerations of other economic media,” according to its website. Its declared mandate is to monitor analyze and provide fair critiques of governmental and non-governmental organizations, movements, and agencies economic performance. 

While the headlines on “90 Eghtesadi” are not very controversial, the language used in the articles clearly shows their hardline approach. For example, an item from its most viewed section titled “Fear Trafficker” promises to examine “the role of one of the enemy’s infantry soldiers in the economic war waged against the people of Iran.” In another item, the website quotes a member of the Expediency Council Ali Aqa- Mohammadi as saying that Tehran’s unemployment problem is not down to a lack of jobs, but a lack of initiative by job seekers.

The post Who owns Nasim Online and 90 Eghtesadi? appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

Javan newspaper is not only written by and for the Basij militia, but also formally controlled by the IRGC, despite its editor’s denial of the existence of such links. A look at the prior and present board members of Javan newspaper uncovers a cohort of the Islamic Republic’s top spin doctors, including the IRGC commander who helped establish the news agencies Fars, Tasnim and Javan: Hamidreza Moghaddamfar. An analysis of the Rooznameh Rasmi business registry shows that a vast majority of past and present board members of this media organization have been IRGC commanders or individuals employed by the Supreme Leader’s office. 

Javan was established in 1998 under the ownership of the Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz publishing house, which owns the newspaper’s publishing and distribution rights. Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz is a Basij Cooperative Foundation, or Bonyad Taavon Basij (BTB) subsidiary, which in turn is controlled by the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, or Bonyad Taavon Sepah, according to previous reporting by Tehran Bureau.

Abdollah Ganji was the managing editor of Javan from 2013 to 2021, when he became the managing editor of Hamshahri Newspaper, according to various news reports. Notably, Hamshahri is one of the media outlets controlled by the Supreme Leader via his family members, as previously reported by the Tehran Bureau.

In an interview published on October 8, 2019 by Ensaf News, Ganji said that Javan has four sources of revenue: newsstand sales, advertisements, an annual subscription contract with the Basij militia, as well as a publishing house owned by Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz.  

In previous public statements, Ganji denied any “organizational, legal or structural” affiliation with the IRGC, “Because they [the public] see this paper [distributed] among the Basij, they think it belongs to the IRGC,” he told Ensaf News.

However, our investigation shows that several Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz board members have IRGC/Basij service records. Publicly available documents from 2017 show that the institute’s main shareholders are the Basij Cooperative Foundation, or Bonyad Taavon Basij (BTB) and its subsidiary, the Consumer Goods Provision Foundation of Basij Members (Tamin-e Aqlam-e Masrafi-ye Basijian).

The Basij are one of the branches of the IRGC. BTB is a subsidiary of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, or Bonyad Taavon-e Sepah (BTS). The Basij leadership has almost always comprised of active IRGC members. 

Javan and the Crackdowns

Javan’s political allegiance to the Basij has driven its disinformation campaign against prominent activists and anti-government protesters. The paper routinely targets the U.S.-based feminist Masih Alinejad. An article on February 13 entitled “Confessions of a disillusioned CIA agent” included a photo of Alinejad and claimed she confessed to being a CIA and White House agent. Javan also falsely quoted Alinejad saying the protests, or “riots,” were orchestrated by the United States.

In another piece from February 25, Javan continued to falsely claim the events following Mahsa Amini’s death were part of an enemy conspiracy, that the fatalities sustained by young people did not happen during the protests, and that the victims were deliberately chosen to represent various ethnic minorities to stoke sectarian violence, among other inaccuracies. 

An overview of Javan board members

Mohammad Vadoud Heydari was the CEO of Javan via Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz from at least February 2012 until 2019, according to Rooznameh Rasmi documents.

A physician by trade, Heydari is one of the founding members of the Muslim Doctors Without Borders of Iran. In January 2021, when the COVID pandemic in Iran was at its height, Heydari was one of 192 signatories of a letter asking Iran’s leader Ali Khamenei to ban the import of American, British, and French COVID vaccines on ideological grounds. The ban was widely seen as contributing to the nearly 145,000 deaths by the virus in Iran. 

Heydari became head of the Student Basij Organization in September 2013, according to Jahan News and held the position for two years, according to Tasnim News Agency. The Student Basij Organization is headquartered at the site of the former U.S. Embassy in Tehran.  

He became head of the Communication and Information Center of the Supreme Leader Representation in Universities organization, or Nahad, in 2016. This organization is charged with delivering PR messages from the Supreme Leader’s Office to higher education institutions. Thus far, there are no announcements about his departure, suggesting that Heydari still holds this position.

In 2016, Heydari was one of the founding members of the hardline Khedmatgozaran Abadi va Pishraft  (Servants of Prosperity and Progress) party which has enjoyed the support of various hardline conservatives. These include Ali Khamenei’s relative Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, Hossein Taeb and  Alireza Panahian. The party also supported candidates like Narjes Soleimani, daughter of the late IRGC General Qassem Soleimani, in the 2021 Tehran city council elections.

He has been a board member of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order bonyad, or EIKO-owned Barakat Ehsan Foundation since 2020, according to Rooznameh Rasmi documents.

Seyyed Nezamoldin Mousavi 

Mousavi is an influential MP for Tehran connected to various Supreme Leader-controlled Bonyads and media organizations such as Fars News and Keyhan, Tehran Bureau’s previous reporting shows. Mousavi was a member of Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz’s board of directors from 2012 until 2017, according to Rooznameh Rasmi documents. 

Hamidreza Moghaddamfar 

Moghaddamfar is an IRGC commander who helped found the Islamic Republic’s largest hardline-affiliated news outlets. Aside from his position on the board of Javan, which he has held since the newspaper’s founding in 1998, Moghaddamfar served on the board of Fars News Agency during its founding in 2003. He is also a founding executive of Tasnim News, which launched operations in 2012. 

Moghaddamfar is also the culture and media advisor to the IRGC commander-in-chief, according to Mehr News. In addition, he is the deputy head of the Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Supreme Leader’s Works, according to the Hawzah news portal. This organization prints, promotes, and distributes Khamenei’s works. 

He has been on the board of Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz since 2012 and is also one of the founding and current board members of Tasnim News Agency. He was the CEO of Fars News Agency in 2012, according to Rooznameh Rasmi. 

Accoriding to Mehr News, he is also the secretary of the People’s Headquarters for Commemoration of Qassem Soleimani.

Seyyed Masoud Jazayeri

Jazayeri is also an IRGC commander. He started his career in Islamic Revolution Committees, the predecessors of the morality police, according to the Islamic Students News Agency. In this role, he dispatched impromptu justice to perceived enemies of the 1979 Revolution in the early years of the regime before joining the IRGC. Jazayeri, an active propagandist, has held various positions in communications. These include a role as the IRGC’s public relations officer and spokesman, member of the IRGC policy office, member of the IRGC Supreme Council, as well as the Supreme Leader’s representative at the IRGC-founded Imam Hossein University. He was appointed the cultural and defense propaganda General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic by Khamenei in 2007 and continues to hold this position.

Jazayeri was a member of Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz’s board of directors from 2012 until at least 2018, according to Rooznameh Rasmi. 

Ali Mohammad Naeini 

Naeini is still another IRGC commander who served on the board of Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz in 2012, according to Rooznameh Rasmi documents. 

Naeini previously sat on the board of Tose Fazahaye Farhangi and the Tehran Municipality’s Cultural & Art Organization when Mohammad- Baqer Qalibaf was mayor. He is currently on the board  of Iran’s National Family Bonyad and recently founded the Sacred Defense of Iran Scientific Association, according to Rooznameh Rasmi. His co-founders include IRGC commanders like Yahya Rahim Safavi and ‌Bahman Kargar, who heads the headquarters of the Rahian-e Noor caravans. In these commemorative tours, regime supporters travel seasonally to the sites of Iran-Iraq war battles in southern Iran.

According to Tasnim News, he is also head of the Headquarters for the Commemoration of 9 Dey (December 30). These pro-government rallies celebrate the crushing of the 2009 Green Movement uprising.

Behrouz Esbati 

Esbati is yet another IRGC commander. He was chairman of the board of Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz in 2012, according to Rooznameh Rasmi. He was previously the head of the Office for the Coordination of National Cyberspace and Armed Forces and is currently head of the Armed Forces Cyberspace Headquarters, according to Tasnim News. 

Javad Jabbari 

Jabbari is another IRGC commander who was on the board of Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz in 2012 until at least 2018, according to Rooznameh Rasmi documents. , According to the Tabnak news agency, Jabbari was the head of Ravayat Fath Bonyad (Chronicles of Victory Foundation) until 2017. This foundation makes documentaries about the Iraq-Iran War and other propaganda. 

Jabbari was also one of the producers of a controversial movie called Golden Collars, according to the culture-focused CinemaPress.ir. This propaganda film about the 2009 protests portrayed demonstrators as Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) agents sent to destabilize Iran. Abolqasem Talebi, the director, claimed on Twitter, that the Supreme Leader’s Office had contacted him to say Khamenei “watched the movie a second time.” 

Mohammad Javad Akhavan 

Akhavan is the current CEO and managing editor of Javan, having replaced Abdollah Ganji in 2021. His inauguration ceremony was attended by some of the regime’s top propagandists including:

 • Sepehr Khalaji, the Supreme Leader’s Office director of public relations

• Abdollah Zeighami, deputy commander of the IRGC media headquarters also known as the Islamic Revolution Media Front headquarters

• Abdolreza Azadi, and IRGC commander and deputy director of the Basij Art and Culture division

Abdollah Zeighami

Abdollah Zeighami has been in charge of the IRGC psyops HQ, according to documents first publicized by the Al Arabiya Farsi news portal. In 2009, he was deputy commander of the Thar-Allah Headquarters, according to Deutsche Welle’s Farsi-language news portal. The headquarters is in charge of security in Tehran. He played an important role in crushing the protests that took place in response to the contested presidential election that year. 

Sepehr Khalaji

Sepehr Khalaji, who has a doctorate in communications, was the Supreme Leader’s Office director of public relations for 12 years and had previously been one of the top executives at the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). This year, he was appointed President Ebrahim Raisi’s chief government speaker.

Abdolreza Azadi

Azadi is an IRGC commander and deputy director of the Basij Art and Culture division. Until recently, he was also the chairman of the board of Payam Avaran Nashr Rouz, according to this Rooznameh Rasmi document. Azadi has served on the board of Basij Cooperative Foundation (BTB), which is a BTS subsidiary, as well as a host of BTB companies such as Razmandegan-e Islam Arts and Culture Organization,  Razmandegan-e Islam Scientific and Education Services Institute, Monadian Basirat Institute and Razmandegan-e Islam Scientific and Education Services Institute.

Monadian Basirat Institute produces propagandistic video games such as “Commander of the Resistance: Amerli Battle” about Qassem Soleimani, Sniper: Golden Eagle, and The Epic of Nader.  

Seyyed Yaser Jebraeili

Jebraeili is credited as the person who developed President Ebrahim Raisi’s economic policy. He is currently the deputy director of the Center for Evaluation and Strategic Monitoring of the Islamic Republic’s General Policies at the Expediency Council. He was also the training and research deputy for Fars News Agency from at least 2013 to 2017, according to news reports. Jebraeili has been a vocal opponent of the previous administration’s efforts to adopt the Financial Action Task Force action plan, which aims to stymie money laundering and terrorism financing, telling Tejarat news that Iran could only adopt the plan “If there were no sanctions and if resistance groups were exempt from terrorist groups.”

The post The IRGC’s Media Trifecta Part 2: Javan Daily appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

Government oversight

The Supreme Council of Cyberspace is tasked with supervising the internet and making decisions about the harmful aspects of Internet use and countering them. For instance, the council believes that there should be different levels of access to unrestricted internet and that there should be legal VPNs available for certain groups of people to bypass filtering.  

There is another organization called  “the Committee to Determine Instances of Criminal Content,” which is headed by the Attorney-General of Iran. This committee is in charge of monitoring the internet and deciding what gets filtered. Its members include:

Private sector

Additionally, most of the following ISP providers are owned by one of two privately-owned consortia. (See charts below).

Pars Giti Ertebat Co, a consortium consisting of the following 11 companies that offer high-speed Internet (PAP):

• Dadeh Gostar-e Asr-e Novin (DGA Novin) aka Hi Web in which EIKO has a 6 percent stake
• Asre Enteqal Dadeha (AsreTelecom)
• Sabanet affiliation uncertain
• Asiatech Data Transfer, a subsidiary of the IRGC’s Bonyad Taavon Sepah-owned Fater Kowsaran Jonoub. However its shareholders include seven individuals and two companies, Atieh Madaran Investment and Andisheh Atieh Madaran Management Services, each owning 10 percent of Asiatech shares. 
• Laser Telecommunication, which we believe is affiliated with Bonyad Taavon Sepah (BTS)
• Pars Online, which has been purchased by Hi Web in which EIKO has a 6 percent share.
• Fan Ava Data Processing (BTS)
• Pishgaman Telecommunications Development
• Shatel Information and Communication Technology Group (Aria Rasaneh Tadbir)
• Kara Amin Communications, which is owned by the bankrupted companies Mersad Shiraz-based Electronics and Iran Telecommunication Industries Co (ITI) 
• Raham Datak Data Transfer Network owned by Tamin Investment Co
• Atieh Madaran Investment, Andisheh Atieh Madaran Management Services and Atieh brokerage, whose previous board members have links to BTS companies

2. Rayan Tadbir Co, a consortium of the following seven FCP companies:

• Pars Online, which has been purchased by Hi-Web in which the EIKO bonyad has a 6 percent share.
• Pishgaman Telecommunications Development
• Sabanet
• Shatel Information and Communication Technology Group (Aria Rasaneh Tadbir)
• Dadeh Gostar-e Asr-e Novin (DGA Novin) – a.k.a. Hi Web in which the EIKO bonyad has a 6 percent stake
• Asiatech Data Transfer, which is a subsidiary of BTS-owned Fater Kowsaran Jonoub 
• Mabna Telecom

The post Who Controls the Iranian Web? appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

The Khameneis and their family members own or control Iran’s major newspapers, publishing houses, news agencies and cultural institutions.Members of the supreme leader’s clan control major institutions while also acting as their regulators, a Doublethink investigation has shown.

Their control spans major media outlets including Hamshahri, Iran, and Jam-e Jam newspapers, the English-language Tehran Times as well as Mehr News Agency.

Khamenei family members also hold leadership positions in Avini Cultural and Artistic Institute and Farabi Cinematic Institute. Both of these institutions are active in film production.

Khamenei Family Role in Media, by Name of Relative

At the same time, members of the clan hold top political positions at two regulatory institutions responsible for media oversight and censorship. The Clean Cyberspace Development Association is responsible for internet censorship, while the Khorasan Press House oversees book publishing.

The Khamenei clan also controls the commercial book market via major publishing houses including Souroush, Hermes and Daftar-e Nashr. This dominance of regulatory bodies as well as publishers effectively gives the Khameneis a monopoly in publishing.

Khamenei Family Role in Media, by Industry Type

Editors’s note: This post was updated Nov. 1, 2019 to reflect new research findings.

The post How the Khameneis Control Iran’s Media appeared first on Tehran Bureau.