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The health of Iran’s banking system has come under scrutiny following recent revelations that over half of the country’s banks fall short of basic capital adequacy standards. While experts say depositors’ money remains reasonably well protected, repeated government bailouts are devaluating the rial at breakneck speed, casting serious doubts on the future value of Iranians’ savings.

To shield ordinary depositors from the impact of bank insolvencies, the government has consistently transferred bad debts to resilient state-backed entities and funded bailouts via the Central Bank. These interventions, however, exact a heavy toll. The financial fallout from insider lending is ultimately borne by citizens in the form of currency devaluation and surging inflation. Iranians are footing the bill for decades of systemic corruption that transformed the country’s banks into vehicles for moving state funds into the hands of politically connected business groups.

Only 13 of the country’s 27 banks currently meet the Central Bank’s minimum capital adequacy requirement of 8 percent, judiciary officials announced last month, while several institutions remained in formal rehabilitation (supervised recovery) or resolution (managed wind-down). The most extreme cases point to problems far beyond familiar levels of undercapitalization. Last October, the Central Bank identified five financial institutions as distressed—Bank Sarmayeh, Bank Dey, Bank Sepah, Iran Zamin Bank, and Mellat Credit Institution—and announced a reform plan for them.

Bank Sarmayeh reported accumulated losses of more than 75.6 trillion tomans against registered capital of just 400 billion, leaving its capital adequacy ratio at negative 257 percent, while Melal Credit Institution had accumulated losses of 65.5 trillion tomans by the end of 2025 after years of heavy related-party lending. The Bonyad Shahid–linked Bank Dey, the military-linked Bank Sepah, and Iran Zamin Bank are also under severe strain, heavily saddled with inherited liabilities, according to Central Bank data—though their opaque balance sheets often make it difficult to identify the sources.

To explain the underlying causes of this weakness, the director of a major bank in Tehran pointed to the notorious bailout of Ayandeh Bank. Dissolved in October 2025 in the wake of a major embezzlement scandal, Ayandeh had accounted for 42 percent of the banking system’s total imbalance, with accumulated losses exceeding 540 trillion tomans and an estimated 311 trillion toman overdraft from the Central Bank. The bank’s dissolution came after failed government efforts to restructure it and sell off its assets, sending a clear warning to other financially distressed banks that they could no longer assume they would be preserved as independent institutions.

Bank Ayandeh’s collapse had profound economic consequences. Its crippling debts were transferred to Bank Melli, the only bank to remain partially state-owned following the privatization of Iranian financial institutions in the early 2000s. “Bank Melli accepted these liabilities because it is backed by the government and the Central Bank,” the bank director told Resanegar, Tehran Bureau’s economic unit.

However, Bank Melli already faced liquidity problems due to its exposure to the liabilities of other ailing private banks. “Melli’s operating balance is negative,” the bank director said, “and without Central Bank support, it would not have been able to assume Ayandeh Bank’s obligations as well.” To compensate for the shortfall, the Central Bank had to print more money, fueling inflation. “Ultimately, the Central Bank compensates for banks’ losses by expanding the monetary base,” the bank director said. “In other words, the money is taken from the pockets of the entire population, because inflation and its costs are imposed on the public.”

Looting the commons

The Iranian economy has thus fallen victim to a practice called “tunneling,” a term coined during the post–Cold War era when former communist countries in Europe transitioned from state-managed to free-market economies. Controlling shareholders of formerly state-owned enterprises moved resources out of firms in ways that benefited themselves or other firms in the same business group, often at the expense of minority shareholders or the firm itself.

In Iran’s case, war, sanctions, and recent cyberattacks have contributed to instability, but new academic research as well as Tehran Bureau’s own past reporting show that the country’s banking crisis is rooted in poor lending practices dating back to the privatization era. While officially registered as private, Iran’s financial institutions remained in opaque ownership networks linked to parastatal conglomerates, or bonyads. 

In 2022, Tehran Bureau analyzed the ownership links of Iran’s top-performing 100 companies and found that 94 of them were controlled by financial groups owned by the bonyads, the government, or both. Eight of the country’s largest private banks, as well as the business groups that owned them, were high up on that list. Those relationships shape who receives credit—and on what scale.

Recent scholarship explores the effects of tunneling on the Iranian banking sector. Many of Iran’s private banks are controlled by the same business groups that own major companies, write the authors of a study of Iran’s bank privatization published this June in the Global Finance Journal. Instead of directing credit to the sturdiest or most promising businesses, the banks often favor companies tied most closely to their own controlling shareholders.

Beginning in the early 2000s, Iran opened its banking sector to private ownership, and the number of private banks grew from one in 2001 to 20 by 2012, according to the Global Finance Journal study. The shift dramatically expanded the supply of credit. Lending to the private sector rose from 18 percent of GDP in 1998 to 53 percent by 2012, in an economy where banks provided more than 85 percent of business financing. 

In theory, this flood of capital should have improved firms’ access to finance and supported investment and growth. Yet within a few years, the expansion of credit had left much of the banking system dangerously exposed. A 2016 parliamentary research report, “Pathology of the Iranian Banking System,” found that banks’ capital was no longer sufficient to cover their nonperforming loans, while repeated liquidity shortfalls were being concealed by continued borrowing from the Central Bank. Large parts of the banking system, including major players like Sepah and Mellat banks, were effectively experiencing simultaneous balance-sheet, liquidity, and regulatory distress.

Many of the banks and credit institutions now struggling to meet capital adequacy requirements trace their origins to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005–13), as do four of the five institutions currently in the Central Bank’s rehabilitation program. The Ahmadinejad administration pushed to privatize state-owned industries and banks, while private banks and credit institutions mushroomed across the country. Several of the latter collapsed within a few years, triggering protests by victimized depositors who became popularly known as malbakhtegan, or the “destitute.” 

Tunneling practices were routinely pursued at virtually all of the banks that have failed or became distressed. A common theme in the recent crises of Ayandeh, Iran Zamin, Dey, Sarmayeh, and Melal is connected lending, self-dealing, weak regulation, and politically protected insiders. Ayandeh’s predecessor, Tat Bank, was found to have used customer deposits to lend to subsidiaries, while Ayandeh itself later directed 80.8 percent of its major loans to its own subsidiaries. In the case of Melal Credit Institution, around 60 percent of its lending went to related parties, and its former CEO was later arrested for allegedly extending 36 trillion tomans to his wife, son, brother, and companies he owned. 

The selective legal handling of financial crime cases and the lack of transparency around their outcomes leads the same types of crimes to recur. In many cases, individuals holding positions at a bank use their influence to secure loans for their own businesses, family, friends, and other intermediaries. (In the Bank Sarmayeh scandal, the lender allegedly granted a loan worth several hundred billion tomans to a homeless man in Tehran, according to officials.) While defendants without influential connections are executed or serve long prison sentences, others convicted of financial crimes involving trillions of tomans have received pardons or been quickly released from prison. 

Banks without banking

Iranian depositors have only nominal protections against these practices. Since last year, Iran’s Deposit Guarantee Fund, the state-backed body responsible for protecting depositors when a bank or credit institution fails, has been required to guarantee up to 400 million tomans per depositor, per institution—about $1,500 USD at the current open-market exchange rate. However, an editorial board member of a major economic newspaper in Iran told Resanegar that the assets of the fund itself have never been publicly disclosed 

Although many Iranian lenders have collapsed, the Central Bank has made every effort to preserve depositors’ savings, the journalist said. For example, in the case of Noor Credit Institution, dissolved in 2024, “deposits and liabilities were transferred to Bank Melli, and depositors received their principal in full.” 

In the case of Caspian Credit Institution and Fereshtegan Cooperative, a chaotic bank failure in the mid-2010s that prompted protests when account holders lost access to their money, “the Central Bank announced that the principal amount of deposits would be recognized without deductions,” the journalist continued. “However, disputed interest payments and interest accrued after the date of the cooperative’s dissolution were excluded.”

The same happened when Samen al-Hojaj Credit Institution and other failing credit providers operating far beyond the remit of their licenses or entirely without authorization, were merged into banks in 2015–17, the journalist said. The principal amounts of deposits were preserved, but to finance these obligations, the Central Bank was forced to expand the monetary base, “meaning the public pays through inflation.” 

To avoid the lending risks associated with unchecked inflation, the institutions charged with allocating capital are themselves fleeing ordinary banking. The bank director explained that banks are “desperately trying to attract funds” because people are increasingly inclined to withdraw their money from the banking system rather than deposit it. “No matter how much interest banks offer, their returns still lag behind those available in other financial markets.”

This is creating the absurd situation in which Iranian banks are increasingly not banking at all, because ordinary lending cannot outrun the current rate of inflation. “Banks no longer issue loans, except in rare cases” such as government-backed marriage loans and loans to Iranian petrochemical companies, the bank director said. “Instead, they engage in trading and commercial activities.” 

The politically connected business groups behind Iran’s private banks have thus effectively shielded themselves from the financial crisis they helped unleash. “They invest in relatively safe sectors that offer attractive returns, such as real estate, bitcoin, and the automotive sector. The principal function of Iranian banks is no longer to provide banking services but to operate as commercial enterprises,” said the bank director. Banks are “not particularly concerned” about the country’s rampant inflation, he added—indeed, the banking system itself is among that inflation’s “main causes.”

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