In another era, Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf might have been remembered as a mayor-turned-Parliament speaker who liked big projects, inflatable budgets, and was not opposed to cracking the heads of anti-government protestors. 

In the current turmoil, his knowledge of Iran’s internal security structure, business interests and leadership hierarchy lend him operational relevance in a state fighting for its survival.

Iran’s leadership is no longer governing in any conventional sense. It is absorbing assassinations, airstrikes, internal disruption, and trying to maintain continuity under pressure. In that environment, the Islamic Republic has defaulted to a familiar type: the manager who is also a commander. Ghalibaf, a former Revolutionary Guards air force chief, national police head, and long-time political operator, sits at the intersection of those roles.

Ghalibaf is reportedly becoming increasingly central in Tehran after the killing of the supreme leader and the decapitation of much of Iran’s senior command structure. 

He is rumored to have replaced Ali Larijani, killed in an air strike March 17, as the Islamic Republic’s de-facto leader, and is reportedly in talks with the United States, according to Israeli news sources. Ghalibaf’s chief characteristic is ambition. He climbed the Islamic Republic’s political ladder presenting himself as a man of execution rather than ideology. He secured his role as Majles speaker during the 2019 election year, when turnout was at an all-time low due to Covid restrictions and general public disillusionment. Cementing his clout in the lower house with only 1.3 million votes, Ghalibaf immediately began appointing friends and confederates to prominent positions in parliament. One of these appointees, Mohammad Saeed Ahadian, is related by marriage to the late Ali Khamenei. Ahadian benefited from the forced takeover of the formerly reformist Khorasan newspaper, where he served as editor-in-chief for two decades.

A History of Violence

Ghalibaf’s self-image of the technocrat who gets things done played well in Tehran. But Ghalibaf’s idea of “management” has always included coercion, patronage, and control. The polished mayor in tailored suits coexisted with the security official who, by his own account, helped suppress protests in 1999 and 2009. Ghalibaf was also a vocal supporter of the hejab and chastity bill, an internationally criticized legislation which introduced harsher penalties for violations of Islamic dress code despite broad-based public opposition to hejab restrictions following the nationwide, violently suppressed Mahsa Amini protests of 2022. The Majles passed the bill in 2024, while Ghalibaf was the body’s speaker.

Ghalibaf also notoriously took credit for a series of violent acts of repression. In an audio file circulated during the 2015 presidential campaign, he described himself “beating [protesters] with wooden sticks” on the back of a motorbike during the student protests of 1999.

Elsewhere in the recording, he boasted of ordering police to fire gunshots at protesters during on-campus student demonstrations in 2003. He also commended himself for an effective response to the unrest following the disputed 2009 presidential election, which saw widespread killings and abuse of demonstrators.

Increasingly, Ghalibaf is projecting hard power publicly. In recent days, Iran has pushed the outer limits of its missile doctrine, claiming responsibility for a long-range strike toward the U.S.-U.K. base on Diego Garcia. This target was over 2,500 miles away, well beyond Iran’s previously acknowledged range. The missiles failed to hit, but that was almost beside the point. The message was received.

Ghalibaf has leaned into that message with something approaching visible enthusiasm. His public statements reject ceasefire logic outright, telling state media Iran “must strike the aggressor in the mouth,” framing escalation as both necessary and inevitable. Even before the current war, he was praising long-range missile tests as a “source of national pride” in state media reports, positioning himself rhetorically alongside the systems he now helps direct.

That instinct runs through his entire career. As mayor, Ghalibaf’s power rested not only on visible infrastructure but on invisible networks: contracts, quasi-state foundations, IRGC-linked conglomerates, and a web of associates who turned municipal spending into political capital. Crucially, those networks did not stop at Tehran’s city limits.

Investigations into his tenure describe a sprawling ecosystem of business interests tied to family members, close allies, and Revolutionary Guards-linked institutions, extending into real estate, construction, banking, and charity structures that operate with both domestic and international reach. At the center of this was his relationship with Khatam al-Anbia, the IRGC’s engineering and construction arm, which was awarded multibillion-dollar development contracts without competitive bidding. This embedded a military-economic complex into the fabric of Tehran’s urban expansion.

From there, the network radiated outward. Entities linked to Ghalibaf and his associates were involved in large-scale real estate ventures, including projects tied to pilgrimage economies in cities like Mashhad, where capital, land, and religious infrastructure intersect. Financial channels ran through institutions such as Ansar Bank, itself tied to the IRGC cooperative foundation (BTS), creating pathways for capital movement that blurred the lines between public funds, private gain, and strategic financing. 

Most of Ghalibafs business network is linked to family members and friends who founded companies that benefited from contracts made possible through Ghalibaf’s various political positions. Ghalibaf’s brother-in-law, Reza Moshkir, reportedly has business ties to Algeria, Senegal, Turkey and Australia, and has been investigated for money laundering. Public business registry documents also show that Ghalibaf himself is on board of directors of three entities: Iran Association of Geopolitics, Khorasan, a private university, and Sepad Khorasan Co., a real estate development company involved in shopping malls, recreational centers and other tourism-related industries. 

What makes Ghalibaf’s network particularly relevant now is not simply its scale, but its structure. It was never just about enrichment. It was about building parallel channels of procurement, logistics, and capital allocation. These systems could operate with flexibility, opacity, and resilience, including across borders where necessary.

This is what makes Ghalibaf valuable now. Iran is no longer a coherent hierarchy; it is a stressed system trying to avoid cascading failure. Ghalibaf is one of the few figures who understands how its parts fit together, and how to keep them moving when they start to break. His business networks are not separate from his political role; they are an extension of it, providing alternative routes for resources, influence, and coordination at a moment when formal channels are under strain.

The post Ghalibaf: From Grifter to Power Broker appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

Beyond his public political career, Ali Larijani was embedded in a network of media, publishing, and quasi-state institutions tied to Iran’s ruling elite. The principlist politician was killed in an Israeli airstrike on March 17 along with his son, Morteza. Under Larijani’s watch, Iran’s state television began to serialise the forced confessions of political detainees. 

From shaping conservative news platforms to holding roles in entities linked to the Supreme Leader’s office and IRGC-affiliated structures, Larijani’s influence extended deep into the economic and informational infrastructure of the Islamic Republic.

Media

Larijani cemented his political clout during his ten-year tenure as head of IRIB, Iran’s state broadcaster, from 1994 to 2004. During this period, IRIB backed the founding of Jam-e Jam, a conservative newspaper that evolved into a mouthpiece for Ali Khamenei. State-affiliated journalists in Iran also say Larijani had editorial influence over Khabar Online, a widely read principlist news platform. Under his watch, Iran’s state television began to serialise the forced confessions of political detainees in the documentary-style show Hoviyyat, which aired in 1996. 

Publishing

Larijani was a board member at Book City, a popular privately held bookseller co-owned by the Khamenei family, from 2004 to 2008, according to national business registry records. He was also a trustee of Amir Kabir Publishing House, which is controlled by the Supreme Leader’s office and co-managed by clerics and IRGC officials close to Ali Khamenei.

Bonyads and Military

Although his name is not linked to any defense-related entity in official records, Larijani frequently appeared at the founding of strategic institutions. He also made public statements regarding the operations of Khatam al-Anbia, the IRGC’s sprawling engineering conglomerate. Despite the opacity surrounding its activities, Larijani was able to estimate the number of individuals involved in Khatam projects during a 2016 expo, according to a Fars News report from that time. He also co-managed Amir Kabir Publishing alongside former Mostazafan Foundation executives Mohsen Rafiqdoust and Mohammad Saeedikia.

Larijani also attended the 2016 opening ceremony of the Kerman-based halal Plasma Bank. The institution was founded by Ali Sadr-Hasheminejad, an internationally sanctioned businessman with ties to Venezuela, to serve the medical needs of Iran’s paramilitary.

Health

Larijani’s brother, Baqer Larijani, was a long-time board member of Soudeh Medical and Treatment Center, a medical institution linked to the family of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Other board members are connected to the Mola al-Movahedin Charity (MMC), a bonyad that forms a core component of the IRGC Quds Force’s domestic economic network.

Larijani’s brother-in-law, Seyyed Mostafa Mohaqeq Ahmadabadi (aka Mohaqeq Damad), was also connected to the Institute for Research, Education, and Treatment of Cancer.

The post Ali Larijani’s Hidden Business Web: Media, Publishing, and Parastatal Power appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

The IRGC newly appointed chief Ahmad Vahidi is a co-founder of the Defense Ministry Auditing firm, entrusted to oversee the financial records of the ministry’s network of affiliated companies.

Iran’s security apparatus uses such organizations to shield classified financial information from broader governmental scrutiny. (Another example is Mofid Rahbar, which oversees the vast empire of companies controlled by the Supreme Leader’s Office.)

The other Defense Ministry Auditing Firm founders are Mohammad Hosseinzadeh Hejazi (IRGC, died in 2021), Asghar Saleh Isfahani (IRGC-Navy), Qasem Taqizadeh (IRGC), Gholam Ali Movahedi (IRGC), Mostafa Esbati (Armed Forces), and Mohammad Eslami (Gov’t).

Overview of Defense Ministry Auditing Firm Founders

-Former Deputy IRGC Commander Mohammad Hosseinzadeh Hejazi died in 2021. He was among the founding members of Adishehaye Imam Khomeini Institute. 

Established April 21, 2012, the institute’s articles of association say it is a “seminary” institution that will  “set up centers in elementary [schools], high schools and universities to encourage students to join the clergy.” Pasta tycoon Reza Motallebi Kashani, who heads another Iranian political business empire, was one of the founding members of this institution. 

Hejazi was deputy commander of  the IRGC’s Tharrallah Headquarters, which is tasked with the  security of the Iranian Capital and put down unrest during the protests that followed the 2009 presidential election. 

Some of his other positions included deputy commander-chief of the  IRGC, Commander of IRGC forces in Lebanon, and Commander of the Basij Forces (1997-2007).

• Commodore Asghar Saleh Isfahani previously headed the Iran-Oman Joint Military Commission, deputy for planning and budget for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic. 

• Brigadier General Qasem Taqizadeh was deputy defense minister and headed the Atomic Energy Organization under the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi.

• Gholam Ali Movahedi is involved with various companies belonging to the Armed Forces, such as Shiraz Electronic Industries and the IRGC’s Sepah Cooperative Foundation (BTS) companies such as Alamas Hekmat Iranian Investment, Soroush Eqtesad Mehr, Zomorrod Fam Persian and Soroush Hekmat Iranian. He also is connected to the Sobh Qarib Iranian Foundation.

• Mostafa Esbati  has held positions such as head of the Defense Ministry’s Marine Industries Organization and the head of the Armed Forces Social Security Organization. He has been a board member of Armed Forces companies. 

• Mohammad Eslami is the current Minister of Roads and Urban Development and a member of the board of the Armed Forces Cooperative Organization, also known as ETKA Holding. He has held positions in the Islamic Revolution Committees, various defense industry organizations and Mostazafan Foundation (BM) companies. He teaches at Malek Ashtar University of Technology, formerly headed by assassinated nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. 

Adishehaye Imam Khomeini Culture and Research Institute 

Established in April 21, 2012, the institute’s articles of association say it is a “seminary” institution that will  “set up centers in elementary [schools], high schools and universities to encourage students to join the clergy.” Motallebi Kashani was one of the founding members of this institution. Other members include:

• Mohammad Hosseinzadeh Hejazi stands out among the founding members of Adishehaye Imam Khomeini Institute, as he is IRGC and was recently appointed as Deputy Quds Force Commander.¹

He was deputy commander of  the IRGC’s Tharrallah Headquarters which is tasked with the  security of the Iranian Capital and put down unrest during the protests that followed the 2009 presidential election.

Some of his other positions include deputy commander-chief of the  IRGC, Commander of IRGC forces in Lebanon, and Commander of the Basij Forces (1997-2007).

Public records show that Hejazi is also one  of the founders of the Defense Ministry Auditing firm along with Ahmad Vahidi (IRGC-QF), Asghar Saleh Isfahani (IRGC-Navy), Qasem Taqizadeh (IRGC), Gholam Ali Movahedi (IRGC), Mostafa Esbati, and Mohammad Eslami.

Vahidi is the former Quds Force commander,  former defense minister, and current member of the expediency council.

The post New IRGC Head Ahmad Vahidi Tied to Secretive Defense Ministry Audit Entity appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

Even as the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, continues to operate in the shadows. He is rumoured to be injured, even dead, and his concealed whereabouts evoke the imagery of a “hidden Imam” central to Shi’a ideology. Although his brothers and other relatives serve on the boards of influential businesses and institutions, his name does not appear in any public business registries. This murky role has made him a useful figure in the Islamic Republic’s opaque power structure.

Until recently, regime propaganda led the Iranian public to believe that the Supreme Leader and his family refrain from business and politics. Ali Khamenei explicitly forbade his sons from engaging in such activities, an edict often repeated by hardline politicians. Behind the scenes, his son Mojtaba was the eminence grise of the Supreme Leader’s Office (Beyt-e Rahbari), acting as the go-between his father and the vast security apparatus and strategic economic empire the Beyt oversaw. 

Through his role in the Beyt,  Mojtaba has privileged knowledge of the security and financial systems that prop up the Islamic Republic’s power structures. Intentionally circular in nature, this self-reinforcing network of unelected institutions was created by the Islamic Republic’s founders to protect their interests. 

It also allowed the Khamenei family to gain control of lucrative companies in strategic industries. Legal privileges allowed the Khameneis to move vast amounts of funds–including those allotted from public coffers– across industrial sectors, funnel money abroad, and crush competition–all in an effort to maximize private profits.

The Supreme Leaders’ Financial Portfolio 

The Beyt-e Rahbari is the only entity within Iran’s ruling structure with the legal power to oversee and regulate the financial activities of major bonyads, including Astan-e Qods Razavi and the IRGC’s Sepah Cooperative Foundation and Khatam al-Anbia, as our deep dive on bonyads has shown. 

In addition, the Beyt directly oversees an array of umbrella organizations that function as predatory conglomerates as well as propaganda machines. They include: Bonyad Mostazafan (BM), Bonyad Shahid (BS), EIKO, Bonyad Sadouq, Development and Improvement of National Endowments Bonyad (BTOM), Bonyad Maskan, Endowment and Charity Affairs Organization (Oqaf), Imam Khomeini Relief Fund (IKRF), Astan Qods Razavi (AQR), Tamin Social Security Fund, Islamic Development Organization (IDO), 15 Khordad Bonyad, Islamic Economy Organization (IEO), etc.  

Though the financials of these organizations are legally shielded from the eyes of elected officials, one institution manages them all: Mofid Rahbar, an auditing firm that exclusively services the companies that fall under the Beyt’s purview. Among the 403 known organizations audited by Mofid Rahbar are book publishing, banking and food-producing brands Iranians encounter on a daily basis. Please see our Updated List of Companies Audited by Mofid Rahbar for a complete overview. 

The Khamenei Family Tree

Mojtaba’s family network operates an extensive network of businesses in strategic industries including oil & gas, construction, publishing, export/import, healthcare, media and technology. A significant number of these companies are co-owned by major bonyads. Others lead to cultural, educational or welfare organizations. Still others are linked to elected governmental bodies, such as the Tehran Municipality. The national budget funds the operating costs of many of these institutions.

Mojtaba’s brothers

While Mojtaba himself doesn’t appear in any business records, his brothers founded various charities. These ostensibly “cultural” institutions engage in the publication of books and periodicals, but also own other active companies, land, and endowed properties, which allowed them to facilitate the opaque transfers of state-owned assets. The national budget funds the operating costs of many of these institutions.

Seyed Mostafa Hosseini Khamenei

• Founding Member of the Islamic Culture Publishing Office

Seyed Meysam Hosseini Khamenei

• Rahpouyan Sepehr Charitable Foundation
• Member of the Board of Trustees and Member of the Board of Directors of Kowsar Cultural Foundation
• Founding Member of the Islamic Culture Publishing Office

Seyed Masoud Hosseini Khamenei (Seyed Mohsen Hosseini Khamenei)

• Founding Member of the Islamic Culture Publishing Office

Mojtaba’s In-Laws

Mojtaba married into the Haddad-Adel family. His father-in-law, Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, served as Majlis speaker and held positions in various think-tanks, councils and foundations including the Expediency Council.

He owns Mehr Farhang School, one of the most expensive in Iran.

His son Farideddin is a trustee of Tasnim Nour Institute, along with Meysam Khamenei. Farideddin is on the board of Tehran Times daily, Mehr News Agency, Jam-e Jam daily, National Retirement Fund-owned Omid Gostar News Agency, Hamshahri Magazines, as well as the Basij-owned Razmandegan Eslam Cultural and Educational Institute.

Haddad’s other son-in-law, Rouhollah Rezaei, is the nephew of IRGC commander and former hostage-taker Mohsen Vezvayi. After a stint in the Ministry of Communications & Technology, Rezaei resigned due to a scandal. He then joined Digikala, Iran’s version of Amazon, as VP of Innovation.

Paternal Brothers and Blood Relatives

Mojtaba’s youngest paternal uncle, the late Seyyed Ali Khamenei’s brother Mohammad Hassan, is a board member of oil and gas, petrochemical, cement, and construction companies affiliated with various financial institutions and foundations such as Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, the National Banks’ Employees Retirement, Disability, and Savings Fund, Mostazafan Foundation, the bonyad EIKO, and Tehran Municipality.

Charitable and For-Profit Organizations

Seyyed Ali Khamenei’s elder brother, Mohammad, along with his children, owns the Sadra Islamic Wisdom Foundation (Bonyad-e Hekmat-e Eslami-ye Sadra). This foundation has several subsidiary companies that provide cold storage and transportation services. Seyyed Mohammad Khamenei is the Head of the Iranology Foundation and has served two terms in the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the first term of the Assembly of Experts for the Constitution. Seyyed Ali Khamenei’s other brother, Hadi, is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Islamic History Research Institute (Pajooheshkadeh-ye Tarikh-e Eslam) and owns the Hayat-e No Cultural and Artistic Institute. Despite the closure of the Hayat-e No newspaper, this institute has not been dissolved.

Oil and Gas and Construction

Seyyed Ali Khamenei’s cousin, Vahid Vaezzadeh Khorasani (son of Fatemeh Mirdamadi), is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of some of the Martyrs Foundation’s construction companies and a board member of Pasargad Oil Company, affiliated with Tamin Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Investment Company. Vahid Vaezzadeh Khorasani is the son-in-law of Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, the Prosecutor General of the country.

Censorship

A large number of Seyyed Ali Khamenei’s relatives are members of the board of directors and board of trustees of companies, charities, foundations, and cultural institutions that have defined their scope of activity as “achieving the goals desired by the Supreme Leader and the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” “expansion of the values and ideals of the Islamic Revolution,” protecting… social norms, and promoting and popularizing the injunction of commanding right and forbidding wrong in cyberspace.”

Policymaking for the Elimination of Dissidents

Mohammad Vaezzadeh Khorasani, Khamenei’s maternal uncle’s husband, was a member of the Board of Trustees of Razavi Islamic Sciences University, affiliated with Astan Quds Razavi, before his death. Khamenei’s cousin, Sadeq Vaezzadeh Khorasani, is a member of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution (SCCR) and the Secretary General of the Iranian Council on International Relations. “Expansion of the influence of Islamic culture in society’s affairs, strengthening the cultural revolution, promoting public culture, and purifying scientific and cultural environments from materialistic ideas and negating the manifestations and effects of Westoxication” are among the goals of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution. This council has played an important role in purging universities of dissident professors. The members of this council are chosen by the Leader of the Islamic Republic, and only he can annul its approvals.

Seyed Mohammad Hosseini Khamenei 

• Representative of Mashhad in the First and Second terms of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
• Member of the Assembly of Experts for the Constitution
• Head of the Sadra Islamic Wisdom Foundation
• Head of the Iranian Studies Foundation
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Hekmat Sara, affiliated with the Sadra Islamic Wisdom Foundation
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of the International Mulla Sadra Association, affiliated with the Sadra Islamic Wisdom Foundation
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of the House of Wisdom and Philosophy, affiliated with the Sadra Islamic Wisdom Foundation
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Iranian Scientific Association of History of Philosophy, affiliated with the Sadra Islamic Wisdom Foundation

Seyed Hadi Hosseini Khamenei

• Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Islamic History Research Institute
• CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Hayat-e No Cultural and Artistic Institute
• Managing Editor of Jahan-e Eslam newspaper
• Representative of Fariman in the First term of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
• Representative of Tehran in the Sixth term of the Islamic Consultative Assembly

Seyed Mohammad Hassan Hosseini Khamenei

• Member of the Board of Trustees of the Rassam Non-Profit University
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Sepehr Hashtom Urban Development Investment, affiliated with the National Banks’ Employees Retirement and Savings Fund
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Hegmatan Cement, affiliated with the Mostazafan Foundation
• Member of the Board of Directors of Payam-e Resa Company
• Member of the Board of Directors of Shazand Petrochemical, affiliated with Bank Melli
• Member of the Board of Directors of Firoozkooh Cement
• Member of the Board of Directors of Beenas Energy
• Member of the Board of Directors of Atmosfer Manufacturing and Industrial Plants
• Member of the Board of Directors of Chin Chin Agriculture and Industry
• Member of the Board of Trustees of Mehr Reza Pilgrim House, affiliated with Alavi Foundation (Mostazafan Foundation)
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Liser Mah Oil, Gas, Energy, and Petrochemical Company

Seyed Ahmad Hosseini Khamenei

• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Karvan Transportation, affiliated with the Sadra Islamic Wisdom Foundation
• Member of the Board of Directors of Autosard Company, affiliated with the Sadra Islamic Wisdom Foundation
• Member of the Board of Directors of the International Mulla Sadra Association, affiliated with the Sadra Islamic Wisdom Foundation
• Treasurer of Homaye Hekmat Charity

Seyed Mehdi Hosseini Khamenei

• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Homaye Hekmat Charity
• CEO of Homaye Hekmat Charity
• Member of the Board of Directors of Ehya Fanavar Abzar
• Member of the Board of Directors of the Iranian Scientific Association of Qur’anic Miracles
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Alvand Catalyst Pioneers
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Hirad Mohaqeq Iranian Medical Equipment
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Yாவarandishan Salamati Company
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Hirad Teb Abzar Qeshm
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Khorasan Khodro Exhaust, affiliated with Iran Khodro
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Behin Roshd Qeshm
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Housing Cooperative of the Rehabilitation Faculty of Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Akam Sazeh Atieh Company

Seyyedeh Zohreh Hosseini Khamenei

• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Homaye Hekmat Charity
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Rouh Al-Jinan Cultural Institute of Qur’an and Etrat, affiliated with Nahj al-Balagha Foundation

Seyyedeh Monireh Hosseini Khamenei

• Member of the Board of Directors of Homaye Hekmat Charity
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Clean Cyberspace Developers Association (Famp)
• Faculty Member of K. N. Toosi University of Technology

Seyyedeh Zahra Hosseini Khamenei

• Member of the Board of Directors of Homaye Hekmat Charity
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Rahab Sazeh Parsian

Seyed Mohammad Reza Hosseini Khamenei

• Member of the Board of Directors of Homaye Hekmat Charity

Seyed Mohammad Hosseini Khamenei (not to be mistaken with Seyyed Ali Khamenei’s brother, Mohammad)

• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Ehya Fanavar Abzar
• CEO and Member of the Board of Directors of Ideh Pardazan Pishro Rah Ayandeh Company

Maryam Hosseini Khamenei

• Member of the Board of Directors of Hayat-e No Cultural and Artistic Institute

Seyed Mohammad Hossein Hosseini Khamenei

• Member of the Board of Directors of Hayat-e No Cultural and Artistic Institute
• CEO and Member of the Board of Directors of Andisheh Khalaq Adak Company
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Andisheh Khalaq Ider Company
• Chief Inspector of the Board of Directors of Arzesah Sazan Ayandeh Pooya Company
• Member of the Board of Directors of Rahab Sazeh Parsian

Seyed Hassan Hosseini Khamenei

• Member of the Board of Directors of Ehya’e Sanaye Khorasan
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Autosard Company, affiliated with the Sadra Islamic Wisdom Foundation

Seyed Hamed Hossein Hosseini Khamenei

• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Lemir Qeshm Engineering Services

Mohammad Vaezzadeh Khorasani (Maternal Uncle’s Husband) (1925-2016)

• Member of the Board of Trustees of Razavi Islamic Sciences University, affiliated with Astan Quds
• Member of the Board of Directors of the Islamic Research Foundation of Astan Quds Razavi
• Director of Astan Quds Razavi magazine
• First Secretary General of the World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought

Sadeq Vaezzadeh (Khorasani)

• Member of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution (SCCR)
• Member of the Expediency Discernment Council
• Member of the SCCR’s Specific Council
• Member of the Board of Directors of Iran Aluminum Company, affiliated with the Steel Employees Retirement Fund
• Head of the Iranian-Islamic Model of Progress Center
• Head of the SCCR’s Cultural and Scientific Monitoring and Evaluation Board

Hessamuddin Vaezzadeh

• Head of the Iranian Council on International Relations
• Faculty Member of the University of Tehran

Hamed Vaezzadeh Khorasani (Hamed Vaez)

• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Arfa Steel and Iron
• Member of the Board of Directors of Pasargad Oil Company, affiliated with Tamin Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Investment Company
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Omran va Tose’e Atieh Shahedan Khorasan, affiliated with the Martyrs Foundation
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Asman Afarin Construction Company, affiliated with the Martyrs Foundation

Khamenei’s Wife’s Family

The family of Seyyed Ali Khamenei’s wife, Mansoureh Khojasteh Bagherzadeh, has also benefited from government rents due to their family connection to the Leader of the Islamic Republic. Hassan Khojasteh Bagherzadeh, Khamenei’s brother-in-law, in addition to holding various positions in the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), is also a board member of companies such as Soroush Publications and Tasvir-e Shahr. He is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the Farabi Cinema Foundation.

Hassan’s son, Komeil Khojasteh Bagherzadeh, manages Khamenei’s official website and is the CEO of Tabyan Noor Cultural and Artistic Institute. Komeil Khojasteh Bagherzadeh is one of the founders of the Institute for Research and Explanation of the Discourse of the Islamic Revolution, whose goals include “explaining and promoting the main indices of the Islamic Revolution from the perspective of Imam (Khomeini) and the Supreme Leader” and “promoting the views of… thinkers aligned with the trend of the Islamic Revolution to explain the discourse of the Islamic Revolution.”

Khamenei’s other brother-in-law, Mohammad Khojasteh Bagherzadeh, is a board member of Iran Red Crescent Investment Company and its subsidiaries, such as Helal Agriculture and Industry. Mohammad Khojasteh Bagherzadeh’s children own a complex of companies producing food products, construction and urban development, and waste management. One of Mansoureh Khojasteh Bagherzadeh’s nephews, Mohammad Saeed Ahadian, is the CEO of the Khorasan Cultural and Artistic Institute, which publishes the Khorasan newspaper. Ahadian is also the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Khorasan Province Press House, which oversees all media in Khorasan.

Hassan Khojasteh Bagherzadeh

• Member of the Board of Trustees of the Farabi Cinema Foundation
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Soroush Publications
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tasvir-e Shahr
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tasvir-e Shahr
• Member of the Board of Directors of Toos Taymaz
• CEO of Asa Toos Food Products

Komeil Khojasteh Bagherzadeh

• CEO of Ayatollah Khamenei’s Official Website
• CEO of Tabyan Noor Cultural and Artistic Institute
• Member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for Research and Explanation of the Discourse of the Islamic Revolution
• Member of the Board of Directors of Mirath-e Ahl-e Qalam

Mohammad Khojasteh Bagherzadeh

• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Khojasteh Charitable Foundation
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of the MS Association of Razavi Khorasan Province
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Mashhad Behrouz Food Products
• Member of the Board of Directors of Helal Agriculture and Industry, affiliated with Iran Red Crescent Investment Company
• Member of the Board of Directors of Iran Red Crescent Investment Company, affiliated with the Iranian Red Crescent Organization
• Member of the Board of Directors of Toos Taymaz
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Toohid Golmakan Men’s Retirement Home
• CEO of Asa Toos Food Products

Masoud Khojasteh Bagherzadeh

• CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Toos Taymaz Company
• CEO of Bahar Gostar Pazh Company
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Asa Toos Iranian
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Mashhad Behrouz Food Products
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Asa Toos Food Products
• Member of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative of Small Industries of Khorasan Can and Jam Factories
• Member of the Board of Directors of Narjes Khatoun Chenaran Charity

Taktam Khojasteh Bagherzadeh

• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Mashhad Behrouz Food Products

Atefeh Khojasteh Bagherzadeh

• Member of the Board of Directors of Mashhad Behrouz Food Products
• Member of the Board of Directors of Asa Toos Food Products
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Azhman Framemari Shahr Consulting Engineers

Saeed Khojasteh Bagherzadeh

• CEO of Mashhad Behrouz Food Products
• CEO and Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Khojasteh Charitable Foundation
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Asa Toos Food Products
• Member of the Board of Directors of Ferdowsi Industrial Town of Khorasan
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Narjes Khatoun Chenaran Charity
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Asa Toos Iranian
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Toos Taymaz

Mohammad Saeed Ahadian

• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Khorasan Press House
• Member of the Board of Trustees and CEO of Khorasan Cultural and Artistic Institute
• Member of the Board of Directors of the Central Foundation for Imam Reza Pilgrims
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Rooyesh Cultural Development Center
• CEO of Danesh Pooyan Toos

Mahdavi Kani and Bagheri Kani Families

Brothers Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani and Mohammad Bagher Bagheri Kani were powerful politicians central to the Islamic Republic’s power structure. The marriage of Mesbah al-Hoda, one of the sons of Mohammad Bagher Bagheri Kani, a member of the Board of Trustees of Imam Sadiq University, to Hoda, the daughter of Seyyed Ali Khamenei, solidified the family’s political and economic writ. Mesbah al-Hoda Bagheri is a professor at Imam Sadiq University. Mohammad Amin Bagheri Kani (Hoda Khamenei’s brother-in-law) also teaches at Imam Sadiq University. Ali Bagheri Kani (Hoda Khamenei’s other brother-in-law), who also graduated from Imam Sadiq University, was previously the Director-General for Central Europe at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as the Deputy Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council for Foreign Policy and International Security for a period and currently serves as an advisor in this council. In the 2013 election, Ali Bagheri Kani was the head of Saeed Jalili’s election headquarters.

During his lifetime, Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani was one of the five clerical members of the Islamic Revolution Council and the third Chairman of the Assembly of Experts. During his presidency of the Assembly of Experts, Mahdavi Kani appointed his son-in-law, Ebrahim Ansariyan (brother of the famous Sheikh Hossein Ansariyan), as the head of his office. Mahdavi Kani was also a member of the Board of Trustees and the President of Imam Sadiq University. Before his death, Mahdavi Kani divided the important positions of Imam Sadiq University among his relatives, including his daughters, sons, grandchildren, and sons-in-law. For example, Qodsiah Sorkhei, Mahdavi Kani’s wife, is the head of the Sisters’ Campus of Imam Sadiq University. After Mahdavi Kani’s death, his brother, Mohammad Bagher Bagheri Kani, served as the President of Imam Sadiq University for a time. It should be noted that Mahdavi Kani’s son, Mohammad Saeed, is the son-in-law of the Head of the Martyrs Foundation, Seyyed Mohammad Ali Shahidi Mahallati, and Mahdavi Kani’s grandson, Farid Mirlohi, is the son-in-law of Alireza Panahian, a cleric close to Seyyed Ali Khamenei and an advisor to the Head of the Leader’s Representation Office in Universities.

Mohammad Bagher Bagheri Kani

• Former Member of the Assembly of Experts
• Former President of Imam Sadiq University
• Head of Imam Sadiq Schools

Mesbah al-Hoda Bagheri Kani

• Member of the Board of Directors of Islamic Culture Publishing Office
• Imam Sadiq University, Faculty of Management and Islamic Knowledge

Ali Bagheri Kani

• Diplomat in Nuclear Negotiations
• Director-General for Central Europe at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Deputy Secretary for Foreign Policy and International Security at the Supreme National Security Council
• Advisor to the Supreme National Security Council
• Manager of Saeed Jalili’s Election Headquarters in 2013

Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani (1931-2014)

• Member of the Second, Third, and Fourth terms of the Expediency Discernment Council
• Chairman of the Assembly of Experts
• President of Imam Sadiq University
• Secretary General of the Combatant Clergy Association

Qodsiah Sorkhei

• Head of the Sisters’ Campus of Imam Sadiq University
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Iranian Scientific Association of Family Jurisprudence and Law

Sediqeh (Maryam) Mahdavi Kani

• Vice Chairman of the Iranian Scientific Association of Family Jurisprudence and Law
• Deputy Head of the Sisters’ Campus of Imam Sadiq University
• World Union of Muslim Women

Ebrahim Ansariyan (Husband of Sediqeh Mahdavi Kani)

• Former Head of the Office of the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts
• Credit Cooperative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Employees
• Member of the Board of Directors of the Consumption and Services Cooperative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Employees
• Treasurer of Ghadir Velayat Alavi Charity
• Member of the Board of Directors of Imam Sadiq Educational Complex
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Louh Zarrin Jame’ Commercial Company, affiliated with Jame’at al-Imam al-Sadiq Holding
• Member of the Board of Directors of the Islamic Services Foundation
• Member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Supporters of Seminary Development

Zohair Ansariyan

• Head of Selection at Imam Sadiq University

Zoha Ansariyan

• Sisters’ Campus of Imam Sadiq University

Mohammad Saeed Mahdavi Kani

• Member of the Board of Trustees of Imam Sadiq University
• Member of the Board of Trustees of Jame’at al-Imam al-Sadiq Holding
• Member of the Board of Trustees of Imam Sadiq University Credit Institution
• Inspector of Taher Iran Company, affiliated with Jame’at al-Imam al-Sadiq Holding

Mahdieh Mahdavi Kani

• Head of Selection at the Sisters’ Campus of Imam Sadiq University

Seyed Mostafa Mirlohi (Husband of Mahdieh Mahdavi Kani)

• Member of the Board of Trustees of Imam Sadiq University
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Jame’at al-Imam al-Sadiq
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Taher Iran, affiliated with Jame’at al-Imam al-Sadiq Holding
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Khazar Steel Melting Complex, affiliated with Jame’at al-Imam al-Sadiq Holding
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Nakhiran Spinning and Weaving, affiliated with Jame’at al-Imam al-Sadiq Holding
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Imam Sadiq Educational Complex
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Rahjoyan Rah Emam Hadi Institute
• Member of the Board of Trustees of Sardar-e Jangal Rasht Higher Education Institute
• Member of the Board of Trustees of Toloo-e Mehr Higher Education Institute
• Member of the Board of Directors of Ghadir Velayat Alavi Charity
• Member of the Board of Directors of Safiran Sobh Rooyesh Institute
• Member of the Board of Directors of Mehdi Jan Weaving
• Alternate Member of the Board of Directors of the Islamic Services Foundation
• Alternate Member of the Board of Directors of Andisheh Yaran Mohseni
• Alternate Member of the Board of Directors of the International Ghadir Foundation

Loulachian Family

Meysam Khamenei married the daughter of a religious merchant from Tehran, Mahmoud Loulachian. Loulachian is one of the founders of Imam Mohammad Baqir Seminary and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Dar-e Rah-e Haqq Institute. He also enjoys many privileges in the Islamic Republic system due to his kinship with Seyyed Ali Khamenei. Hossein Loulachian, Meysam Khamenei’s brother-in-law, is the CEO of Kowsar Cultural Foundation and a board member of the Tariq al-Quds Jonoub Interest-Free Loan Fund. Hossein Loulachian is an eulogist at the Leader’s Office mourning ceremonies.

Meysam Khamenei’s other brother-in-law, Alireza Loulachian, was the CEO of Tasnim Noor Institute, affiliated with the Islamic Development Organization, for 14 years. The Islamic Development Organization is one of the institutions covered by Seyyed Ali Khamenei’s office. Alireza Loulachian, along with Meysam Khamenei, is a board member of the newly established Rahpouyan Sepehr Foundation, which operates “to achieve the goals desired by the Supreme Leader and the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran in all social, cultural, health and treatment, environment and natural resources, construction and development, technology, international affairs, infrastructure, sports, and tribal fields.” Meysam Khamenei’s brother-in-law (by marriage to his wife’s sister), Mohsen Chini-Foroushan, has a history of management at the Institute for the Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults (Kanoon-e Parvaresh-e Fekri-ye Koodakan va Nojavanan), Hamshahri Institute, Islamic Culture Publishing Office, and membership in the Supreme Council of Research and Educational Planning for Textbooks.

Mahmoud Loulachian

• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Dar-e Rah-e Haqq Institute
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tariq al-Quds Jonoub Interest-Free Loan Fund
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Islamic Education Society
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Mosque Builders’ Philanthropists Association
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Kowsar Cultural Foundation
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Fajr Clothing Foundation
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Islamic Culture Publishing Office
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Iranian Anti-Smoking Association
• CEO of Ershad va Refah Imam Sadiq Charity Foundation, affiliated with Dar-e Rah-e Haqq Institute
• CEO of Eskan Yavar Company, affiliated with Dar-e Rah-e Haqq Institute
• Member of the Board of Directors of the Cultural Publications of the Headquarters for the Establishment of Prayer
• Member of the Board of Directors of Mahdi Mow’oud Cultural Foundation
• Member of the Board of Directors of Sadiq Pardisan Culture Creators
• Member of the Board of Directors of Nahj al-Balagha Foundation
• Member of the Board of Directors of Enfaq Thulth Charity
• Member of the Board of Trustees of the Association of Supporters of Seminary Development (Al-e Mohammad (PBUH) Donation Association)
• Founding Member and Executive Board Member of the Philanthropists’ Association of Astan and Dar al-Hadith, affiliated with Astan Abdul Azim
• Member of the Board of Trustees and Board of Directors of the International Ghadir Foundation
• Founder of Imam Mohammad Baqir Seminary
• Member of the Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces (JAMNA)

Hossein Loulachian

• CEO of Kowsar Cultural Foundation
• Member of the Board of Directors of Tariq al-Quds Jonoub Interest-Free Loan Fund
• Member of the Board of Directors of Eskan Yavar Company, affiliated with Dar-e Rah-e Haqq Institute
• Member of the Board of Directors of Ershad va Refah Imam Sadiq Charity Foundation, affiliated with Dar-e Rah-e Haqq Institute
• CEO of Siyahat Ferdows Iranian Company, a subsidiary of Ershad va Refah Imam Sadiq Charity Foundation
• Member of the Board of Directors of Mashhad Sadiqi’yeh Hotel, a subsidiary of Siyahat Ferdows Iranian Company
• Member of the Board of Directors of Qom Sadiqi’yeh Hotel, a subsidiary of Siyahat Ferdows Iranian Company
• Member of the Board of Directors of Tondar Parts and Service Distribution
• Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tittow Toys, Entertainment, and Stationery
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Yavar Sanat Parnian
• Member of the Board of Directors of Kowsarieh Tehran Seminary
• Eulogist at the Leader’s Office

Alireza Loulachian

• Member of the Board of Directors of Kowsar Cultural Foundation
• Member of the Board of Directors of Rahpouyan Sepehr Charitable Foundation
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tarh-e Naqsh-e Ilia
• Former Member of the Board of Directors and CEO of Tasnim Noor Institute, affiliated with the Islamic Development Organization
• Member of the Board of Directors of Kish Institute of Science and Technology
• Member of the Board of Directors of Tariq al-Quds Jonoub Interest-Free Loan Fund

Mohsen Chini-Foroushan

• Former CEO of the Institute for the Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults
• Representative of the Minister of Education on the Board of Directors of Fajr Clothing Foundation
• Member of the Board of Trustees of Ayin-e Roshan Cultural Foundation
• Chairman of the Board of Directors of Offset Company
• Member of the Board of Directors of Ershad va Refah Imam Sadiq Charity Foundation, affiliated with Dar-e Rah-e Haqq Institute
• CEO of Islamic Culture Publishing Office
• CEO of Hamshahri Institute
• Member of the Board of Directors of Payam-e Hamshahri Company
• Former Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tasnim Noor Institute, affiliated with the Islamic Development Organization
• CEO of Persia International Film Institute for Children and Young Adults
• Member of the Board of Directors of Roshangaran Elm va Honar Institute
• Member of the Supreme Council of Research and Educational Planning for Textbooks
• Member of the Supreme Council of the Parents and Teachers Association
• Member of the Supreme Council of Art Center Policymaking
• and …

Kharazi Family

The marriage of Seyyed Masoud Khamenei to Sousan Kharazi created another influential clan in Iran’s power structure. Masoud’s father-in-law, Mohsen Kharazi, was a member of the Assembly of Experts and the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom before his death. Mohammad Baqer Kharazi, Masoud Khamenei’s brother-in-law, is the Secretary General of Hezbollah of Iran.

Mohammad Sadeq Kharazi, Masoud’s other brother-in-law, held important positions, such as Deputy Head of the War Propaganda Headquarters in the Supreme Defense Council and Member of the Central Council of the War Support Headquarters (at the age of 20), Member of the Supreme Council of National Defense (at the age of 22), Advisor to the CEO of the Islamic Republic News Agency (at the age of 23), Advisor to the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (at the age of 25), Representative of the Islamic Republic to the United Nations (at the age of 26), and Iranian Ambassador to France. He also owns Hermes Publications and Hafez Shiraz Non-Profit University.

The post Iran’s Invisible Supreme Leader appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

1.    Iran is run by a network of powerful clans who are connected through marriage, shared business interests and common allegiances to the IRGC and major bonyads.

Political Business Empires

2.    Each clan fosters connections to high politics, state-funded media or charities and lucrative industries, appointing friends and family members to strategic positions whenever possible.

Mohsen Rezaei and Family at Tabnak News

3.    State-run media is an especially powerful tool. The clans own major news agencies like Tabnak (Mohsen Rezaei), Fars News (Seyyed Nezalmodin Mousavi) or newspapers like Hamshahri (Qalibaf), Khorasan (Mohammad Saeed Ahdian) and Iran (the Khameneis). They use these media outlets, which are mostly funded by taxpayers, to attack their political or business rivals or to dispel corruption allegations.

4.    Those with business activities in the media sphere often also run the institutions that control censorship boards and limit press freedom. This further empowers them to eliminate critics.

Motahari Family Interests in Business and the Media

5.    In the case of Khorasan newspaper, the Khamenei clan used religious courts to remove the publication’s reformist editor-in-chief and replace him with clan member Mohammad Saeed Ahdian.

Khamenei Family Interests in Media

6.    Tehran MP Seyyed Nezalmodin Mousavi, who directs the regulatory Muslim Journalists Association, used his clout in several media outlets to win a seat in the Majles.

Mousavi’s Roles in Politics, Bonyads and the Media

7.    Other clans, like the Dastgheibs and the Tajgardoons, have so much power in their respective provinces that they do not need to own the media to silence their opponents.

The Dastgheib Family Empire

8.    Both the Dastgheibs and the Tajgardoons have reportedly intimidated their critics with the help of local authorities.

The Immense Web of Gholamreza Tajgardoon

9.    Well-known political figures like IRGC founder Mohsen Rezaei use their clan’s clout to expand control over unelected political bodies.

Mohsen Rezaei’s Complete Network

10. Rezaei appoints his friends and relatives to the Expediency Council, then uses their votes to veto Majles bills that clash with his own interests.

Mohsen Rezaei’s Bloc in the Expediency Council

The Takeaway: This dynamic is set up to help the clans stay in charge at the expense of the public. Conflict of interest laws are weak, and the government institutions intended to uphold them, such as the Majles, the judiciary, or the Tehran municipality, are under the control of the same clans who continuously break the rules.

The post Political Business Empires: An Overview appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

The search for solutions to Iran’s endemic corruption problem inevitably begins with the identification of its main structural cause: the lack of accountability of Iran’s ruling institutions, especially those whose economic activities fall under the oversight of the Supreme Leader’s Office (Beyt-e Rahbari). 

The Beyt is the only entity within Iran’s ruling structure with the legal power to oversee and regulate the financial activities of major bonyads, including Astan-e Qods Razavi and the IRGC’s Sepah Cooperative Foundation and Khatam al-Anbia, as our deep dive on bonyads has shown. 

In addition, the Beyt directly oversees an array of umbrella organizations that function as predatory conglomerates as well as propaganda machines. They include: Bonyad Mostazafan (BM), Bonyad Shahid (BS), EIKO, Bonyad Sadouq, Development and Improvement of National Endowments Bonyad (BTOM), Bonyad Maskan, Endowment and Charity Affairs Organization (Oqaf), Imam Khomeini Relief Fund (IKRF), Astan Qods Razavi (AQR), Tamin Social Security Fund, Islamic Development Organization (IDO), 15 Khordad Bonyad, Islamic Economy Organization (IEO), etc.  

Though the financials of these organizations are legally shielded from the eyes of elected officials, one institution manages them all: Mofid Rahbar, an auditing firm that exclusively services the companies that fall under the Beyt’s purview. Among the 403 organizations audited by Mofid Rahbar are book publishing, banking and food-producing brands Iranians encounter on a daily basis. Please see our Updated List of Companies Audited by Mofid Rahbar for a complete overview. 

Updated List of Companies Audited by Mofid Rahbar

The protection of the Beyt-e Rahbari means these organizations are exempt from tax obligations, anti-corruption regulation and financial reporting rules. They are also entitled to government grants. According to available data, which does not include undisclosed grants to larger bonyads like BM, AQR or EIKO, government allotments to Beyt-controlled institutions totalled 35,717 billion Toman, around 5.9 percent of the 2021-2022 national budget. The companies are managed by a kinship network of several hundred people who simultaneously hold dozens of positions on the corporate boards of these businesses, according to whistleblower testimonies.

Budget Grants to Select Supreme Leader Institutions in 2021-22

Source: Iran’s National Budget

The legal privileges outlined above allow these executives to move vast amounts of funds–including those allotted from public coffers– across industrial sectors, funnel money abroad, and crush competition–all in an effort to maximize private profits.

“Even though these institutions are effectively using public funds or (or in case of institutions such as the Bonyad Mostazafan, public properties which were handed over in the early years of the IRI), it is impossible to audit their accounts,” states Transparency, Corruption and Accountability in Iran, a paper recently published by Small Media Foundation. 

The paper’s author notes that the non-state, ostensibly “public” institutions overseen by the Supreme Leader are legally exempt from the control of the Supreme Auditing Council (SAC), an independent, Majles-linked entity which is “in charge of auditing all accounts of government ministries and state institutions.”

Throughout Iran’s post-1989 history, elected government bodies made occasional efforts to regulate the institutions overseen by the Beyt. One such moment was in 1996, when President Akbar Rafsanjani asked the Guardian Council to clarify whether the SAC’s auditing authority would be expanded to certain non-state public institutions including those led by the Supreme Leader, according to Small Media. But here, as in other cases, the “circular structure” of Iran’s government ensured that non-elected public institutions remain accountable only to the Supreme Leader and each other: “The Guardian Council responded that, in its view, the SAC only has the authority to audit the sections of institutional budgets that were directly provided by the government’s annual budget, and nothing more.

Later, in 2001, Mohammad Khatami’s reformist government founded the Organization for Collection and Sale of State-owned Properties of Iran (OCSSPI), challenging the bonyad EIKO’s monopoly over properties seized according to Article 49 of Iran’s constitution. For the following decade, these two organizations were in conflict over jurisdiction. Chief Justice Sadeq Larijani settled the dispute in a 2013 directive, recognizing EIKO as “the only organization with jurisdiction over properties belonging to [the supreme leader].”¹

Later, in 2001, Mohammad Khatami’s reformist government founded the Organization for Collection and Sale of State-owned Properties of Iran (OCSSPI), challenging the bonyad EIKO’s  monopoly over properties seized according to Article 49 of Iran’s constitution. For the following decade, these two organizations were in conflict over jurisdiction. Chief Justice Sadeq Larijani settled the dispute in a 2013 directive, recognizing EIKO as “the only organization with jurisdiction over properties belonging to [the supreme leader].”/p>

The post The Supreme Leader’s Vortex of Corruption appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

Mofid Rahbar, the accountancy that exclusively services organizations overseen by Ayatollah Khamenei’s office (Beyt-e Rahbari), audits 403 private businesses and other organizations with privileged access to tax exemptions and government grants. They include book publishing, banking and food-producing brands Iranians encounter on a daily basis.

Mofid Rahbar was established in 1993 as an auditing firm that, according to its website, offers “professional services to institutions and agencies supervised by the Office of the Supreme Leader.”

Since we last reported on the firm in 2019, the list of organizations overseen by Mofid Rahbar increased from 289 to 403. In the past three years, Beyt-e Rahbari’s portfolio of companies in the tech sector doubled. Its holdings in the financial sector increased 63 percent, while the number of pharmaceutical and healthcare companies increased 21 percent.

Mofid Rahbar reported 750 billion rials (17,857,143 USD)¹ in assets in October 2021, up from 360 billion rials (10,800,000 USD) in 2019.

Updated List of Companies Audited by Mofid Rahbar

Mofid Rahbar has been the board inspector² on several newly-established companies owned by Khamenei’s bonyads:

1- Bonyad to Support Missionaries and Missionary Activities on the International Arena  (Est. October 18, 2021)

This institution is a subsidiary of the Endowment and Charity Affairs Organization (Oqaf) and its main activities are “providing financial resources to support missionary activities internationally through the endowment of facilities and grants to missionaries.” The trustees/board members of this new institution include several members of the SL inner circle including :

• Mahmoud Lolachian (trustee)- Lolachian is the father-in-law of Khamenei’s youngest son, Meysam. Lolachian is involved in a wide range of businesses and charities.

• Seyyed Mehdi Khamoushi (trustee)- a cleric with close ties to Ayatollah Khamenei as well as Majles Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and other members of the Islamic  Republic ruling elites. He is a member of the Tehran Seminary’s Management Council, serving as the secretary of the council. He is the current head of Oqaf and the former head and a trustee of the Islamic Development Organization (IDO).

• Abuzar Ebrahimi Torkaman (trustee)- is the current head of the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO). Torkaman has served as a cultural attache for the Islamic Republic in Turkmenistan, Turkey, and the Russian Federation.   

• Mehdi  Ahari Mostafavi (Board Member)- Some of his past/ present positions include: former head of the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO), the Islamic Republic’s envoy to Austria, and Germany, Deputy Foreign Minister, deputy head of the SL Office’s international directorate, and Member of the Islamic Republic’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations. Mostafavi was also involved in the US Embassy takeover and hostage-taking crisis (Nov 4, 1979 – Jan 20, 1981) and his appointment as the Iran envoy to Germany in 1987 drew criticism from the US state department citing concerns “that Mostafavi might use his position to help establish a terrorist network in Europe”, according to a Chicago Tribune article.

• Majid Meshki (CEO)- is a cleric who also heads the Almurtaza International Institution, which produces propaganda in different languages and trains international missionaries to spread the Supreme Leader’s ideology. 

• Ali Abbasi (trustee)- is a cleric who heads the Al-Mostafa International University (Jameat-ol-Mostafa Al-Alamiya). The University has been sanctioned by the US treasury for  being “a recruiting ground for the IRGC-Qods Force.” The university received 487 billion Toman  (115,952, 381 USD) in the 2021-2022 calendar year.

• Alireza Erafi (trustee)- a member of the Guardian Council,  who was formerly the president of Al-Mustafa International University  (See Above) and the Friday prayer leader of Qom and Meybod.

• Mostafa Morsali (trustee)- Another cleric with close ties to Ali Khamenei and one of the founders of the Islamic Revolution Committees that dispatched impromptu justice to perceived enemies of the 1979 Revolution in the early years of the regime. He represented the supreme leader at Sharif University, traveled with Ali Akbar Velayati on diplomatic missions, and founded the Ghadir Encyclopedia Foundation with Velayati. Morsali is also the CEO of Ashura International Bonyad, which was created on the order of the supreme leader to promote Khamenei’s agenda internationally. Morsali is also a founding member and trustee of Khatam University along with Ali Akbar Salehi, the director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

• Reza Ramezani (trustee)- this cleric represents the Caspian province of Guilan in the Assembly of Experts, a powerful body that is tasked with overseeing and appointing the Supreme Leader himself, and previously headed the Islamic Center of Hamburg³ and founded a seminary in Hamburg.

• Mohsen Qomi (head trustee)- He is a member of the Assembly of Experts, a Deputy Advisor for International Affairs in the Supreme Leader’s Office, and an advisor to the Supreme Leader on International Communications. Qomi has represented SL on international visits and at universities. He was sanctioned by the US  Treasury in 2020 in recognition of his efforts to  ‘advance the Islamic Republic’s destabilizing objectives.’

2- Waqf Mandegar Multi-Branch Qard al-Hassan Fund (Est. December 27, 2021)

 This institution is also a subsidiary of the Endowment and Charity Affairs Organization (Oqaf) and its main activities include: “Holding at least 5% and at most 10% of the funds received from persons as “Qard al-Hassan (interest-free loan) Deposit” in the form of “Certificates of Participation bonds guaranteed by banks, the central bank or the government”, “Short-term investment bank deposits”, and ” Qard al-Hassan checking accounts” or a combination of them,” “granting Qard al-Hassan loans for essential needs such as employment, wedding and dowry, expenses, healthcare costs, home construction, mortgage, and renovation and repair, and tuition fees, from the remaining resources of the fund,” as well as “receiving monetary and non-monetary assistance and gifts from the government, and/or natural and juridical persons.”

Two of its notable trustees are: 

• Seyyed Mehdi Khamoushi (trustee)- a cleric with close ties to Ayatollah Khamenei (see above).

• Alireza Hoshyar Aq Qaleh (trustee)- he is connected to various businesses and bonyads controlled by the SL and audited by his accounting firm including the Development and Improvement of National Endowments Bonyad (BTOM) where he is a trustee.

 Other trustees and board members include several individuals who are Oqaf executives such as Saeed Khoshnoudi, Amrollah Hassaninia, and Alireza Asgari Abyaneh to name a few.

3- Pars Salamat Nano  (Est. May 3, 2020)

This company is a subsidiary of EIKO. Its articles of incorporation state it is involved in the “purchase and sale, production and distribution, import and export of all authorized commercial goods, including medical, therapeutic, hospital, dental, rehabilitation, and laboratory equipment and supplies,” “health products, cosmetics,” “upstream and downstream petrochemical, oil and gas industry products,” “all-cellulose, electrical, electronic products,” “heating and cooling installations and their installation, operation and maintenance,” “foodstuffs, agricultural and petrochemical products,” “auto parts,” and “design, manufacture, and sale of machinery and production lines used in the production of these goods and products,” as well as “producing products and services based on new technology,” “clearance of goods from domestic and international customs,” “opening letters and lines of credit,” and ‘obtaining Rial and foreign currency loans.” 

Pars Salamat Nano is listed on the Alborz Distribution Company’s website as being the producer of three-ply masks for adults and children. 

Alborz Distribution is a subsidiary of  Alborz Investment Group which is an EIKO-owned pharmaceutical holding with several subsidiaries including Atipharmed, Alborz Darou, Iran Darou, KBC, Tolid Darou, Sobhan Darou, Sobhan Oncology, Sobhan Pharma Group, etc.

Alborz Investment Group is in turn a subsidiary of Barakat Pharmaceutical Group which, according to a now redacted page on its website but available via web archive, is one of the largest pharmaceutical holdings in Iran,  with over 20 subsidiaries. This group has a 14% share in the country’s drug production market and produces 420 different drugs. 

The founding board of Pars Salamat Nano featured companies such as  Pars Bazargan (oil and gas company and subsidiary of Tadbir Energy Development Group (TDEC)), Persia Oil & Gas Industry Development Co (TDEC subsidiary),  Arman Productivity and Construction Engineers, and Petro Iranian Karkheh (Both Persia Oil & Gas subsidiary →TDEC), and NanoTech Ayandeh (SANTA).

On its website, SANTA claims to have been founded in 2019 with the aim of “Investing and commercializing nanotechnology products.” However, public records show that the company was originally founded on October 26, 2011, as Tose Ertebatat Jame Mobin a telecom company that was a subsidiary of Iran Mobin Electronic Development (IMED). IMED  (EIKO) along with Shahriyar Mahestan (BTS) and Tose Etemad Investment (BTS) were the three members of the Mobin Trust Consortium that purchased the Mobile Telecommunication Company of Iran, the largest mobile operator in the country, in 2009. 

Pars Salamat Nano was dissolved on February 19, 2022.

4- Barakat Online Insurance Broker (Est. December 10, 2019)

This EIKO-owned company is a broker of insurance policies. Public records show it is registered at the same address as Barakat Pharmaceutical Group and its founding board featured  Barakat Foundation, one of the main holdings/ subsidiaries of EIKO, Salamat Barakat, a company that manages healthcare facilities, and is involved in pharmaceutical import-exports and Refah va Tamin Atiyeh Omid, a company that “provides for the future and helps the welfare of EIKO staff, and is registered at the same address as EIKO.

It is noteworthy that one of the founding members of  Refah va Tamin Atiyeh Omid Seyyed Hessam Shams Alam is a long-time executive of Parsian Bank. EIKO owns a 45% share in Parsian Bank via several of its subsidiaries. 

5- Bina Institute (Est. June 29, 2020)

This institution is a subsidiary of the Islamic Development Organization (IDO). its articles of incorporation state it is in the business of conducting “studies on scientific, religious and policy research topics on domestic and international issues, providing quantitative and qualitative analyses,” “publishing studies and analyses through holding exhibitions and conferences,” creating “video clips, digital texts,” “social media activities,” and “providing services to institutions and organizations per the institute’s objectives.”  

One of the most notable members of this institute’s founding board is Seyyed Meysam Seyyed Salehi who happens to be to be the manager of Soroush, a controversial Iranian messenger app⁴ created to replace Telegram which IRI officials accused of stoking unrest in the country and banned⁵ during the 2017-2018 protests.

In 2018, Salehi became the CEO of Jam-e Jam Institute, which prints Jam-e Jam newspaper and runs its website. He held the position until April 2020. It should be noted that Fariduddin Haddad Adel, whose sister Zahra is married to Mojtaba Khamenei, has been a long-time board member of Jam-e Jam Institute. 

6-Barakat Health Strategy Development Co (Est. February 24, 2020)

This is another EIKO subsidiary that states its activities as “providing consulting services… hospital design and expansion, providing solutions for optimizing the use of existing spaces, providing consulting services and supply and maintenance of medical and non-medical equipment,” and “human resource management”

Barakat Foundation, Barakat Ehsan Foundation, Salamat Barakat were on its founding board.

7- Tadbir PM  (Est. November 9, 2020)

This EIKO subsidiary is a portfolio management services company. According to its articles of incorporation, the firm’s activities include:  “accepting positions in investment funds,” “risk management consulting,” “consulting in mergers, acquisitions, changes and the restructuring of companies and organizations,” as well as “consulting in the design and formation of financial institutions,”  “financial information processing activities,” “designing securities,” and “ marketing and sale of securities,” and “determining the selling price or underwriting of securities.”

8- Barakat Employment Development Qard al-Hassan Fund (Est. May 16, 2021)

This fund is a subsidiary of Barakat Foundation, one of the main holdings/ subsidiaries of EIKO.

According to its articles of incorporation, this company offers “Qard al-Hassan (interest-free) loans to create and increase employment from the fund’s excess resources,” opens “Qard al-Hassan (interest-free) bank accounts,” accepts “assistance and monetary and non-monetary gifts from the government, and/or natural and juridical persons,” and creates “any insurance coverage for the fund’s assets with insurance companies and institutions.”

9- Pishgaman Sareer Razavi Investment (Est. November 3, 2021)

A subsidiary of AQR, this company’s activities include “investing in stocks, shares of companies, investment units of funds or other securities …to make a profit by acquiring control of a company, on its own or along with its affiliate companies…, ” and “investment in coinage, precious metals, bank deposit certificates…” as well as “ import-export and customs affairs.”

10- Sina Sabad Gardan (Est. November 19, 2019)

This company is a subsidiary of Sina Financial and Investment Holding Co, which is BM’s financial holding and counts Sina Bank among its subsidiaries.

Sina Sabad Gardan is a portfolio management company and its articles of incorporation allow it to “buy, sell or hold securities in the name of a certain investor,” and “accept positions in investment funds,” among other things.

11- Arzesh Afarinan Ideh Paydar (EST. July 19, 2020)

A subsidiary of the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (IKRF), this company’s activities include “establishing new companies and partnerships with other companies for profit,” “participating in production and construction projects for profit,” “ import-export and customs affairs,” “ participating in domestic and international expos,” “offering business services, conducting studies and offering consulting services in various fields including economics, management, market, and industrial engineering,” “holding expos”, and “ sales and procurement of any and all equipment and accessories, creating online shops and e-commerce and customer clubs, project management providing any and all engineering services, financial management, non-network, and non-pyramid business management, distribution management, supply and sale of all essential accessories, and electrical and electronic equipment.”

12-Energy Gostar Dezh Nirou (EST. October 6, 2020)

A Bonyad Shahid (BS) subsidiary this company’s articles of incorporation state it is in the business of  “producing and selling electricity to individuals and legal entities inside the country and abroad, purchasing electricity, constructing new and renewable energy and hydropower power plants,” “buying and selling goods, tools, machinery, and equipment …from inside the country or abroad,” “taking necessary measures to improve productivity, optimize and develop the capacity of power plants, outsourcing technical and engineering operations (including operation, maintenance, design, installation, commissioning, supervision, development, and optimization of facilities),” “investing and financing projects related to energy, establishing or participating in value chain companies,”  and “buying and selling any and all fertilizers and their derivatives, performing other activities that are directly or indirectly related to the subject of the company’s activity” among other things.

13- Faraz PMC (Est. November 2, 2020)

Another Bonyad Shahid subsidiary, Faraz PMC is a portfolio management services company that according to its articles of incorporation is involved in a variety of ventures including “accepting positions in investment funds,” “risk management consulting”, “consulting in mergers, acquisitions, changes and the restructuring of companies and organizations,” “consulting in the design and formation of financial institutions,”  “financial information processing activities,” “designing securities,” “ marketing and sale of securities,” “determining the selling price or underwriting of securities,” “obtaining financial facilities or acquiring assets … investing in, or establishing an independent legal entity, or participating in the establishment of other legal entities,” “opening bank credit documents and import or export of goods and performing relevant customs services.”

14- Khorshid Hashtom Raouf Kowsar Hotel   (Est. January 16, 2022)

This Bonyad Shahid subsidiary carries out a wide range of activities including but not limited to “constructing, establishing, administrating, managing and operating tourism buildings, hotels, motels, restaurants and all activities related to tourism services, accommodation and catering domestically and internationally,” “buying, selling, renting, and … of hotel, motel, and restaurant buildings and facilities and equipment, objects and goods necessary for above-mentioned activities,” “establishing higher education and academic centers to train the company’s employees as well as other persons … in the tourism and hospitality industry and related services,” “investing and partnership in domestic and international companies and institutions in affairs that are directly or indirectly related to the tourism and hospitality industry,” and “conducting any financial and commercial transactions in the field of tourism and hospitality.”

15-  Tadbirsazan Safar Gostar (Est. April 12, 2022)

A subsidiary of Bonyad Maskan, this company was founded to “create and equip tourism facilities,” “ manage and operate tourism facilities,”  and “investment in tourism.”

The post The Supreme Leader’s Financial Portfolio appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

In 1992-1993, S.K. was a Tehran University law school student working at the Planning and Budget Organization, a governmental body tasked by then-President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to oversee the reconstruction of Iran’s moribund post-war economy. As a fluent English speaker with “no political baggage”, he was selected by a former professor to adapt international best practices in market competition and consumer protection to the Iranian reality. He had access to classified information about the oversight and business holdings of major bonyads, and worked alongside individuals hand-picked by the regime to become Iran’s new economic stewards. His testimony provides unique insight into the dynamics of Iran’s economy–and where it all went wrong.

In 1992, S.K.’s politically disgraced law professor recruited him to work at the PBO. The organization’s head tells him he needs a fluent English speaker with “no political baggage” to reach out to Western embassies.

Dr. Hadi Esmaeilzadeh was my research project professor.¹ In September 1992, he calls me to the faculty office and tells me that ‘we know that your English is impeccable. We need someone at the Planning & Budget Organization (PBO). I was dumbfounded that he, with his political record, with his jail record, was actually working in the faculty in PBO. He gave me an address, told me to show up at a certain time. It was late Sept by this time. I met Mahmoud Alizadeh Tabatabaie (MAT)², the head of the legal department of the whole PBO.

I told him: Are you telling me that in the whole body of the government there is nobody else who can go to these embassies and talk to them? And this is basically what they said: First of all, you are a younger person. We know that you don’t have any baggage. We know that you don’t have any certain backgrounds. Those people who do know the language and or who have been educated abroad, we can not trust them. That was the first and foremost thing. The second thing was that if they would send the typical Hezbollahi employees with some language institute translator or interpreter or something — they had done that actually — but the embassies had not received them.

Up against the radical base

SK accepted the job offer, and sought out the help of the French, Italian, British and Swedish ambassadors. Political problems mired his mission from the outset. Engagement with the Westerners resulted in hours of interrogation in the basement of the PBO herasat.³

I would ask MAT when I would go to these embassies to get model laws for our work, “Why don’t you ask [Iran’s] French embassy? Why don’t you ask [Iran’s] Brussels embassy, where all the European stuff is? Or Iranian embassy in Britain? He told me, “They do not work with us. They report to Beyt-e Rahbari [the Supreme Leader’s Office].”

I worked three days a week on an hourly basis. I did most of the work at home. When I came to work… when I was entering the building I was stopped by the Herasat and taken to the basement and I was told that I was a British spy basically.

I was there for six hours. I was interrogated about everything I had ever done in my life. And at the sixth hour I went to the basement elevator, came upstairs, took the other elevator. I went directly to the office of Rouhani Zanjani, and lo and behold I realized it was completely cordoned off. Unbeknownst to me, Rafsanjani was visiting the director. 

I sat in the office. I was really shaken by the whole experience. I tried to find Alizadeh Tabatabaie, I couldn’t find him. That’s why I went to where Tabatabaie was in the meeting–I don’t remember these parts. I could hear Rafsanjani sitting in that office talking with them. 

The conversations revealed that the economic interests of the Supreme Leader’s Office and the bonyads conflicted with those of Rafsanjani’s cash-strapped government. While the former wanted to access public coffers to fund the foreign projects of unelected revolutionary organizations, the Rafsanjani government wanted to focus on domestic economic stimulus.

I can remember what was being discussed….That the economic situation was really really bad. They were about to borrow a lot of money.⁴ I could remember all of these things. The oil prices were very low in those years, 1992-1993. And Rafsanjani was trying to brainstorm with these people. How they could make money. I also heard the word Lebanon a few times. That they were under pressure through the Jihad-e Sazandegi to help Lebanon.⁵ But Jihad-e Sazandegi was getting money from the government because it was part of the government and Rafsanjani was arguing–I vividly remember this part–was arguing that Lebanon was the supreme leader’s project. The money has to come directly from the SL’s own foundations. I heard several times “Daramadeh bonyadha barahyeh Lobnan kafieh, daramadeh bonyadha barahyeh Lobnan kafieh.”⁶ I could hear that.

In the years S.K. was employed at the PBO, the regime had lost nearly all its foreign reserves and was on the cusp of economic collapse. The Rafsanjani Administration was left with a host of confiscated properties and dilapidated factories. The president saw privatization as the only way to save these holdings from ruin, but the entrance of foreign capital was a politically unsavory move for the revolutionary elite–furthermore, it was explicitly prohibited by the Constitution. 

Rafsanjani wanted to give it back to [politically] cleared industrialists. He lobbied Khamenei to decide what form privatization would take, because he wanted a finger in the pie. He wanted to keep out the industrialists with access to U.S. dollars, and he also didn’t want to upset the radical base.

‘Like a Frankenstein monster’

The PBO also grappled with structural obstacles to privatizing state-owned enterprises in which the bonyads owned competing stakes. Before the revolution, Iran’s major industries were organized, fairly neatly, into vertical monopolies run by the “One Thousand Families,” wealthy industrialists and landowners loyal to the Shah. When Khomeinists confiscated these properties on ideological grounds, they did so without considering how they would be managed in the future. This led to the “syndrome of overlapping monopolies” that plagues the Iranian economy to this day. 

SK: “The fundamental problem was this… The Revolution court, when they confiscated everything, they didn’t know what to do with all of this so they started handing things over depending on whatever they decided to different foundations. 

So the [Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation]⁷ could have gotten part of the industries or businesses of a certain individual or a certain enterprise [that operated] in Iran under the Shah. Bonyad Shahid could have got some of that, but then Mostazafan Foundation could have gotten the other side of that same business….So there will be problems. One of the reasons that EIKO was created was that now we had horizontal monopolies that had been created like a Frankenstein monster. There were several Frankenstein monsters created out of the body organs of different monopolies that existed as coherent cohesive organic entities before the revolution.

Here, S.K. explains that the bonyad EIKO was not set up to gobble up conglomerates, but rather to arbitrate between the other bonyads under the direct control of the Supreme Leader: Mostazafan (BM), Bonyad-e Shahid and Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (IKRF).⁸

SK: EIKO was effectively at the time a judiciary headquarters for the resolution of disputes, mainly between Komiteh Emdad, Shahid and BM. That’s all that they did. In the later years of course, Beyt-e Rahbari [the Office of the Supreme Leader], which was expanding even then, assigned to EIKO all the other things that it could do. But…EIKO does not appoint the directors of the Bonyads. The [Supreme Leader] appoints the directors. The only thing that Setad Ejraee does is act as some kind of coordinating headquarters, as an arms-length entity for Beyt-e Rahbari.

The Origins of Khatam al-Anbia

Working within the framework of these nascent “monsters” was a certain paramilitary organization whose economic writ had yet to be institutionalized.

The IRGC had already started investing in building dams. I think that 1993–that’s I think the turning point of the IRGC starting to really get involved through its Khatam al-Anbia headquarters. There were also discussions that the IRGC’s resources have to be used, that they had to use the conscripts’ power, that Azad University was now churning out so many engineers. They were churning out these engineers who could get experience and offer services for free as IRGC conscripts, and started being involved in all these reconstruction projects. Roads and dams and ports were a major portion of the discussion. I did not hear anything about oil in those days.

And so Iran’s industries were torn apart, often illogically, by the clashing interests of the country’s ruling political factions. Adding to the internal disputes were the claims of politicians who represented elected governmental bodies. This led to an effort to move shares of state-owned companies to the Bank of Industry and Mine and the partial privatization of the holdings of  Iran’s Social Security Organization (Tamin). Though set up to finance necessary state expenditures into welfare and reconstruction, these mechanisms also fell victim to the predatory interests of various political actors.

SK: From the outset, it looked like everybody was trying to use these entities in order to use them as instruments of devouring the newly privatized public sector and make inroads for the purposes of money laundering and tax evasion by various investments in their subordinate enterprises.

The anti-monopoly, consumer protection and competitive market policy provisions S.K. researched were eventually included in the 2004 amendment to Article 44 of Iran’s constitution, which continues to govern privatization practices to present day.⁹ However, the institutions overseen by the Supreme Leader’s Office, as well as certain charities, religious and paramilitary endowments are exempt from many regulations. 

The post The Making of a Shadow Economy appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

Though a key component of good governance, transparency is a term often used but rarely defined. Explaining what transparency means in Iran is even trickier, because the legal structure is specifically designed to shield certain people and institutions from public scrutiny. 

“Despite its importance and wide-ranging usage in political and economic reports, scholarly literature, international regulations and conventions, the concept of transparency is not always explained or defined in the related literature,” Small Media Foundation observes in its forthcoming report, “Transparency, Corruption and Accountability in Iran.”

According to Small Media Foundation, the most comprehensive definition of transparency is to be found in a 2007 document produced by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) entitled “What is Good Governance?” This report defines transparency in the following terms:

Transparency means that decisions taken, and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.

In some countries, however, the rules are intended to further obscure, rather than clarify, the facts. “In Iran, regulations and legislation more generally can also be untransparent or are themselves a source of ambiguity,” Small Media Foundation notes, citing recent scholarship.

Tehran Bureau therefore adopts Small Media Foundation’s modified definition, which takes the specifics of the Iranian example into account:

Transparency means that decisions taken, and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations, which themselves are clear and unambiguous. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.

The post What Is Transparency? appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

One of the main purposes of Tehran Bureau’s beneficial ownership research is to uncover conflicts of interest, the prevailing mechanism of corruption in Iran and, indeed, the world. Our research shows that Iran’s clan leaders deliberately place their associates and family members into powerful positions, then exploit their conflicts of interest to strengthen and expand the clans’ political business empires. 

Given how prevalent the practice is, it is perhaps unsurprising that Iran’s conflict of interest (COI) laws fall below global standards. A whole swathe of anti-corruption legislation, including COI laws, has been stalled in the Majles (parliament) since 2019 under unusual circumstances.

Pending Legislation

Transparency International defines conflict of interest as a situation where an individual or the entity for which they work, whether a government, business, media outlet, or civil society organization, is confronted with choosing between the duties and demands of their position and their own interests. 

Currently, the IRI’s laws and regulations in this area are limited and rudimentary:

Hassan Rouhani’s administration drafted a relatively comprehensive bill consisting of 40 articles, which was presented to parliament in November 2019 as a “double urgency” bill. It has yet to receive Majles approval, and judging by media and expert opinion, its passage does not seem imminent.

The current version of the bill, “The methods of managing conflict of interest in the fulfilment of legal responsibilities and provision of public services,” is available online. The bill, shortened from an original 70 articles, has been criticized by Iranian law experts and officials as overidealistic and impractical.¹ It basically focuses on the “individual” and does not consider institutional or structural conflict of interest. 

An alternative bill, consisting of 27 articles, has been drafted by MPs and is currently being reviewed by the parliament’s social commission.² The drafting of alternative bills by the legislature is not common practice, as bills presented by the executive are supposed to take precedence over in-house parliament bills. 

Current Legal Regime

A range of existing acts, law, and regulations explicitly or implicitly deal with the issue of conflict of interest, but they are unorganized, largely undetailed, and similarly oriented toward individual, not structural or institutional, conflict of interest. Here is a list:

1. An act dating from 1958 ³: “Prohibition of the intervention of ministers and the members of the parliament[] and state employees in state and national transactions.” This is the most comprehensive law, although by international standards it is highly limited. Comprising eight main articles, it basically prohibits any employee of the state (or their close relatives⁴) from part taking in several types of transactions. Notably, retired state employees are exempt from the law. 

2. “Prohibition of receiving commission in foreign transactions” (1993 act). 

3. “Prohibition of holding more than one [governmental] occupation” (1994 act). 

4. “The act of managing civil services” (2007) has two articles, 47 and 94, that consider conflict of interest among state employees. 

5. “The act for increasing the integrity of the administrative system and for fighting corruption” (2001), especially article 5. 

6. “Implementing the general policies of article 44 of the constitution” (2007 bylaw), especially article 5 (note 1) and article 46. 
7. Finally, there is the 2015 act “Investigating the assets of authorities and officials of the IRI” and its 2019 regulative bylaw.

The post Iran’s Conflict of Interest Laws Fall Below Global Standards appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

The late statesman Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was both a founder and a victim of the kleptocratic system at the heart of the Islamic Republic. A shrewd strategist who was at once a man of the people and a ruthless elitist, his presidency, from 1989 to 1997, saw the rise of the clannish power networks and corrupt institutions that continue to paralyze Iran’s economy.

Rafsanjani unabashedly appointed his close relatives to various positions of power, helped them secure prestigious jobs, and sent them abroad to study; Rafsanjani himself never traveled abroad without several members of his family in tow. He doled out public funds to whomever he pleased: regime officials, his own family members, and the families of known terrorists.

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and his wife of almost six decades, Efat Marashi, had five children: Fatemeh (now 60), Mohsen (59), Faezeh (58), Mehdi (51), and Yaser (50). Tehran Bureau takes a look at their lives, their business interests, and their web of influential connections that extend across the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The post The Web of the Rafsanjani Clan appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

The late statesman Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was both a founder and a victim of the kleptocratic system at the heart of the Islamic Republic. A shrewd strategist who was at once a man of the people and a ruthless elitist, his presidency, from 1989 to 1997, gave rise to the clannish power networks and corrupt institutions that paralyze Iran’s economy.  

The lack of comprehensive public business records from the Rafsanjani era make tracing his family’s role in Iran’s economy difficult, but Rafsanjani was a dedicated diary keeper and one of the few IRI officials to publish annual memoirs until his suspicious death in 2017. 

These memoirs, augmented by our research into current business records and whistleblower interviews, offer a wealth of information about his relationship with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other top decision makers, family scandals, and watershed events that took place behind closed doors and were never shared with the nation. 

They also paint a picture of a man who never traveled abroad without several, if not all, members of his family in tow. Rafsanjani unabashedly appointed his close relatives to various positions of power, helped them secure prestigious jobs, and sent them abroad to study. He doled out public funds to whomever he pleased: regime officials, his own family members, and the families of known terrorists like Anis Naccache, who led a failed attempt to assassinate Shapour Bakhtiar, Iran’s last prime minister before the Islamist takeover. They also show a man who sent his children to negotiate with various countries on behalf of Iran instead of using the foreign service apparatus created specifically for this task. 

Tehran Bureau provides an in-depth look at the Rafsanjani family’s business interests. In part one of this series, we examine the network of Mohsen Hashemi, Rafsanjani’s oldest son, who has held prestigious posts in Tehran’s municipal administration, national transport, and the Expediency Council.

Overview: The Rafsanjani Children 

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and his wife of almost six decades, Efat Marashi, had five children: Fatemeh (now 60), Mohsen (59), Faezeh (58), Mehdi (51), and Yaser (50).

All five of the Rafsanjani children are involved in Daftar Nashr Maaref Enqelab (aka Office of Publishing Revolution Learnings), a publishing house dedicated to the works of Rafsanjani and works on Rafsanjani. 

• Mohsen Hashemi served as CEO and board chairman from 2004 to 2013 
• Mehdi Hashemi served as vice chairman from 2004 to 2013 
• Yaser Hashemi served as a board member and vice chairman from 2004 to 2013 
• Fatemeh Hashemi served as a board member from 2004 to 2013
• Faezeh Hashemi served as a board member from 2009 to 2013
• Emad Hashemi, son of Mohsen Hashemi, served as CEO in 2013

Official information about Daftar Nashr Maaref Enqelab’s board has not been updated since 2013.

Mohsen Hashemi 

Rafsanjani’s oldest son, Mohsen, is married to Azam Hashempour¹ and has three sons: Emad, Ehsan, and Alireza. Emad is married to Zahra Seyyed Rouhani², Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s great-granddaughter.

Mohsen, who holds a degree in mechanical engineering from a Canadian university, was involved in the IRGC missile project for at least four years, based on his September 2011 interview with Khabaronline.

At the age of 28, while his father was president, Mohsen became the head of the Presidential Office of Inspections, holding this position for eight years. When his father became the head of the Expediency Council, Mohsen became his chief of staff. He also served as Azad University’s construction deputy for four years until, in 2017, he won a seat in the 5th Tehran City Council and became its chairman. Mohsen Hashemi is the head of the central council of the Executives of Construction Party (ECP), which was founded by former cabinet members and friends of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1996. 

Mohsen Hashemi has been on the board of several companies including: 

1. Refah Cultural Bonyad (linked to Mohsen Rafiqdoust) as a board member since 2007. 

2. Tehran Metro Company as CEO, board chairman, and vice chairman for a decade (2003–2013) until he was replaced with Habibollah Bourbour.

3. Tehran Metro Station Complexes Development Co as a board member.

4. Iran Rail Association as board chairman.

5. Tehran Urban and Suburban Railway Operation (TUSRO) as board chairman and vice chairman until 2013. Other TUSRO board members who served alongside Mohsen include: 

• Habil Darvishi (board chairman), who was also the CEO of the Tehran Metro Company. He went on to become the CEO of Mofid Economic Group (EIKO) and then the CEO of the Police Co-operative Foundation.

• Jafar Rabiei (board member), who has ties to companies like Rasaneh Mehr Vatan (BTS), Kowsar Markazi Credit Institute (BTB), Ezam Management and Operation Co. (Ezam Group, Abbas Iravani³), and Parsian Oil and Gas Development (Ghadir Investment, Armed Forces).

Rabiei is the CEO of the US Treasury–sanctioned Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Co (PGPIC) and deputy of projects and planning  for the Defense Industries Organization (Armed Forces). He had a stint at the Expediency Council, and there were rumors that he was a contender for oil minister in Ebrahim Raisi’s administration.

• Mohammad Ahmadi Bafandeh (board member), a graduate of Imam Hussein University, an IRGC military academy. Bafandeh has ties to various Bonyad-owned entities such as Kowsar Agricultural Investment Co (BS) and Chemi Darou Kowsar (BS), Metra Consulting Engineers (BTS), and Iran Marine Service (Ghadir Investment). Bafandeh has previously been the mayor of Qom and Tehran’s district 1.

• Ali Mohammad Qoliha (CEO, board member), son-in-law of eulogist Mansour Arzi’s brother. Arzi is close to the supreme leader and has trained many of the Islamic Republic’s hardline eulogists including Mahmoud Karimi, who in 2014 brandished a gun and shot a few rounds during a road rage incident. Qoliha previously had positions on the board of SAIPA, a carmaker with strong ties to BTS. He also enjoys close ties with Majles speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. According to reports, Qalibaf was set to replace his executive deputy in the Majles, Hamid Aslani,⁴ with Qoliha. However, because of Qalibaf’s secretive appointments and dismissals, it is not clear whether or not he was eventually appointed to a parliamentary position. Qalibaf did, however, put Qoliha in charge of Ebrahim Raisi’s inauguration ceremony. 

• Seyyed Jafar Tashakori Hashemi (board chairman, board member), a member of the Qalibaf network.

6. Tamadon Azad Pars Tourism Development Co.

Mohsen was chairman of this company’s founding board and represented the interests of Azad Pasargad Development Co. on its board of directors. Both of these companies are Azad University subsidiaries. 

Azad Pasargad Development’s articles of incorporation describe it as an “investment company” that “manages factories in any industrial sector”  as well as participating in the “purchase, sales, packaging and distribution of all legal products,” “ investment in foreign and domestic companies” and “managing, designing, supervising and implementing construction projects, land surveying, road construction and dam construction.”

Established on May 8, 2016, Tamadon Azad Pars is involved in “investment, executing and operating projects [such as] tourism, recreational and hospitality facilities and any other activity related to tourism, raising capital and partnership with any and all foreign and domestic individuals and entities in the tourism sector . . . including hotels, hospitality centers, tourism, recreational, sports, cultural, historical, educational and business complexes,” “operating domestic and international tours via air, ground or sea,” and “partnering with production and economic units and investment in any and all domestic and international companies.”  

Other Tamadon Azad Pars board members include: 

• Mohammad Mostafa Doa-Gouei (vice chairman), who has been affiliated with SAIPA Sports Club, a multisport club based in Tehran and Karaj that owns a football team and has links to members of the Qalibaf network. He has also served on the board of bank subsidiaries such as Mellat Leasing (Bank Mellat subsidiary), Rahbaran Hadaf Arman (Bank Tose Saderat), and Dey Leasing (Bank Dey).

• Farbod Komaei (board member), who is also on the board of Azad Pasargad Development and represents the interests of ANA News Agency, which belongs to Islamic Azad University. Komaei is also the board chairman of a transportation company called Ofoq Etemad Kala Shahr-e Kord, a Bonyad Maskan subsidiary. Bonyad Maskan is one of the several bonyads overseen by the office of the supreme leader. 

• Karim Eqbal Behbahani (alternate inspector), who has been an inspector in over 125 companies in fields including industrial, petrochemical, marine services, and agriculture.

Of Mohsen Hashemi’s three sons, Alireza Hashemi Behramani has been in Switzerland since at least 2015 and is currently conducting thesis research at the University of Geneva, according to its website. Alireza and his father have two companies registered in France: Rubis D’Evian (real estate) and Rubis De Maxilly (construction and real estate). Alireza and his uncle Yaser founded another company in France in 2017, SCCV Rubis.

Alireza was the board chairman of a company called Arvin Sazan Sadid in 2007, which according to its articles of incorporation was a construction contractor with activities ranging from building bridges, tunnels, and dams to street asphalt repairs, restoration of buildings and green spaces, piping (water, sewage, gas), import-export, and other trade activities. His fellow board members are the Jannatian family, who own the Omran Sarir International Co.

The patriarch of the family, Mahmoud Jannatian, is the former deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI); he was placed on the EU sanctions list in 2008 and removed in 2015. Jannatian allegedly oversaw the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Mohsen’s oldest son, Emad, is the CEO of Daftar Nashr Maaref Enqelab (see above) and recently joined the board of Abnieh Gostar Karafarin, a Karafarin Bank (Entrepreneur’s Bank) subsidiary. EIKO is the majority shareholder in Karafarin Bank.

Abnieh Gostar Karafarin is an investment company that “does any and all legal trade transactions, construction contracting of buildings, industrial, commercial, administrative and residential complexes inside the country and abroad . . . imports construction material and anything else necessary for the company’s activity from abroad,” according to its articles of incorporation.

Mohsen’s youngest son, Ehsan, is 24 years old and does not appear to be involved in the family’s business activities. 

The post The Rafsanjani Children, Part 1: Mohsen Hashemi appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

The late statesman Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was both a founder and a victim of the kleptocratic system at the heart of the Islamic Republic. A shrewd strategist who was at once a man of the people and a ruthless elitist, his presidency, from 1989 to 1997, gave rise to the clannish power networks and corrupt institutions that continue to paralyze Iran’s economy.

The lack of comprehensive public business records from the Rafsanjani era make tracing his family’s role in Iran’s economy difficult, but Rafsanjani was a dedicated diary keeper and one of the few IRI officials to publish annual memoirs until his suspicious death in 2017. 

These memoirs, augmented by our research into current business records and whistleblower interviews, offer a wealth of information about the Rafsanjani clan’s relationships with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other top decision makers, family scandals, and pivotal events that took place behind closed doors and were never shared with the nation. 

In this series, Tehran Bureau provides an in-depth look at the Rafsanjani family’s business interests. Part one examined the network of Mohsen Hashemi, Rafsanjani’s oldest son. Now, in part two, we turn to the youngest of Rafsanjani’s three sons, Yaser Hashemi, along with his wife, Maryam Salari, and her family connections.

Yaser Hashemi

The youngest son of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Yaser Hashemi Bahramani, 50, is married to Maryam Salari.¹ They have one daughter, Leili, who is married to Mohammad Mahdi Sanei Taheri.

Yaser was one of his father’s chiefs of staff at the Expediency Council. After Rafsanjani’s death, Yaser’s office was sealed shut and he was effectively purged from the EC. Yaser was reportedly also chief of staff of Azad University’s board of trustees. Rafsanjani’s archived website states that Yaser was once in the business of cheese imports. 

According to a 2003 article in Forbes, “Yaser owns a 30-acre horse farm in the super fashionable Lavasan neighborhood of north Tehran, where land goes for over $4 million an acre. Just where did Yaser get his money? A Belgian-educated businessman, he runs a large export-import firm that includes baby food, bottled water and industrial machinery.”

Yasser’s business interests include: 

1. Raha Mehr Vatan Charity

Established in September 2019, Raha Mehr Vatan describes itself as a “non-political, not-for-profit, and non-governmental institute” that is focused on “healthcare.” The company’s board of directors consists of: 

• Yaser Hashemi – CEO and board chairman 

• Maryam Salari (wife) – vice chairman

• Leili Hashemi (daughter) – board member

• Mahmoud Salari (father-in-law; see “The Salaris,” below) – alternate board member

• Massoud Khalili – board member

Khalili was one of the founders of Iranian Equestrian Industry Co. and represented the interests of the Equestrian Federation of Iran on its board of directors (note Yaser’s horse farm mentioned in the Forbes article cited above).

• Mahmoud Yazdi – treasurer, board member

Yazdi is a long-time business partner involved in various Yaser Hashemi/Maryam Salari companies.

• Davoud Soleimani – inspector

Soleimani is connected to various other businesses linked to Yaser Hashemi’s family (see below). He is also the CEO of a travel agency called Shajareh Taneem that operates Haj tours. 

• Soraya Marashi (relative) – alternate inspector

2. Sanati Tolidi Moratab 

Yaser Hashemi was the vice chairman of Sanati Tolidi Moratab in 2007 and represented the interests of the Ahrar Markazi Institute on its board of directors. 

Established on October 7, 1957, Tolidi Moratab was the official dealer of Land Rovers in Iran and later launched an assembly line to produce the car in the country. The company was nationalized after the 1979 Revolution. Approximately 62 percent of the company’s shares are now owned by Ahrar Markazi Institute, which was established on January 23, 1994, to financially empower former POWs and war veterans, who are also its shareholders. Members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) serve as the institute’s executives. In addition to Sanati Tolidi Moratab and other companies, Ahrar owns various properties and land across the country.

On November 29, 2014, a meeting of Ahrar shareholders and the board of directors led to a group of shareholders airing their grievances to the media. By their account, Ahrar was operating without any supervision from Bonyad Shahid, the para-governmental foundation that is supposed to exercise oversight over veterans’ affairs. Shareholders, they asserted, were kept in the dark about the way the institute was run, its subsidiaries, and its finances, and they had yet to receive their requisite dividends. On February 13, 2015, Ahrar’s shareholders finally lodged a complaint with the General Inspection Organization of Iran (GIO). No updates regarding this complaint have been released.

3. Tehran Airline (fka Safat Airline)

This airline is also a subsidiary of the Ahrar Markazi Institute. It operated both passenger and cloud-seeding flights but lost its permit in 2013. The company still exists and changed its name from Safat to Tehran Airline in April 2018.

In 2006, Yaser was the board chairman of Safat Airline.

4. SCCV Rubis

Public records show that Yaser’s SCCV Rubis, headquartered in Évian, France, lists his wife, Maryam Salari, and their daughter, Leili, as partners along with his nephew Alireza. Public documents also show one Ali Bahmanpour as affiliated with the building construction company, which was established in 2017.

Maryam Salari

In addition to sitting on the board of Raha Mehr Vatan Charity (see above), Maryam Salari is connected to several travel and trade companies: 

1. Parvaz Sharq Pasargad

Established on May 10, 2010, the company’s articles of incorporation state that it is a “general contracting company for construction work, electrical work curbing and gutter services, air duct installation, residential, commercial and institutional cleaning services, catering and meal distribution services, and import-export of all legal products.” 

However, according to its website, Parvaz Sharq Pasargad has over a “decade of successful experience in aviation and tourism and has been active in marketing, sales, and travel agency and airport services.” This change of charter has not been reflected in public records. 

Maryam is the current board chairman of the company and its one-time CEO. Her brothers, Reza and Mohammad Salari, have both served on its board as vice chairmen.

Other current and former board members of Parvaz Sharq Pasargad include: 

• Mahmoud Yazdi – current vice chairman

Yazdi is also the treasurer of Raha Mehr Vatan Charity and the vice chairman of another company called Paranedeh Sefid Kahkeshan, which “obtains visas, operates domestic and international tours,” and engages in “travel ticket sales, hotel reservations, and any other activity directly or indirectly related to passenger transportation.” 

• Abtin Yazdi – current CEO

He is a board member in Paranedeh Sefid Kahkeshan (see above) and the vice chairman of a Kahkeshan Rah Parvaz Travel Agency. 

• Naser Khedrnejad – current board member; former CEO

Khedrnejad is connected to various companies owned by Minoo Industrial Group such as Qassem Iran and Persuisse Export Co. Minoo itself is owned by Azadegan Co., a conglomerate similar to the Ahrar Markazi Institute (see above) in its declared mission to empower war veterans and former POWs. He is also on the board of several travel agencies dedicated to religious tours and pilgrimage services.

• Saeed Ohadi – former board member 

In 2007, Ohadi was board chairman of Sanati Tolidi Moratab (see above) and served on its board of directors along with Yaser Hashemi. Ohadi is a long-time executive of companies belonging to both Azadegan Co. and Ahrar Markazi Institute.

2. Airsa Vision Parsian 

This company was established on July 14, 2013, to “conduct trade activities including procurement, production and distribution, import-export and offering after-sales services,” “customs services,” “project management,” “obtaining loans and lines of credit,” and “commission work.” In April 2016, Airsa Vision Parsian’s charter was amended and it became a “cleaning company” before it was dissolved in early November 2017. 

Maryam Salari was one of its founders and a vice chairman.

Other executives included: 

• Davoud Soleimani – CEO 

Soleimani was also the founding board of Raha Mehr Vatan Charity as inspector. Soleimani is linked to several other travel agencies specializing in pilgrimage and religious tourism. 

• Hamed Hashemi (relative) – board chairman

He is on the board of at least one other company connected to Yaser Hashemi and Maryam Salari’s network (see below). Hamed Hashemi and Sima Farshchi (also a board member) established an import-export company on Qashem Island called Maysa Sanaat Jonob Qashem.

• Mohammad Salari (see above) – dissolution manager

3. Ira Anahita Asanbar

Established in January 2017, this company “offers elevator repairs and maintenance” in addition to the “purchase, sales, distribution, production, packaging, import-export and after-sales services of any and all legal products,” “holding seminars,” “obtaining loans and lines of credit from domestic and international banks and credit institutions,” and “customs services.” 

 Maryam Salari is the company’s vice chairman. Other executives include: 

• Hamed Hashemi – board chairman
• Sima Farshchi – board member
• Mohammad Reza Navaei – alternate inspector

Navaei is connected to an oil swap company, Otana Energy, which is part of a larger network of oil swap firms.

4. Asra Parvaz Air Travel and Tourism Services (Eavar)

Asra Parvaz is a travel agency that, according to its website, was founded in 2003 to “plan and operate tours of European countries” and “initially operated cultural tours for students and university professors” before expanding its travel packages due to increasing demand. In February 2017, Asra Parvaz amended its charter to include “all electronic air travel services such as e-tickets.” 

Public records show that when Asra Parvaz’s owners registered “Eavar” as their official brand, 50 percent of the company was owned by Fara Sanaat Pasargad Iranian Engineers, which according to its website is the official representative for Philips Monitors. 

Maryam Salari has been a board member since January 2013 and has held positions such as board chairman and vice chairman. Other members of her and Yaser Hashemi’s network have also served on Asra Pravz’s board of directors, including:

•  Azad Yousef Zamani – board chairman

Yousef Zamani has been on the board of Asra Parvaz since 2007. He was previously on the board of Parvaz Sharq Pasargad, another company linked to Yaser Hashemi’s wife and her relatives. Azad Zamani is connected to several other travel companies, including Khadamati Shirin Safar Qarreh Sabz (Green Continent Sweet Travel Services), where he is the board chairman. Despite bearing the name of a travel agency, according to its articles of incorporation Khadamati Shirin Safar Qarreh Sabz is a “trade company” involved in “import-export,” “participates in public and private tenders,” and offers “management and business consulting services.” Public records show that Asra Parvaz is an equity partner in Khadamati Shirin Safar Qarreh Sabz.

• Ali Kavezadeh – CEO and board member

Kavezadeh has been on the board of Asra Parvaz since 2013 and previously held the position of vice chairman. Kavezadeh is the current vice chairman of Khadamati Shirin Safar Qarreh Sabz’s board of directors. 

5. Jahan Web Gostar Parsian

Established on September 7, 2010, Jahan Web Gostar Parsian provides “computer hardware and equipment services, including system assembly and upgrades, installs computer networks, offers after-sales services and imports-exports any and all computer parts and equipment.”

In April 2012, Jahan Web Gostar Parsian’s board consisted of: 

• Maryam Salari – board member and equity partner 

She remained an equity partner and board member until March 2016.

• Seyyed Amir Reza Hashemi Golpayegani – equity partner and vice chairman

Golpayegani is also an equity partner and board chairman of Paranedeh Sefid Kahkeshan (see above), along with Abtin and Mahmoud Yazdi. Amir Reza is the son of Mohammad Reza Hashemi Golpayegani, minister of science, research, and technology in Rafsanjani’s second administration.

• Mohsen Mozafari – board chairman 

Mozaffari is also on the board of Parvaz Sharq Pasargad and several other travel companies connected to Azad Yousef Zamani (see above).

• Farid Dalaei – founding board member, equity partner, and CEO

Several of Dalaei’s family members are affiliated with Jahan Web Gostar Parsian. Dalaei himself is connected to Parvaz Sharq Pasargad, another of the Salari-Hashemi businesses.

The Salaris (Yaser Hashemi’s in-laws)

Azra Marashi—sister of Efat Marashi, Rafsanjani’s wife—married Abdolkarim Salari and together they had four children: Mohammad, Mahmoud, Malakeh, and Mahin. Mahmoud Salari himself has had at least four children: Maryam (now Yaser Hashemi’s wife), Neda, Reza, and Mohammad.

• Mahmoud Salari is an alternate member of Raha Mehr Vatan Charity’s board of directors.

• Reza Salari (son) is vice chairman of Parvaz Sharq Pasargad (see above). He was also one of the founding members and chairman of Fashafouyeh Water Ski’s board of directors. While Fashafouyeh Water Ski is dedicated to water sports and recreation, the company’s article’s of incorporation enables it to “import-export any and all legal products including sports equipment” and “ope[n] sports clubs.” 

• Mohammad Salari (son) is a board member and one-time vice chairman of Parvaz Sharq Pasargad (see above). He is the dissolution manager for Airsa Vision Parsian (see above). He was an equity partner and vice chairman of Fashafouyeh Water Ski’s board of directors. 

• Mahmoud Salari [2] (cousin) is on the founding board of Ali Abad Sadat Cultural Charity along with other members of the extended Marashi family. 

Other individuals connected to the Salaris via their companies include:

Shahriyar Shahir Barzegar, the CEO of Fashafouyeh Water Ski’s at its founding. He leveraged this company to personally accompany the Islamic Republic’s ski teams in the 2014 Olympics as “manager,” according to his website. He also credits himself as being the father of “principled franchising” in the country as the founder of the Hoopoe salons for men. He is also the board chairman of the Shana Caspian of Anzali Free Trade Zone, an import-export company involved in “medical, hospital and laboratory equipment imports.”

Changiz Shakouri, one-time CEO and equity partner in Fashafouyeh Water Ski. He was recently appointed political deputy to the superintendent of Masal County, Gilan Province. He previously held executive positions in Talesh County and Astara County, the latter of which is on Iran’s crucial trade border with the Caucasus. His daughter Tanya is also an equity partner in Fashafouyeh Water Ski.

The post The Rafsanjani Children, Part 2: Yaser Hashemi appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

The late statesman Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was both a founder and a victim of the kleptocratic system at the heart of the Islamic Republic. A shrewd strategist who was at once a man of the people and a ruthless elitist, his presidency, from 1989 to 1997, gave rise to the clannish power networks and corrupt institutions that continue to paralyze Iran’s economy.

The lack of comprehensive public business records from the Rafsanjani era make tracing his family’s role in Iran’s economy difficult, but Rafsanjani was a dedicated diary keeper and one of the few IRI officials to publish annual memoirs until his suspicious death in 2017. 

These memoirs, augmented by our research into current business records and whistleblower interviews, offer a wealth of information about the Rafsanjani clan’s relationships with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other top decision makers, family scandals, and pivotal events that took place behind closed doors and were never shared with the nation. 

In this series, Tehran Bureau provides an in-depth look at the Rafsanjani family’s business interests. Part one examined the network of Mohsen Hashemi, Rafsanjani’s oldest son. Part two turned to the youngest of Rafsanjani’s three sons, Yaser Hashemi, along with his wife, Maryam Salari, and her family connections. Now, in part three, we focus on the late president’s two daughters, Faezeh and Fatemeh, and the Lahouti clan they both married into.

Faezeh Hashemi Bahramani

Faezeh, 58, is Rafsanjani’s youngest and most controversial daughter. She is married to Hamid Lahouti Eshkevari and has two children, Hassan and Mona. Hassan lived in the UK and was briefly arrested upon his return to Iran in 2012. Mona is married but not much is known about her husband or her life. Faezeh was rumored to have divorced her husband, though she denied this in an interview published by Jamaran News in 2014.

By her account, Faezeh loved to study but was unable to pass the university entrance exam in Iran for several years until she finally gained admittance to Islamic Azad University, which was co-founded by her father in 1982. She holds a doctorate in human rights law from the school. 

In 1989, early in her father’s first term as president, the Islamic Federation for Women’s Sports was founded and Faezeh, a sports fan, was appointed as its director. Faezeh held this position until 2009, when the sports federation was closed because of her political activities.

In 1996, former cabinet members and friends of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani founded the Executives of Construction Party (ECP),¹ and Faezeh became the head of its women’s branch. The same year she won a seat in the 5th Majles. Two years into her term, Faezeh decided to try her hand at journalism by publishing Zan, a newspaper for women;² one year later, it was banned for promoting feminism, among other offenses.

When she failed to win reelection, she decided to go abroad to further her education: “I first chose Canada but then changed my mind and went to the UK.” She obtained her master’s degree in human rights law from a university in Birmingham, UK, and lived there for two years “incognito.” She started a PhD program at the university but then transferred her credits to Islamic Azad University.

She now teaches law at the school’s Faculty of Law, which she implies was founded so she would have a teaching position. “We founded the faculty of law on Dr. Jassebi’s³ order, and I teach courses related to my field of study there.”

According to public records, Faezeh Hashemi served as an alternate board member of Daftar Nashr Maaref Enqelab from 2009 to at least 2013—records have not been updated for this institution since that year. 

Faezeh’s husband is connected to several companies, including: 

• Polyethylene Tak Sirjan⁴ – founded on April 14, 1991. Hamid Lahouti was on the board of this Kerman-based company as chairman and vice chairman until September 15, 2007, when he was replaced by Abdollah Azimi. Azimi is connected to various other industrial and import-export companies. The company produces plastic bags, polypropylene fibers, and multifilament yarn, according to the business directory website Kompass.
• Sirjan Industrial Foams – Hamid Lahouti was the board chairman of this company, which was established on July 27, 2004. The company makes  “all varieties of foam, polypropylene, polyethylene, polystyrene, polyurethane, and parts made from such foams,” in addition to “importing relevant machinery, raw materials, and additives.”
• Sabok Saz Bespar – Hamid Lahouti has been the board chairman of this company since it was established on September 8, 2001. The company produces industrial foam, particularly for use in the auto industry. Members of the Azimi family (see above) are also on the board of this company. 

Fatemeh Hashemi Bahramani

Fatemeh, 60, is married to dentist Saeed Lahouti Eshkevari—brother of Faezeh’s husband—and together they have two children, Ali and Sara. She has a degree in political science from Islamic Azad University.

Fatemeh was once stricken by a mysterious illness for which she went to Canada for treatment, according to her father’s memoirs. She also sought treatment in the UK.

She headed the Iranian Women’s Solidarity Association, a position that enabled her to travel around the globe. She used her father’s position as president to secure funds for her various projects and in obtaining things like a Xerox machine and heaters for her office.

Fatemeh founded the Moderation and Development Party in 2001 along with several individuals close to Rafsanjni such as Akbar Torkan, the defense minister in Rafsanjani’s first administration. Hassan Rouhani was the party’s candidate during his successful 2013 and 2016 campaigns for the presidency.

Fatemeh is involved with various health-related foundations and institutions, despite lacking relevant academic credentials: 

• Charity Foundation for Special Diseases (CFSD): She founded this bonyad on May 7, 1991, continues to head it, and is one of its trustees alongside Hossein Marashi (chairman of the board of the Quds Force–controlled Mola al-Movahedin Charity). The charity has at least ten treatment centers in various cities across Iran as well as at least two in Iraq. 
• Iran Specific Patients and Transplant Sports Federation: She heads this institution, which was founded on June 19, 2016.
• Soudeh Medical and Treatment Center: Fatemeh was formerly the chairman of this CFSD subsidiary’s board of directors. Hossein Marashi (MMC) is its current board chairman. Baqer Larijani, former Majles speaker Ali Larijani’s brother, has been a board member since at least 2015. 
• Institute for Research, Education, and Treatment of Cancer (aka Cancer Research, Training, and Prevention Institute): This institute was founded on July 11, 1998. It falls under the CFSD umbrella and is dedicated to cancer research and treatment as well as helping sufferers and their families to cope with a cancer diagnosis. According to its website, the institute is building a hospital that “will be completed within three years”— there is no indication of when that three-year span began or is supposed to end.

Fatemeh Hashemi has been the vice chairman of its board of directors since August 2015. Her uncle Mohammad Hashemi Bahramani, Rafsanjani’s youngest brother, has been its CEO and board chairman since at least 2008. Fatemeh’s cousin Ali Hashemi (Bahramani) is also a former board member. 

Fariba Lahouti Eshkevari, a relative of her husband, is also a trustee of this institute. Fariba’s business interests connect her to notable Islamic Republic officials and elites including Masoumeh Ebtekar and her two sons Eisa and Taha Hashemi, Seyyed Mostafa Mohaqeq Ahmadabadi (who is married to Ali Larijani’s sister).

Rafsanjani helped fund this endeavor because Fatemeh suggested it, according to his memoir.

Not much is known about Fatemeh’s husband, Saeed, who has kept a very low profile. But he works at Akhtar Hospital, which was once the American Army hospital and transferred to Bonyad Mostazafan after the Revolution.

Rafsanjani’s Daughters and the Lahouti Clan 

Saeed and Hamid Lahouti’s younger brother Vahid was a member of the Mojahedin e-Khalgh (MEK)—arrested in 1981, he died in custody under suspicious circumstances. Their father was cleric Hassan Lahouti Eshkevari, who was close to Khomeini and accompanied him back to Iran from France. He is seen standing behind Khomeini in the famous picture of the Ayatollah disembarking the plane that brought him to Tehran. Hassan Lahouti went on to become a commander of the Islamic Revolution committees and later briefly the first commander of the IRGC. He was also the MP for Rasht in the first Majles following the Islamic Revolution and the first Rasht Friday prayer leader.

In October 1981, Vahid Lahouti was arrested by the pro-Khomeini revolutionaries. Hassan was arrested two days later and died within hours in Evin Prison. In a now archived Shahrvand Emrouz interview⁵ with Faezeh and Fatemeh Hashemi and Hamid Lahouti, they all deny that Hassan had any involvement with the MEK and state that he died of strychnine poisoning based on the coroner’s official report and not of a heart attack as claimed by IRI media at the time. 

Fatemeh Hashemi says that when they learned of Vahid’s arrest her father called Evin Prison warden Asadollah Lajevardi⁶ to ask what the charge was. Lajevardi assured Rafsanjani that they just needed to ask a few questions and would release him. A few days later, the Lahoutis were informed that Vahid had broken his leg in prison. Rafsanjani once again called Lajevardi and was told that Vahid had thrown himself out of a window and injured himself trying to escape from prison officers. 

According to Fatemeh Hashemi, when she informed her father that Lajevardi’s men had gone to her father-in-law Hassan Lahouti’s house to arrest him, Rafsanjani called Lajevardi and told him that his men must leave Lahouti’s house right away. Despite promising to do so, they instead took Lahouti by force. “I called Ahmad Khomeini and told him that Mr. Lahouti had been arrested and taken to Evin Prison, [and to] tell Imam [Khomeini] about this and he did. Imam Khomeini asked them to call Mr. [Hassan] Mousavi Tabrizi [prosecutor general of the Revolutionary Court] to tell him Mr. Lahouti should not be taken to Evin Prison.” Unable to locate Mousavi Tabrizi, Fatemeh says Ahmad Khomeini sent a bike messenger to Evin, but by the time the messenger reached the prison they learned that her father-in-law had expired.

Fatemeh Hashemi and Hamid Lahouti both say they found out from the coroner’s report that Hassan Lahouti died of strychnine poisoning. While then president Rafsanjani looked into the issue “tirelessly,” Fatemeh says her father asked them to “keep silent on the matter for the sake of the Revolution.”

Fatemeh says that a few days after her father-in-law’s death they learned that Vahid had also died—when they contacted Behesht-e Zahra cemetery, they were informed that he had been buried ten days previously. “We were told that Vahid died after throwing himself out of his hospital bed.” Faezeh Hashemi says Vahid died of “blunt force trauma to the head.”

The post The Rafsanjani Children, Part 3: Faezeh and Fatemeh Hashemi appeared first on Tehran Bureau.

The late statesman Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was both a founder and a victim of the kleptocratic system at the heart of the Islamic Republic. A shrewd strategist who was at once a man of the people and a ruthless elitist, his presidency, from 1989 to 1997, gave rise to the clannish power networks and corrupt institutions that continue to paralyze Iran’s economy.

The late statesman Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was both a founder and a victim of the kleptocratic system at the heart of the Islamic Republic. A shrewd strategist who was at once a man of the people and a ruthless elitist, his presidency, from 1989 to 1997, gave rise to the clannish power networks and corrupt institutions that continue to paralyze Iran’s economy.

The lack of comprehensive public business records from the Rafsanjani era make tracing his family’s role in Iran’s economy difficult, but Rafsanjani was a dedicated diary keeper and one of the few IRI officials to publish annual memoirs until his suspicious death in 2017. 

These memoirs, augmented by our research into current business records and whistleblower interviews, offer a wealth of information about the Rafsanjani clan’s relationships with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other top decision makers, family scandals, and pivotal events that took place behind closed doors and were never shared with the nation. 

In this series, Tehran Bureau provides an in-depth look at the Rafsanjani family’s business interests. Part one examined the network of Mohsen Hashemi, Rafsanjani’s oldest son. Part two turned to the youngest of Rafsanjani’s three sons, Yaser Hashemi, along with his wife, Maryam Salari, and her family connections. Part three focused on the late president’s two daughters, Faezeh and Fatemeh, and the Lahouti clan they both married into. Now, in this fourth part we look at Rafsanjani’s middle son, Mehdi Hashemi.

Mehdi Hashemi

Mehdi, 51, is the second of Rafsanjani’s three sons and the fourth of his five children. He is married to his cousin Fereshteh Hashemi¹ with whom he has two sons, Foad and Yasin. Foad has been in the UK since 2013 studying at City, University of London, where he attained both his bachelor’s and master of science degrees. He recently obtained a PhD in renewable energy management and systems technology. No information is publicly available on Yasin.

Mehdi has a master’s-equivalent diploma from the Sharif University of Technology in energy systems engineering. He obtained this diploma via the educational partnership program between the university and the Iranian Fuel Conservation Company (IFCC).² At the time, Mehdi was the IFFC’s CEO and vice chairman and evidently gave himself an IFCC scholarship. He then used this diploma to obtain a PhD in energy engineering from Azad University—to which his family had multiple business connections. In 2010, he began pursuing an Oxford doctorate in constitutional law. (He is also reported to have a degree in telecommunications, but this has not been verified.)

Mehdi managed his father’s 2005 reelection campaign; the two-time president failed to secure a third term and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the presidency. One year later, Mehdi managed his father’s successful campaign for a seat in the Assembly of Experts. 

In 2009, following the contested presidential election, Rafsanjani appointed Mehdi as his representative in the joint election integrity committee.

Mehdi was also the chief of staff of Azad University’s board of trustees; after he left the country in 2010 the position was given to his brother Yaser. 

Aside from having served as vice chairman of the Daftar Nashr Maaref Enqelab publishing house, devoted to his father’s legacy (see our article on Mohsen Hashemi), Mehdi was involved at the top levels of two oil and gas firms: 

• Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company (IOEC) – from March 17, 1993, until 2000
• Iranian Fuel Conservation Company – from 2000 until 2006

Mehdi’s Many Scandals 

Mehdi Hashemi was rarely far from scandal for more than two decades. In 2003, Norwegian Statoil was investigated for paying him 15 million dollars in “consulting fees” via an offshore company ​​to win contracts to develop the offshore platforms in South Pars Phases 6, 7, and 8. Statoil executives told Norwegian investigators that the fees paid to Mr. Rafsanjani were based on a contract that he said had been used with other multinational oil companies, suggesting that Statoil was not alone. In 2007, Parisian prosecutors launched an investigation into oil giant Total over an alleged bribe of 95 million Swiss francs ($78.6 million) bribe paid to Mehdi to win a gas project in South Pars.  

In 2015, Tasnim released a 20-year-old confessional audio recording of Abbas Yazdanpanah Yazdi, a close friend and confidant of Mehdi’s, detailing various projects and deals that were made with international companies but only after a fee was paid to Mehdi. Yazdanpanah Yazdi had been arrested on charges of espionage in 1995, during which time his confessions were recorded. He was granted furlough that same year and left the country. Yazdanpanah Yazdi then took British citizenship and continued his work with Mehdi Hashemi, according to Mashreghnews. Yazdanpanah Yazdi had allegedly testified in an arbitration case filed by Crescent Petroleum against NIOC—another oil deal that Mehdi was said to have been involved with. Yazdanpanah Yazdi disappeared in Dubai in 2013 and is presumed dead. There has been widespread speculation that Mehdi Hashemi was behind his disappearance, and many, including Yazdanpanah’s wife, believe the Iranian government was involved in her husband’s disappearance and death. 

In another case, Iranian-born, European-educated businessman Houshang Bouzari brought a suit against the Islamic Republic and Mehdi Hashemi for “kidnapping, false imprisonment, assault, torture, and death threats” in 2000. In an interview with The Atlantic in 2012, Bouzari claimed that Mehdi had demanded a $50 million bribe from him or else his South Pars contract would be scrapped. Before Bouzari could make a decision, Mehdi informed him that he was creating a company called Iranian Offshore Engineering and Construction Company (IOEC) that would take over all South Pars oil projects. Public records from the early 1990s when IOEC was established are not available; however, in 2015 Rafsanjani met with IOEC executives and confirmed that it had been his son’s initiative that led to the company’s creation. Several entries from 1996 in Rafsanjani’s memoirs also indicate that Mehdi was the CEO of IOEC.

Bouzari traveled to Tehran to dissuade then president Rafsanjani and Mehdi, but his plan backfired and landed him in Evin Prison. According to Bouzari, his interrogators demanded $5 million to let him go. His wife paid $3 million of the ransom and he was released after a few months having promised to pay the remainder. Having fled to Canada with his family in 1998, Bouzari brought suit against the Islamic Republic in the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario. The  lawsuit was ultimately dismissed on May 1, 2002, with the court ruling that it lacked jurisdiction.

Mehdi was arrested in 2012 and sentenced to ten years in prison for embezzlement, accepting bribes, and national security crimes in June 2015.

Mehdi’s Cousins and In-Laws

Mehdi’s wife Fereshteh has at least three brothers, Ali, Naser and Mohammad, all referenced in Rafsanjani’s memoirs. Mohammad is a doctor who during Rafsanjani’s presidency went to Germany for a fellowship. He is married to Maryam Zaheri, who is related to the Fayazbaksh family. 

Naser, a pistachio farmer, is married to Mansoureh Mahdavi Shahroudi, the daughter of Mohammad Sharif Mahdavi Shahroudi. 

Mohammad Sharif Mahdavi Shahroudi was one of Rafsanjani’s close associates and a former Iranian envoy to South Africa who, according to Rafsanjani,  played matchmaker in Nelson Mandela’s marriage to Graça Machel (the widow of former president of Mozambique Samora Machel). 

Naser Hashemi and his wife’s family own a publishing house called Chav Gostar Packaging and Printing. Hassan Hashemi Bahramani (possibly another one of Fereshteh’s brothers) formerly served as its CEO, and Hassan Moadikhah was board chairman. Moadikhah is the son of Abdolmajid Moadikhah, a former Revolution Court Prosecutor,  MP and close Rafsanjani associate. 

Mansoureh Mahdavi was the vice chairman of this company, where positions were also held by her brothers Alireza (inspector) and Mehdi (alternate inspector). Alireza Mahdavi is a cultural advisor to the Tehran provincial governor, for whose office he previously served as public relations and international affairs director.

Mehdi Mahdavi is connected to several companies ranging from recycling firms to ones that create libraries and data centers for government organizations and others involved in import-export. 

Both Mahdavi brothers are connected to Rah Jooyan Imam Hadi Institute, which is linked to Mostafa Mirlohi, a relative of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s.

Another influential individual affiliated with this company is Alireza Mousavi Bojnourdi (related to the Khomeini family³). Alireza and his family members own the Talaei Pars Tobacco Co. as well as oil and gas companies such as Persis Sun (oil swap, import-export, domestic and international investment, offshore oil services and construction) and the newly established Petro Esteel Asia, which deals in imports of “oil, gas and petrochemical industry equipment, imports of iron ore and other metallic bars.” 

The family’s other holdings include the Persis Daad (fka Nik Rouz Daad) law firm, Ma’araf Rayzan Artistic and Cultural Institute (book publication and compilation, visual arts and graphics, theater set design, database creation, visual effects, and costume design—as well as providing journalists with fixers), and a Quran Bonyad.

The post The Rafsanjani Children, Part 4: Mehdi Hashemi appeared first on Tehran Bureau.